A Phenomenon to Monitor:  Racial Discrimination at NASA, 1974-1985 by Calvino, Ruth Joy
Clemson University 
TigerPrints 
All Theses Theses 
May 2020 
"A Phenomenon to Monitor:" Racial Discrimination at NASA, 
1974-1985 
Ruth Joy Calvino 
Clemson University, calvinor@outlook.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses 
Recommended Citation 
Calvino, Ruth Joy, ""A Phenomenon to Monitor:" Racial Discrimination at NASA, 1974-1985" (2020). All 
Theses. 3281. 
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/3281 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in All Theses by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact 
kokeefe@clemson.edu. 
“A PHENOMENON TO MONITOR:”  
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AT NASA, 1974-1985 
A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
 In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts  
History  
by  
Ruth Joy Calvino 
May 2020  
Accepted by: Dr. Pamela Mack, Committee Chair 
Dr. Joshua Catalano 
Dr. Vernon Burton  
ii 
ABSTRACT 
As NASA propelled mankind beyond the limits of the earth, women and African 
American employees fought against discriminatory structures and systems within the 
agency. Since its inception, NASA administrators and NASA’s black employees had a 
tenuous relationship. Black employees did not trust their supervisors, NASA Equal 
Employment Opportunity staff, or the discrimination reporting processes. Utilizing the 
case files of the class action lawsuit MEAN v Fletcher, new oral interviews, NASA EEO 
and administrative archives, and US Congressional hearings, this thesis argues that 
NASA was structurally and systemically racially discriminatory. NASA’s problems 
were similar to those at other technological agencies, both within the US and globally, 
but NASA lagged behind other US governmental agencies in both the number and the 
percentage of minority employees.  
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Amidst global political and social unrest through the 1960s, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration beat the Soviets in the space race. This NASA—
the iconic, relevant, patriotic NASA—was white and male, with a conservative, 
traditional institutional culture. As NASA propelled mankind beyond the limits of the 
earth, women and African American employees fought against discriminatory structures 
and systems within the agency. 
The turn of the decade brought social and political upheaval inside NASA. The 
intensity of the crash Apollo program created a culture where NASA ignored everything 
but their technocratic goals. But by 1972 and the end of Apollo, the agency no longer had 
an excuse to continue to overlook issues such as racial discrimination. The federal 
government, as well as the American public, were less eager to fund NASA because of 
the mounting costs of the Vietnam War. Concurrently, global race and gender relations 
were being renegotiated through the impact of second-wave feminism, the civil rights 
movement represented by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and black power movements, and 
they required NASA to respond. NASA’s one-track focus on Cold War superiority 
through technological innovation was no longer enough to retain national attention, 
funding, or broad-based support.   
In 1972, President Nixon extended the Civil Rights’ Act to apply the same equal 
employment regulations to federal government agencies that the Act had imposed on the 
private sector. Though facing budget and personnel cuts, NASA was forced to find a way 
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to hire and meaningfully promote women and people of color. Many white NASA 
employees and supervisors saw diversity in employment efforts as a distraction from the 
agency’s real mission. But black Americans, particularly those employed by NASA 
disagreed:  
It seems to me that somewhere along the way, NASA lost sight of its status as an 
agency of the Government of the people, by the people and for the people. The 
race for the moon seems to have clouded the fact that we, too, are the people. We, 
Blacks, women…and other minorities have a share of the national pride at which 
the space race was aimed….Considering that the U.S. entered the space race 
behind and met its goal in fine fashion, it is, in my opinion, unconscionable that it 
cannot meet goals with respect to my segments of the population in a timely 
manner.1 
 
Discriminatory structures as well as supervisors who systematically engaged in 
prejudiced actions and attitudes, or inaction—neglect of EEO responsibilities—were 
problems NASA did not make serious efforts to solve, even after the pressure of Apollo 
had lifted.  
During the mid-20th century, the United States government created many 
technological agencies, and there are striking similarities between their cultures, 
organizational structures, and problems. Because these agencies were innovative and 
technologically progressive, they tended to resist social change, leading to deep problems 
between the agencies’ administrators and middle managers and their women and minority 
employees. Several historians have analyzed these problematic relationships, including 
issues such as underrepresentation in the workforce, discrimination in hiring and 
 
1 Statements of Andrea Diane Graham, US Congress, House of Representative, 
Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearing on NASA’s Equal Opportunity Program. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 
221.  
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promotions, and mistreatment on the job. The discrimination perpetrated by these federal 
agencies was not exceptional compared to corporate behavior or the culture at large, but 
the African American community displayed enthusiasm for working in the federal 
government, expecting these agencies to take the lead in promoting economic inclusion 
of black workers. 
NASA in particular lagged behind the rest of the federal government in numbers 
of minority employees and in implementing equal employment opportunity policy. In 
1973, only 5.19% of NASA’s workforce were minorities; over the previous seven years 
that number had increased only one percent.2 During this same period, 20% of federal 
agency employees were minorities. Additionally, while 70% of NASA’s employees were 
employed at the GS-10 level or above—positions that generally required at least one year 
of graduate study—only 29% of black employees reached a GS-10 or higher.3 Every 
group or agency that investigated NASA found something along the lines of, “Blacks 
were clustered in the lower levels of the agency and whites were clustered in the higher 
levels…with respect to the total complement of secretaries at that time, ‘the black 
secretaries were clustered [at] the GS-5, 6 [level] and the white secretaries were 7, 8, 9, 
 
2 Report to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration’s Equal Employment Opportunity Program Could be Improved,” 
16 Apr 1975, Box 45, Container 46, RG 21, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-12/31/1985, 
District Court of the United States US District Court for the District of Columbia, 
National Archives and Record Administration, Washington DC (This archive will be 
referred to as NARA I). 
3 For a table explaining grade scale (GS-levels) rates of pay, see Figure 1, p. 72. Harris, 
Hogan, and Lynn to Fletcher, 20 Sep 1973; Folder: NASA Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program, Box: George M. Low Papers, Box #33, NASA HQ.  
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regardless of who they worked for.’”4 But NASA consistently claimed, “the assertion of 
racial unbalance at lower levels…is purely speculative.”5 NASA Headquarters promoted 
minorities at a rate of approximately 15%; white employees were promoted at nearly 
double that rate—28.9%.6  
While some at NASA acknowledged race and diversity issues, their efforts had 
negligible effects because they did not change the behavior of supervisors and managers, 
much less average employees. At least into the 1980s, heads of offices were not even 
aware of their EEO and Affirmative Action responsibilities. By late 1984, NASA’s code 
block 600, which “includes professional management positions in research and 
development administration…for which a college degree or the equivalent, and 
specialized training and experience are required,” was comprised of only 16.8% minority 
employees, and that percentage was declining.7 While NASA bemoaned that as a 
technical agency there just were not enough qualified minority candidates in science and 
engineering fields, a 1975 Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation found 
that in fourteen job categories, excluding science and engineering jobs, NASA employed 
 
4 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 
1980, Box 42, RG 21, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-12/31/1985, NARA I. 
5 Defendant’s Reply Brief,19 Dec 1980, Box 42, NARA I.  
6 Installation Comparisons of Average Promotion Rates non-minority/minority FY 1972 
through Dec 31, 1974, Box 43, NARA I. 
7 Definition of NASA Code Black Groupings, Folder: No. 6 + 7, Box 43, NARA I; 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Further Extension, 3 Aug 1984, 1 Aug 1984, Box 
43, NARA I. 
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the lowest percentage of minorities in every category, when compared to other 
government agencies in the same geographic areas.8  
NASA administrators’ consistent refusal to define or discuss racial discrimination 
in a clear and meaningful way may have been the single biggest hurdle to changing 
structures which perpetuated discrimination. While women of any race faced 
considerable hardship working at NASA, NASA made efforts including training seminars 
and publishing pamphlets on the subject directed toward the average [male] employee, 
working to change actions and mindsets by explicitly addressing common ways people 
discriminated against women.9 Regardless of the relative success NASA’s efforts to 
integrate women, the agency did not make even these token efforts toward identifying 
and preventing discrimination against black employees.   
Racial discrimination in employment was a particularly difficult battle to fight 
because employment is supposed to be based on merit. Determining merit was 
complicated by cultural differences and the results of larger systemic discrimination, such 
as employees educated in unequal systems. Nancy MacLean’s Freedom is Not Enough: 
The Opening of the American Workplace argues that good jobs, and open access to jobs, 
are essential to becoming a full citizen. This is particularly important in the US because 
of the deeply rooted Protestant work ethic and the myth of the American Dream—that 
 
8 “National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Equal Employment Opportunity 
Program Could be Improved.”  
9 One such initiative was called “A Woman’s Place is Everywhere,” NASA Headquarters 
Federal Women’s Week, November 4-8, 1974; it was also part of “Women’s Week” in 
August 1975. Hearing before the Committee on Science and Technology US Congress, 
House of Representatives 94th Congress, Second Session on H.R. 11573, 1977 NASA 
Authorization, 27 Jan 1976, No. 66, Vol III, 258.  
 6 
one has the opportunity to achieve whatever they dream through hard work. Americans 
find a large part of their identity from their work, and therefore, job segregation leads to 
cultural exclusion.10 MacLean includes this striking quotation, “the best thing that has 
ever happened to black women in the South in my lifetime is a chance to be full-fledged 
citizens,’ she said, ‘and that comes from their work. You can't even pretend to be free 
without money.’”11 Within the context of civil rights historiography, Freedom is Not 
Enough spans a timeframe of over fifty years and counters a dramatic or climactic event-
based narrative.  
For too long, American's understanding of the movement has come from 
journalists, drawn as they are to dramatic showdowns...The focus on these 
climactic confrontations has drawn attention away from quieter struggles on other 
fronts—above all, from the fight to secure access to good jobs.12 
 
MacLean demonstrates her argument over the Long Civil Rights’ movement, 
discussing a wide range of individuals affected by job discrimination: white women, 
black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and the Jewish American 
population.13 She argues that colorblindness was a conservative tactic used to 
 
10 Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2006, 6.  
11 MacLean, 88.  
12 MacLean, 5.  
13 The Long Civil Rights’ movement has no definitive dates. Many scholars point to the 
roots of the civil rights movement in the 1910s or the interwar period and do not offer an 
ending date focusing rather on the ongoing nature of the struggle for social justice and 
racial equity within the United States. Scholars who prefer open-ended periodization over 
the more traditional “Montgomery to Memphis” periodization are often engage in a 
bottom-up methodology. See Charles W. Eagles, "Toward New Histories of the Civil 
Rights Era." The Journal of Southern History 66, no. 4 (2000): 815-848; Adam 
Fairclough, "Historians and the Civil Rights Movement." Journal of American 
Studies 24, no. 3 (1990): 387-398; Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights 
Movement and the Political Uses of the Past” The Journal of American History, Vol. 91, 
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disenfranchise people of color once outright segregation and discrimination were no 
longer culturally acceptable or able to be legally upheld. Backlash against affirmative 
action, MacLean argued, was a backdoor to continuing discrimination. Some assumed all 
women and minority employees were merely handed their positions because of their skin 
color or gender and did not afford these employees the opportunity to prove their ability. 
MacLean’s work is foundational to the field on how the civil rights movement 
desegregated employment and the lasting effects of discrimination in employment. 
MacLean approaches the subject broadly, but utilizes specific case studies to illustrate 
broader, national trends. This thesis builds on MacLean’s argument that because jobs are 
foundational to citizenship and identity, employment was not a tangential arm or 
afterword to the movement, but a pillar of meaningful integration.   
Cold War Contextualization and Comparative Literature  
A number of scholars have written on the problem of racial equality in 
employment at other government technological agencies; while not every scholar focused 
on race alone, many have discussed the issue and offer a window into the kinds of 
attitudes management and administrators held toward minorities. Some scholars also 
investigated the experiences and perspectives of minority employees. Most of these 
works of scholarship are community histories, social histories, or microhistories of one 
site. Existent work on NASA discusses many facets of NASA history, but scholars have 
 
No. 4 (Mar., 2005): 1233-1263; Kathryn L. Nasstrom, "Beginnings and Endings: Life 
Stories and the Periodization of the Civil Rights Movement." The Journal of American 
History 86, no. 2 (1999): 700-711.  
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paid very little attention to systemic racial issues at NASA and how people of color 
fought discrimination.  
Other scholars raise important issues of methodology for this study of NASA. 
While scholars’ approach to their histories differed broadly, almost all incorporated oral 
history sources to some extent because many of the racial issues at these agencies went 
undocumented—or hidden—in the archival record. Often race issues were simply not a 
priority to administration and therefore were dismissed. Additionally, governmental 
records rarely offered much insight into people of color’s perspectives. These issues are 
by no means exclusively American; a discussion of computer programmers in Great 
Britain’s Civil Service, uranium mining in selected countries throughout the continent of 
Africa, and the Soviet nuclear weapons industry all show strikingly similar parallels of 
discrimination against people of color, women, and other marginalized populations in 
government projects to advance technology.14  
The federal government created other technological agencies to fight other facets 
of the Cold War, perhaps most notably, the arms race. Massive industrial and scientific 
complexes built the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and these sites provide another example 
of how government technology agencies related to minority employees. 
Kate Brown, in her work Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the 
Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters argues that in order to understand either 
 
14 See, Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the 
American South, University of Georgia Press, 2013; Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: 
Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2012, and Marie 
Hicks, Programmed Inequality. (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2017.  
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the American or the Soviet nuclear programs, they have to be studied together. Plutopia 
tells the story of humans—workers—on two continents, citizens of two countries with 
supposed opposing worldviews and opposite forms of government. However, while not 
identical in practice, the two governments utilized similar methods to manage public 
opinion, keep workers satisfied, and accomplish necessary work. These methods included 
“skimping on safety and waste management to prioritize production, repressing 
information about accidents, forging safety records, deploying temporary ‘jumpers’ to do 
dirty work, and glossing over sick workers and radioactive territories, all while treating 
select citizens to generous government subsidies and soothing public relations 
programs.”15  
In Plutopia, Brown built on the work of Hevly and Findlay’s Atomic Frontier 
Days: Hanford and the American West and Michelle Gerber’s On the Home Front: The 
Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site, but her main contribution was comparing 
and contrasting Hanford, Washington and Ozersk, an atomic city in Russia.16 Brown 
coupled extensive oral interviews with documentary evidence, but her source material 
was not merely to gather information. Brown highlighted human stories above all else. 
Brown is very present in the narrative and her interviews with workers play a central role 
in how she constructed the narrative. She offered the reader vivid details about the 
 
15 Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and 
American Plutonium Disasters. (New York: Oxford University Press, USA), 2013, 9.  
16 John M. Findlay and Bruce W. Hevly. Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford and the 
American West. (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 2011; Michele Stenehjem 
Gerber On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press), 2007. 
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setting—food she didn’t eat, the state of the interviewee’s home, their health, etc. She 
expresses how interviewees viewed her, the relationship she had with them, and how her 
own views became better informed and nuanced through even her mistakes or regrets in 
the research process. Through all of these choices, she portrays everyone involved—
workers, government decision makers, company bureaucrats, and herself, as incredibly 
human. She wrestles with ethical issues of the field, such as how researchers should treat 
those who they write about, particularly when those individuals are living and helping a 
historian with her research.  What all is involved in the researcher’s responsibility to the 
people he or she studies, particularly when that population is oppressed and lacks access 
to resources? On a level fundamental to the study of history, Brown openly discusses the 
preconceptions she was forced to shed through her research: for example, noncredible 
narrators proved to be reliable. Her assumptions were proven completely inaccurate, in 
many cases, through interviews and corroborated accounts.17 The author’s intensely 
personal approach to the narrative coupled with her willingness to admit the messiness of 
determining reliability led her to simply state an attitude that perhaps many historians 
hold but few communicate so clearly: “I do not claim to have uncovered the truth. Rather, 
I hope to have illuminated a corner of it.”18 Brown’s methodology is a compelling 
example and this thesis will utilize a similar method, using oral history, court documents, 
and other sources to cross check and inform one another.  
 
17 “Several people told me fanciful stories that led me to doubt their credibility. When I 
checked their accounts, however, many turned out to be true. I learned to look out for 
apparently unreliable narrators as potentially rich sources…some of my interviewees met 
me with suspicion of distrust…for them I was the unreliable narrator…” Brown, 8-9.  
18 Ibid.  
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While Brown’s work focused on bomb production in the USSR and Washington 
state, Kari Frederickson’s Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the 
American South concerns how the creation of the Savannah River Site, a nuclear complex 
to refine plutonium and tritium for the H bomb, impacted rural South Carolina. 
Frederickson wove together social, political, economic, environmental, and identity 
history to present an inclusive narrative of the many ways that the Cold War industry 
impacted this one place.19 This work argued that Cold War industry modernized South 
Carolina, recreated regional identity, and formed an upper-middle class consumer 
society, like much of the US in the postwar period. Though Cold War Dixie focuses on 
the creation of the middle class, Frederickson discusses how the site impacted black 
South Carolinians and poor whites. Frederickson’s sources and methods are wide-
ranging—archival, oral history interviews she conducted, media, court records and many 
corporate and government documents. Her focus was not on individuals, but a 
community as a whole.  
For this thesis, the most relevant parts of Frederickson’s discussion concern the 
site’s impact on African Americans. She argues that the site entrenched segregation, 
whereas segregation had previously been piecemeal and informal. Not only did housing 
become formally segregated with the creation of specially segregated areas but 
employment in Ellenton also became more highly segregated, as the plant restricted 
hiring black employees for only menial jobs. While black employees made more at the 
 
19 Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American 
South. (Athens: University of Georgia Press), 2013, 4-5.  
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plant than in agricultural work, they were not eligible for many of the benefits that whites 
received; black employees had few advancement opportunities. Even pink-collar jobs 
were closed to African American women because of the “office wife” paradigm. Building 
on Margery Davies’ argument that these jobs were about sex in addition to the actual 
office work being accomplished, Frederickson explained, “jobs in the pink-collar office 
sector were reserved for young, white, single, and preferably attractive women...the 
private secretary was ‘as a rule, an office wife.’ The southern race/sex taboo made it 
almost impossible for black women to work in office positions.”20  
From the very beginning of the site’s creation, the National Urban League and 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People opposed systemic barriers 
to African Americans but had only limited successes. However, the government and Du 
Pont continued not hiring and appropriately promoting black workers. A class action case 
was shot down in court, in part because of the culture of South Carolina courts. It was 
settled out of court with no admission of wrongdoing, which was disappointing and 
unsatisfactory to the plaintiffs. The outcome of this case, as well as the “office wife” 
paradigm illustrate the entrenched discrimination and dead ends that black workers faced 
at government agencies during the Long Civil Rights movement. By the 1960s, NASA 
had allowed black women into clerical positions, but the idea of being an “office wife” 
still negatively affected them, whether it was being solicited for sexual relationships, a 
 
20 Frederickson, 100; also see Margery Davies, Woman’s Place is at the Typewriter: 
Office Work and Office Workers 1870-1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 
1982.  
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male supervisor summoning them with a bell, or a more general sense of being expected 
to be a submissive helper.21 
In 1981 Charles Jackson and Charles Johnson published City Behind a Fence: 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1942-1946, a community history of Oak Ridge, Tennessee and the 
atomic plant at that location. This work spans 1942-1946, from the birth of Oak Ridge to 
just into the postwar era—before much civil rights legislation, but after the federal 
government had formally desegregated employment. In Oak Ridge, as at the Savannah 
River Site, the administrators institutionalized local Tennessee norms—segregation. 
Racial progress, along with a variety of other social issues important to workers’ lives in 
Oak Ridge, were continually inadequately addressed, and problems were only slowly 
remediated, if at all. Johnson and Jackson take the approach that the companies and 
government put forth effort to address many of these issues—perhaps with the exception 
of living accommodations for black workers; “Good intent was always there, reflected 
especially in one line of prose which appeared so repeatedly in written responses from the 
company that the words became almost legend, among reservation residents. ‘An effort 
will be made.’”22 In their discussion of racial issues, the authors are extremely 
sympathetic to plant administration, “while there is no evidence to suggest these firms 
 
21 Gloria Taliaferro, Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 20 July 
& 20 October 2019 (hereafter cited as Taliaferro 20 July 2019 or Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019); 
US Congress, Senate, Hearing Before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences. Review of NASA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Program, 93d Cong., 2d 
sess., 24 January 1974; Box No. Y 4-546, Congress (Committees of Congress) Senate 
Appropriates Committee, 1906-, Publications of the Federal Government, RG 287, 
NARA I.  
22 Charles Jackson and Charles Johnson, City Behind a Fence: Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 
1942-1946, (University of Tennessee Press), 1986, 69.   
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deliberately refrained from hiring blacks for other than very low level jobs, it seems 
likely that, given the general attitudes toward blacks in this period, the possibility of 
employing them for skilled or professional positions was simply not considered.”23 
Jackson and Johnson portray the predominant racial attitudes of Oak Ridge leaders by 
this quotation from a survey, “ The responsibility of the Office of District Engineer and 
Roane-Anderson Company is not to promote social changes, whether desirable or 
undesirable, but to see that the community is efficiently run and that everybody has a 
chance to live decently in it.’”24  
Building on City Behind a Fence, Russell Olwell wrote At Work in Atomic City: A 
Labor and Social History of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, published in 2004. For this thesis, 
this book is significant because of approach: it focuses primarily on workers. Olwell, 
self-aware of the historiography in which he is in conversation, argues that his work was 
a social history, distinguishing his work from Jackson and Johnson’s community history. 
He utilizes some of their oral histories and paired these with many newly declassified 
government documents to create a more labor-focused social history.25 Olwell highlights 
both the inequalities faced and the immense contributions made by African American 
workers and women. Focusing more on the effects on the workers than the structures 
perpetrating discrimination, Olwell argues that while African Americans were segregated 
 
23 Jackson and Johnson, 112.  
24 At the same time, the authors elsewhere demonstrated that everyone, particularly black 
employees, were not able to “live decently” in Oak Ridge. Jackson and Johnson, 117-
118.  
25 Russell Olwell, At Work in the Atomic City: A Labor and Social History of Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee. (University of Tennessee Press, 2004), 7.  
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into the lowest-paying jobs and faced tough conditions, they were drawn to Oak Ridge. 
Drawing on oral history, the author found that “in spite of racial discrimination, work at 
Oak Ridge generally paid much better than work elsewhere in the South.”26  
Doug Brugge, Timothy Benally, and Esther Yazzie-Lewis collected amd 
translated a collection of oral histories, published as The Navajo People and Uranium 
Mining. While other works focused on the structures of discrimination, The Navajo 
People and Uranium Mining almost entirely focuses on the memories of Navajo people, 
whom the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) exploited to mine uranium. The work also 
included some articles that had originally appeared in public health and policy journals. 
The editors were activists, and the project went through multiple iterations before it 
became a book. The authors argued that, “After all these years of hardship, ending in a 
bare semblance of justice, there are important moral lessons to be learned. The oral 
historians and narrative chapters in this volume may help public-health officials and 
people in high places to gain some empathy for the poor and disadvantaged.”27 Neither 
the oral histories nor the narrative chapters portray a consensus of what the Navajo 
people would consider to be just retribution for this exploitation of people and land, but, 
“all of the contributors to this volume would agree that the experience of the Navajo 
people with uranium, was a tragedy and a violation of human rights.”28 
 
26 Olwell, 23.  
27 Doug Brugge, Timothy Benally, and Esther Yazzie-Lewis, eds. The Navajo People and 
Uranium Mining. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,) 2007, xii.  
28 Brugge et al, xviii.  
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The volume’s methodology is essentially the product: oral history. The editors 
articulate their three-fold reasons for engaging in this methodology. First, the editors wish 
to use oral history to oppose “the standpoint of authority…the powers that be,” and to 
allow “the underclasses, the underprivileged, and the defeated [to be witnesses].”29 
Second, they chose oral history to complicate the narrative and show the importance and 
even the “awkwardness” of individual stories.30 They attempt to frustrate what traditional 
historians have sought to accomplish in constructing “grand patterns of written history.”31 
Third, they honor the Navajo tradition of oral history. While historians and the editors 
often value oral history for its rawness and its delivery to the reader in an unfiltered 
manner, most of these oral history interviews were conducted in Navajo and were 
translated, therefore adding a layer of interpretation. Second, the editors exercised 
authority over the interviews by editing and paring down the interviews for publication. 
This study is relevant to the broader discussion of how the US government, through its 
technological agencies, viewed and treated minority employees, and the structures of 
power that propagated systemic racism. This project demonstrates the importance of 
amplifying affected individuals’ experiences and voices, particularly when they have 
been silenced, and their voices do not often show up in the official, governmental, or 
archival record, except in distorted glimpses.  
 
29 Brugge et al, 178.  
30 “We do not try to present the experience wrapped up in a tidy package with a single 
internally consistent conclusion…We hope the range of perspectives and voices gives 
readers a deeper appreciation for the complexity of the issue and helps them understand 
that they do not know everything, even after finishing the book.” Brugge et al, xviii-xix.  
31 Brugge et al, 178.  
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This thesis will deal with the theme of justice, how people experience and 
perceive injustice, and how impacted individuals respond to attempts to advance justice. 
The sources contained in The Navajo People and Uranium Mining center around the 
injustices and harm to Navajo workers and land. In numerous different ways, the miners 
had similar experiences—they were exposed to uranium to an unsafe degree without their 
informed consent. The US government’s attempts at remuneration came too late, at too 
high a cost, and were insufficient to even cover the expenses incurred. Beyond the 
massive medical, psychological, and familial consequences of unsafe exposure to 
uranium, the land was deeply and perhaps irreversibly affected. Some of the interviewees 
discussed this issue,  
Rita Capitan: ‘we filed a lawsuit to prove to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
that this was not safe.’  
Mitchell Capitan: ‘we told them, “would you let this happen in your back yard? 
Think about it. This is the same thing. We’re just protecting our land.”’… 
Dr. John Fogarty: ‘would this happen in Santa Fe, would this happen in 
Manhattan, would this happen in San Francisco? No. I think this is a case of 
environmental racism.”32  
 
Through the use of oral history, The Navajo People and Uranium Mining demonstrates 
the environmental and personal cost of AEC’s wartime mentality which disregarded 
environmental concerns, indigenous tradition, and human rights.  
Literature on NASA  
Much of the historical literature on NASA has been focused on its scientific 
endeavors; some studies concern NASA as a bureaucracy, and even fewer scholars have 
 
32 “Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining: interview with Rita and Mitchell 
Capitan” in Brugge et al., 171-172.  
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investigated social aspects such as the race, gender, and labor history of the agency. Amy 
Foster’s Integrating Women into the Astronaut Corps focuses on “women’s labor history 
and the history of gender and technology.”33 While her work mentions NASA initiatives 
to recruit women and ethnic minorities because NASA’s efforts usually grouped them 
together and because it feels dishonest to discuss one without at least mentioning the 
other, her work gives only a cursory nod to ethnic and racial issues at NASA. However, 
her work has importance to the growing field of civil rights in the workplace. Foster 
analyzes a form of integration at NASA; this analysis has ramifications for the study of 
how NASA attitudes, procedures, and culture changed to incorporate people different 
from the traditional astronaut or engineer archetype. She discusses the ways in which her 
work built on previous work, but she presses into the historiographical gap of analysis of 
the managerial and physical structures that perpetuated discrimination against women.34 
Her work furthers a “third phase” of women’s history: “trying to understand why we still 
struggle to see men and women as equal.”35 Her work fits into broader discussion of 
women’s place in the workplace and in society, but focuses on white collar work, not the 
more prevalent history of working class women.36 Philosophically, Foster argues that 
history is a remedy to the halt of social progress in regard to women.37 Situated in this 
third phase of women’s history, Integrating Women into the Astronaut Corps, was written 
 
33 Amy Foster, Integrating Women into the Astronaut Corps: Politics and Logistics at 
NASA, 1972–2004. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 2011, 3.  
34 “This book intends to address the technological and logistical history as yet unexplored 
and fill those analytical holes.” Foster, 4.  
35 Foster, 158.   
36 Foster, 5.  
37 Foster, 159. 
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to be didactic and remedial to a contemporary need for further integration of women in 
the workplace. 
Foster defends NASA’s intentions of incorporating women into the agency. While 
she acknowledges that NASA was not well prepared to integrate women into the corps, 
Foster argues that NASA did indeed desire this end.38  
As it turned out, NASA did not discriminate against women in the astronaut corps 
outright. What the historical record ultimately illustrates is that Cold War politics 
and the 1961 presidential directive to go to the Moon undermined the agency's 
freedom to develop the space program and human spaceflight…. Granted, 
snapshots of the astronaut corps and Mission Control in the 1960s and early 1970s 
still appeared white and male. But those pictures reflected the face of college 
graduates in the sciences and engineering at the time, not discrimination on 
NASA's part.39 
 
Foster does not go as far as other Cold War scholars, but she argues that it was not 
primarily NASA administration or policy that discriminated against women, but rather 
that outside cultural pressures and other systemic barriers to women created a difficult 
environment for NASA to integrate women. This thesis contrasts NASA’s active role in 
integrating women into the workforce with the longevity of NASA’s record of rebuffing 
attempts to mitigate discrimination against black employees.  
NASA published Andrew Dunar and Stephen Waring’s The Power to Explore: A 
History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960-1990 in 1999. The work covers a wide 
variety of topics and aspects of the Center’s history. Arranged topically, Dunar and 
Waring cover both the technical contributions of the Center and the sociocultural history 
 
38 Foster, 2, 46-47, 51-55, 62, 66, 68, 71, 100, 105, 153-154.  
39 Foster, 154.  
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of the Center, calling the Center’s history a “microcosm of [NASA].”40 They study how 
the Center’s geographical location in Huntsville, Alabama impacted the Center’s cultural 
development, and how the Center changed Huntsville.41 Dunar and Waring address the 
Center’s problematic racial issues—both discrimination against nonwhite workers and 
the issue of the Nazi past of the German scientists—in a manner that balances 
representing the complexity without apologizing for those whose attitudes were 
problematic. This is the first official NASA history to include social history in its 
commission. The authors argue that “a broad approach to the Center's history is necessary 
because Marshall has always been complex, even enigmatic.”42 
In their discussion of how politics influenced race relations in Huntsville, the 
authors argue that “Huntsville politicians and businessmen wanted to avoid controversy. 
Madison County's prosperity depended on the Federal Government, and few wanted to 
jeopardize that support. The Gospel of Wealth had more disciples in Huntsville than did 
the Gospel of White Supremacy.”43 However, the authors do not entirely dismiss the 
culture of racism at Marshall and adversity that many people of color faced regarding 
employment at the Center, showing administrators’ and employees’ attitudes from both 
NASA records and oral history with black employees, “Employment opportunities were 
limited; African Americans comprised 18 percent of Huntsville's population, but less than 
 
40Andrew Dunar and Stephen Waring, Power to Explore: A History of the Marshall 
Space Flight Center, 1960-1990, (Washington, DC: NASA Headquarters History Office), 
1999, ix. 
41 Dunar and Waring, ix.  
42 Dunar and Waring, vii.  
43 Dunar and Waring, 116.  
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1 percent of Marshall's workforce…accommodations on the Arsenal and at Marshall 
were no longer segregated, but blacks still encountered barriers. ‘Most definitely there 
was discrimination…upward mobility just wasn't there.’”44 NASA officials’ argued that 
“the disappointing record of black recruitment at Marshall and its contractors stemmed 
from barriers that limited black access to scientific and technological education. 
Huntsville was a microcosm of a larger regional problem.”45 The authors’ attempt to 
highlight the multifaceted racial problems at Marshall by discussing the issues of 
segregated schools and other barriers recruiters faced finding and successfully recruiting 
qualified people of color, and pay less attention to what NASA could have done to lower 
these barriers. 
 However, NASA’s racism extended beyond the American South. In a paper 
presented in 2017 at the NASA and the Long Civil Rights Movement Symposium, Keith 
Snedegar examines how African liberation and civil rights in the US impacted 
employment struggles at NASA’s satellite tracking station in Hartebeesthoek, South 
Africa.46  He argues that “social conservatism of NASA administrators [was] born 
perhaps out of a technocratic focus on the objectives before them.”47 Though 
discrimination in employment was illegal in the US—and all US funded operations 
around the world—NASA administrators proved themselves to be “insensitive to global 
 
44 Dunar and Waring, 117-118.  
45 Dunar and Waring, 120.  
46 Keith Snedegar, “The Congressional Black Caucus and the Closure of NASA’s 
Satellite Tracking Station at Hartebeesthoek, South Africa” in NASA and the Long Civil 
Rights Movement, eds. Brian Odom and Stephen Waring, (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida), 2019. 
47 Snedegar, 2.  
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issues of racial equality.”48 A major method that NASA used to manage this precarious 
political issue was to downplay the US’s role at the tracking station and to try to keep it 
out of the public’s view. However American activists, including two congressmen, 
Charles C. Diggs, Jr. and Charles Rangel, were already aware of the situation. Snedegar 
agrees with scholars like Mary Dudziak that much of NASA’s positive racial policies—
and the US government as a whole—resulted from external political and economic 
pressure from activists, not from within the agency.49 This argument contrasts Foster’s 
argument that NASA wanted to integrate, but primarily faced barriers from outside. 
While it does not mean only help or only discouragement came from outside—both came 
from a variety of sources at all points—but, Snedegar’s argument is that NASA did not 
promote change, while Foster argues that NASA was—and had been planning to at some 
point—push forward change. 
The two historical scholars who have given the most sustained attention to race 
issues at NASA are Kim McQuaid and Eric Fenrich. Both argue that NASA was 
systemically and structurally racially discriminatory. Kim McQuaid, in his article on 
Glenn [formerly Lewis] Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio argues, "NASA was a 
technologically innovative organization which was socially detached…when problems 
didn't have technical solutions, it [NASA administrators] apparently simply didn't know 
what to do."50 In another article on NASA in the Nixon Era, he argues, “Basically, an 
 
48 Snedegar, 1.   
49 See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2011. 
50 Kim McQuaid, “The Space Age at the Grass Roots: NASA in Cleveland, 1958-1990” 
American Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2006), 113, 125. 
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elite agency began coming to social understandings late; when it did, it proceeded to 
address them in a half-hearted and ambivalent fashion, not feeling it had much to learn, it 
denied that problems—or solutions—existed.”51 Eric Fenrich’s dissertation The Color of 
NASA: Racial Inclusion in the American Space Program, 1957-1978,  is a broad history 
of race relations at NASA. He argues that, “NASA’s 15-year string of promises met 
internal resistance…[and] the agency’s actions failed to match the leadership’s 
rhetoric.”52 McQuaid and Snedegar both investigated case studies in order to demonstrate 
a broader trend across NASA.  
Perhaps the most written about racial issue at NASA was the high-profile firing of 
Ruth Bates Harris. Articles about this case have been published in sociological, historical, 
and public management journals, and contemporary press paid attention to the case—
over 200 newspapers articles were published on the topic. Because she worked in the 
Equal Employment Opportunity office, the case offers a window into racial issues at 
NASA. However, she was the highest-ranking black woman at the agency. While 
Harris’s case evidenced, “that those who strive toward the broader goals of NASA are, at 
best, chided and told to focus on the narrower view and, at worst, terminated,” and 
demonstrated NASA’s disrespect for black employees and resistance to EEO reform, this 
 
51 Kim McQuaid, “'Racism, Sexism, and Space Ventures': Civil Rights at Nasa in the 
Nixon Era and Beyond" in Societal Impact of Spaceflight eds. Steven J Dick and Roger D 
Launius, (Washington DC: NASA History Division), 2007, 423. 
52 Eric Fenrich. “The Color of NASA: Racial Inclusion in the American Space Program, 
1957-1978” PhD diss., University of California Santa Barbara, 2015. ProQuest 
(3733584), 216.  
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case does not address systemic or grassroots problems affecting the bulk of black NASA 
employees, mostly in low-ranking, low-paying jobs.53 
Fenrich argues that Ruth Bates Harris’s case (fired in 1973 because of an 
accurate, but disagreeable EEO report) set off a chain reaction at NASA, but he only talks 
briefly about what those events were. This thesis will argue that Minority Employees at 
NASA (MEAN) v. Fletcher (Civil Action 74-1832), embodied the momentous chain of 
events that Harris’s firing spawned.54  Harris’s firing, in part, sparked organization for 
what became MEAN, but without Harris’s strong EEO leadership—and support for those 
employees—NASA failed to meaningfully implement even the case settlement’s modest 
stipulations. 
Primary Sources and Justification for this Study  
A group of black employees of NASA began to meet in homes, primarily in 
response to NASA administrator James Fletcher’s firing of Ruth Bates Harris in October 
1973.55 Calling themselves Minority Employees at NASA (MEAN), this activist group 
organized solely to formulate a united—and anonymous—front to fight against NASA’s 
discriminatory systems.56 The group’s first action in March 1974 was to file a formal 
complaint with Administrator James Fletcher in the form of a letter.57 By December 
 
53 Statements of Andrea Diane Graham, March 13-14, 1974, 221.  
54 Because the case was litigated from 1974-1983 the name of the defendant (the NASA 
administrator) changed; therefore, the case will be referred to and cited by its name at the 
time. It is all the same case, Civil Action 74-1832.  
55 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. Other specific events that precipitated outrage will be 
addressed later in the thesis. 
56 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019 
57 MEAN to Dr. James Fletcher, 14 March 1974, Folder: MEAN Group Meeting, 
Box: George M. Low Papers, Box #33 NASA HQ. 
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1974, NASA had not responded satisfactorily, and the group filed a class action lawsuit 
against NASA on behalf of all minority and woman employees of NASA, naming three 
individual plaintiffs, Gloria Taliaferro, Diane Moore, and Rosemary Ferguson, in 
addition to MEAN as an organization. Initially, the complaint extended NASA-wide but 
was eventually limited to all black employees at NASA Headquarters.58 The MEAN case 
was broadly representative and truly grassroots. Additionally, this group comprised 
primarily secretarial and administrative assistant employees who themselves wrote the 
complaint and organized support for it. Several of the individuals had worked at other 
centers, or had close contact with other black employees, particularly at Goddard 
Spaceflight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland and Kennedy Space Center in Florida. All 
were in relatively low-ranking jobs—predominately around GS-3 – GS-7s.59 Instead of 
solely focusing on the achievements of the few, high-ranking blacks in the organization, 
this case focused on the vast majority of the rank-and-file black employees and 
demonstrates the complexity of views that they held. Not all black employees agreed on 
the means or end they were pursuing. For example, many black employees at 
Headquarters saw Dudley McConnell and Harriet Jenkins, two black, senior EEO 
 
58 “One thing that Richey [the judge] did…that pissed us off—he restricted us to 
Headquarters.” Gloria Taliaferro, conversation with the author, 5 May 2019.  
59 See Figure 1, p. 72. Federal employees pay is determined by the US Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM); positions receive “grades,” and promotions can be in-
grade “step” promotions, or entire grade promotions. Jobs increase in grade with 
increased requirements for experience, education, and/or skills. Most black women in 
secretarial positions at NASA at this point were between a GS 3 and GS 7. “Rates of Pay 
Under the General Schedule Effective the first pay period beginning on or after October 
1, 1974,” Office of Personnel Management, 1974, https://archive.opm.gov/oca/pre1994/ 
1974_GS.pdf, accessed 4 Mar 2020. 
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employees, as puppets of the NASA establishment and unwilling to push for the changes 
other black employees needed.60 
The foundational documents for this thesis are those contained in the case files of 
Minority Employees at NASA (MEAN) v Fletcher. These documents include 
transcriptions of court hearings before an appointed magistrate and a judge in the circuit 
court, depositions, a host of documentary evidence argued in the case, opinions of the 
court, and the out-of-court settlement reached in 1978 and extended to 1985. These 
sources form the core for the narrative; witnesses and lawyers argued the facts of the 
case.  
A second important body of sources are those contained in the NASA 
Headquarters History Office archives from the EEO office and the papers of George 
Low, NASA’s deputy director during this period. These sources include internal memos, 
meeting minutes, and responses to MEAN during the time that the complaint went 
through NASA’s administrative process. Despite immense opposition, some black 
employees at NASA refused to be silenced. One of my goals with constructing this 
narrative is to amplify those voices and let the actors’ words stand as written or spoken. 
 
60 “[McConnell] was a scientist. He didn’t know crap from cranola… That [McConnell 
being head of EEO] was a joke…Harriet Jenkins was the Agency person. She couldn’t 
find discrimination—rest her soul—the whole time she was in NASA. At any of the 
centers. Nowhere.” Taliaferro 20 July 2019; “is the EO office the only place where a 
black can move up in NASA?...how can an unqualified individual of junior civil service 
grade be promoted over a qualified person unless the sex or age of the incumbent were a 
factor?...How can we expect management to be firmly pushed on EEO by someone who 
seemingly owes everything to that management?...that’s the end of the EO program….he 
doesn’t consider himself black. He is insensitive to the concerns of women. How can he 
direct EO for women?” EEO Report, 21 September 1973, Folder: NASA Equal 
Employment Opportunity Program, Box: George M. Low Papers, Box #33 NASA HQ.  
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Therefore, I include some lengthy quotations. Some sources, such as the fourteen-page 
letter MEAN wrote to Administrator Fletcher, offer critical insight into MEAN’s 
argument and perspectives on NASA culture. This letter offers a particularly raw glimpse 
into what these employees wanted to communicate to NASA administrators. Anonymity 
and a united front gave them the opportunity to voice the concerns they felt that had been 
previously ignored or those that were too risky to voice as an individual.61 While 
individuals’ words are removed from time and place, I sought to diligently and ethically 
contextualize them to aid in understanding and amplifying the experiences these 
individuals related. 
Third, particularly after Administrator Fletcher fired Ruth Bates Harris, 
Congressional committees took a close look at NASA EEO procedures, implementation, 
and complaints. The Senate Committee on Appropriations and Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences were both aware of the MEAN complaint and 
questioned NASA administrators about the allegations in 1974.62 These Congressional 
hearings were one of the most important factors that motivated NASA toward ending 
discriminatory practices. Plaintiffs of the case point to Congress’s level of involvement in 
NASA EEO affairs as an essential barometer for progress in equal opportunities for 
minorities at NASA.63 In 1975, GAO furnished a report entitled “National Aeronautics 
 
61 Other sources, such as interviews, are not publicly available or easily accessible and 
therefore their inclusion in the work aid in establishing them in the record for future 
scholarship.  
62 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 January 
1974; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Review of 
NASA's Equal Employment Opportunity Program, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 24 January 1974.  
63 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019 
 28 
and Space Administration’s Equal Employment Opportunity Program Could be 
Improved” to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. This report 
investigated Headquarters and all ten field offices and found that NASA had failed to 
appropriately educate employees on discrimination complaint procedures, provide EEO 
training for supervisors and managers, and failed to account for—or accomplish—their 
yearly EEO goals.64 Additionally “about 24 percent of the NASA employees interviews 
said they would not file a complaint even if they were victims of discrimination. About 
58 percent of…counselors believed employees did not have confidence in the complaint 
system. Some employees feared reprisal or intimidation and other employees did not 
believe the system would produce a just resolution.”65 This investigation confirmed, 
overall, the class action nature of MEAN’s allegations. The GAO’s recommendations for 
remediation were similar to those reached through the Settlement, but NASA had resisted 
the GAO report, attempting to explain away the investigation’s findings.66 
The final major source for this work is two oral history interviews conducted with 
Gloria Taliaferro. Taliaferro was one of three named plaintiffs in MEAN v Fletcher, and 
one of the foremost catalysts behind the case. She worked at NASA for nearly forty 
years, fought multiple discrimination complaints against supervisors throughout her 
employment at NASA, and the court called her, “an outspoken civil rights activist at 
NASA.”67 These oral interviews were fundamental in filling in the gaps in the 
 
64 “National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Equal Employment Opportunity 
Program Could be Improved.”  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 MEAN v Beggs, (decided D.D.C 20 December 1983). 
 29 
documentary evidence, helping to inform the reading of documents, and in understanding 
the perspective of an employee and plaintiff. The emotional and mental toll of the case 
was immense; the case only showed what happened up to one point in time, but 
Taliaferro’s interviews illuminate what happened to the people involved while the case 
was being litigated, once the Settlement took effect, and once the Settlement had expired. 
Taliaferro made it clear that she felt she was a causality of the cause: she was blackballed 
because of her activism and involvement with the case.  
Phone interviews with other parties involved helped to further contextualize both 
the MEAN case and NASA’s internal culture. Civil rights lawyers Rod Boggs and Rachel 
Trinder helped to illuminate some of the legal strategy and give a broader window into 
the climate of employment discrimination in Washington DC and the federal government 
at this time. Trinder also spoke to the stress Taliaferro bore to litigate the MEAN case, 
her character, personality, and sacrifice. Alex Roland, a former employee in the NASA 
History Office provided helpful perspective on the atmosphere and dynamics of that 
office, which was the object of much debate in the litigation of MEAN’s case.  
NASA, too focused on technocratic goals, continually ignored and dismissed their 
problem of systematic and structural discrimination. Black employees of NASA suffered 
not only because of the blindness of NASA administrators, but also because for years, the 
court system fell into the same culture of down-playing or ignoring discrimination in 
employment, at least within the federal government. While NASA argued that social 
objectives were not within their scope of priorities, the courts could not. However, the 
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case demonstrated that even when the courts shifted toward allowing Title VII complaints 























Origin of the MEAN Complaint  
NASA administrators’ efforts devoted to Equal Opportunity did not follow a straight, 
upward trajectory but rather ebbed and flowed based on Congressional pressure, Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) personnel, NASA goals, and budget constraints. 
Employees, black and white, have suggested that through the Apollo era (1958-1972), 
black and woman employees, while very few in number, faced somewhat less hostility 
from white, male coworkers, because the agency’s culture was one of intense focus on 
Space Race objectives: “During Apollo and all that time, we all worked together…We all 
felt a part of it. A part of something…That era then was very nice. We all worked 
hard.”68 Working together as a team, no matter the cost, some were able to more easily 
see past gender or racial differences. However, once the pressure of the Space Race 
lifted, NASA’s culture reverted to a more traditional, hierarchical culture that tended 
toward racism and sexism.  
Equal opportunity advocates often used these accomplishments as a rallying 
point. In 1972, a NASA publication quoted Irving Kator, a Civil Service Commission 
representative, saying, “from my vantage point as a layman…the greatest moving force in 
your [NASA’s] achievement was the commitment to get the job done…we need the same 
kind of commitment in EEO. We need the same kind of commitment to meet the goal of 
 
68 It should not be assumed that women or people of color had an “easy” time during this 
era—they were segregated in low-paying jobs and excluded in many ways. Gloria 
Taliaferro, interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview, Oxon Hill, MD, 20 July 2019 
(hereafter cited as Taliaferro 20 July 2019).  
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social reform and equal opportunity for all persons.”69 In an EEO report, the authors 
juxtaposed NASA’s fantastic technical record with its dismal EEO record,  
NASA has demonstrated to the world that it has limitless imagination, vision, 
capability, courage and faith, limitless persistence and infinite space potential. It 
made the United States a winner in space and improved the quality of life for all 
people…However, in spite of sincere efforts on the part of some NASA 
management and employees, human rights in NASA have not even gotten off the 
ground…the striking anomaly of the undisputed success of NASA genius and its 
total insensitivity to human rights and human beings could destroy the aspirations 
and morale of a superior intellect….this objective examination of the program 
supported by thorough analysis and first-hand experience is provided solely for 
the purpose of giving NASA an Equal Opportunity Program compatible with her 
genius in space exploration.70 
 
NASA did not, in practice, heed these calls to make Equal Opportunity a priority.   
Many examples of NASA’s racial issues fall into three categories of 
discrimination: bias in the hiring process; unfair practices in promotions, job 
categorization, and compensation; and the third, ignorant or overtly displayed negative 
racial attitudes toward minority coworkers or subordinates during their common 
interactions. An example of unfair hiring was when those selecting candidates screened 
 
69 "EEO Program Promised Full Support of NASA," NASA Activities Vol 3, Issue 2 
(Washington DC: NASA, 15 February 1972), 74. https://books.google.com/booksid=Os 
nfm_EZif8C&lpg=PA74&ots=xlcy1ltvvR&dq=Irving%20Kator%20nasa&pg=PA74#v=
onepage&q&f=false  
70 EEO Report, 21 September 1973, Folder: NASA Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program, Box: George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal 
Employment Opportunity files #2, #13883, Box #33 NASA HQ, HRC, Washington DC 
(archive hereafter referred to as NASA HQ); in Harris’s words in her autobiography, “We 
are employed by a Federal agency that is responsible for a multibillion dollar space and 
aeronautics program….we are in a beautiful position to have positive effects on human 
understanding and cooperation in improving the quality of life for all people. If we can’t 
do it, who can?” Ruth Bates Harris, Harlem Princess: The Story of Harry Delaney's 
Daughter, (New York: Vantage Press), 1991, 259.  
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out applicants who graduated from Historically Black Colleges and Universities.71 While 
such hiring discrimination occurred at NASA, this thesis primarily concerns the issues 
that employees hired to work at NASA faced while at the agency. MEAN v Fletcher 
primarily concerns the second form—discrimination barring minorities from promotion 
opportunities. Oral history and some court documents offer glimpses into how minority 
employees experienced the third: systematic discrimination infused into everyday 
interactions. Some of these experiences were not strictly personal, but employees felt the 
effects through administrative decisions.  
In 1971, as NASA developed an EEO office, Administrator Fletcher hired Ruth 
Bates Harris as director. Harris, a black woman and civil rights activist, had earned an 
MBA with an emphasis in personnel administration and industrial relations from New 
York University, and had years of experience as the director of Human Relations for the 
Montgomery County school board in Maryland, as well as the executive director of the 
DC Commission on Human Relations—a civil rights implementation group.72 But before 
she even began her employment as director of the EEO, she was demoted to deputy 
director, under Dudley McConnell.73 McConnell was a black scientist with no human 
 
71 Taliaferro related that there was no checks or programs in place to prevent things like 
research proposals from HBCUs getting cut automatically. Taliaferro 20 July 2019.  
72 James Fletcher, Announcement Key Personnel Change Subject: Director of Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 24 Aug 1971, Folder: Equal Opportunity Programs, Office of; 
Box: Equal Employment Opportunity, Box 4 of 4, General 1969-2001, #18507, NASA 
HQ.  
73 “Effective immediately, the Equal Employment Opportunity Office is established 
under the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management. Mr. Robert King 
has been designated as the Director of the new office, and Mrs. Ruth Bates Harris will be 
the Deputy Director…. Mrs. Harris will be the NASA Director of Equal Employment 
Opportunity and will provide direction to equal opportunity programs for NASA 
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resources, personnel management, or EEO expertise or experience. As historian Eric 
Fenrich argued,  
Low opted for McConnell because he believed that an insider would be able to 
understand the "problems of technical management" within the space agency 
better than an outsider, even if that other person had more EEO experience. 
Eighteen months after Harris’s initial hiring, NASA still preferred the safety of an 
“insider” who would work within the existing agency culture over someone like 
Harris who might buck the system. Despite its rhetoric of creating a racially 
cooperative workplace, the agency exhibited reluctance toward efforts – or people 
– that might instigate unwelcome change.74  
 
Black employees at NASA loudly voiced to management that they viewed McConnell as 
a yes-man for NASA administration, not an advocate for them or agent of change. 
Particularly after NASA administrators established a dedicated EEO office, EEO 
personnel were able to develop solid goals and plans. At a conference in 1972, 
Administrator Fletcher said, “the full weight of NASA will be behind our Equal 
Employment Opportunity Office and Equal Employment Programs throughout the 
agency. They will have NASA’s institutional support.”75 However, NASA administrators 
ignored, or even thwarted, common sense forms of implementation. Additionally, 
 
employees. In addition, she will be the Deputy Director for the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Office.” James Fletcher, Special Announcement “Subject: Equal 
Employment opportunity Office-Organization Realignment,” 1 September 1971, Box: 
George M. Low Papers—Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal Employment Opportunities 
File #2, NASA HQ.  
74 Eric Fenrich, “The Color of NASA: Racial Inclusion in the American Space Program, 
1957-1978” (PhD diss., University of California Santa Barbara, 2015), ProQuest 
(3733584), 225.   
75 "EEO Program Promised Full Support of NASA," 15 February 1972.  
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administrators opposed EEO personnel who spoke out about how miserably the agency 
was failing to meet the goals.76  
Two years into her employment, Harris and two other EEO employees—Samuel 
Lynn, a black man, and Joseph Hogan, a white man, prepared a thorough analysis of 
NASA’s EEO efforts for presentation to Fletcher.77 They prepared this report on their 
own time, using their own money. Harris explained their attitude, “we wanted to be sure 
there was nothing inaccurate or exaggerated to prove a point. We would try to keep him 
[Fletcher] relaxed, yet we would convey the urgency of the matter.”78 Based on their 
research, these three found NASA EEO efforts to be a “near total failure.”79 They 
presented this report to Fletcher on 21 September 1973. On 25 September of the same 
year, on the basis of “seriously disruptive” behavior and incompetence, Fletcher fired 
Harris; Hogan was transferred out of the EEO office; Lynn received a formal warning.80 
Media coverage accused NASA of discrimination. The New York Times article entitled 
 
76 The example of Administrator Fletcher firing Ruth Bates Harris and demoting/moving 
other key EEO personnel after a candid report communicates how vehemently 
administration opposed being confronted with NASA’s subpar record.  
77 “I found Joseph Hogan, director of contract compliance and Sam Lynn, his assistant, 
very competent and very committed to providing strong leadership to NASA’s progress 
in equality of opportunity.” Harris, 255-256.  
78 Harris, 268.  
79  EEO Report, 21 September 1973, Folder: NASA Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program, Box: George M. Low Papers- Box #33 NASA HQ.  
80 “A divisive spirit became rampant in the office. The report itself reflects this 
unfortunate development…she was never able to implement her plans to achieve solution 
now was she able to work with others outside the EEO Office to do so…Mrs. Harris has 
not demonstrated the degree of administrative and management skill required of her 
position….she became a serious disruptive force within her own office…” Fletcher 
Memo to All NASA Employees 2 Nov 1973, Mrs. Ruth Bates Harris bio- NASA file, 
NASA HQ; Harris, 270.  
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“Top Black Woman Ousted By NASA” and a Science magazine article criticizing NASA 
were explosive, sparking popular outrage. Over 50 civil rights organizations, including 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, rallied to fight on Harris’s behalf.   
NASA officials claimed Harris’s firing was not because of racial or sexual 
discrimination, but in the words of EEO Assistant Administrator Dudley McConnell, 
because “[Harris] lacked administrative experience and never troubled to learn the 
workings of the bureaucracy.”81 Harris filed a lawsuit based on racial and sexual 
discrimination; it was settled out of court, and as part of the settlement, Harris was 
reinstated as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs (for Community and 
Human Relations).82 George Low, NASA deputy director had stated in his deposition 
regarding the investigation of Harris’ firing, “Dr. Fletcher and I felt that Mrs. Harris 
stood in the way of the implementation of NASA's EEO Program.”83 In almost direct 
contradiction to this statement, in his memo to all NASA employees on the occasion of 
Harris’s reinstatement, Fletcher stated that “it is fair to acknowledge that some of the 
forward movement NASA has subsequently made in equal opportunity has been 
stimulated by the forces she so eloquently set in motion at that time. Moreover, there was 
 
81 Ironically, Harris’s resume contradicted this statement, while McConnell himself 
lacked administrative experience. Constance Holden, “NASA Sacking of Top Black 
Woman Stirs Concern for Equal Employment,” Science, New Series, Vol. 182, No. 4114 
(Nov. 23, 1973), pp. 806. 
82 Memo by James Fletcher to all NASA employees, 16 August 1974, Mrs. Ruth Bates 
Harris bio- NASA file, NASA HQ, HRC, Washington DC.  
83 Responses to Question Given to George M Low in Writing By William Roscoe, CSC 
Investigator, for the Ruth Bates Harris Investigation, 14 June 1974 Folder: R.B. Harris 
Termination, 013701, Box: George M. Low Papers/EEO File/Record Numbers 013696-
013704 NASA HQ.   
 37 
never any doubt about her commitment to equal opportunity and her desire to help NASA 
move forward.”84 This memo was part of Harris’s settlement—one of her requirements 
read, “send out a memorandum to all employees clearing Mrs. Harris's reputation and 
expunging any adverse reflection on her in Administrator's November 2 memorandum to 
employees.”85 Though Harris was reinstated, the damage to any fragile confidence 
minority employees may have had in the EEO office was shattered. Within the 
Headquarters EEO office, surveys, statements, and memos written by minority 
employees explain, “people are afraid to speak out…they don’t even take their problems 
to counselors….they are afraid of harassment.”86 An example of the “contradiction of the 
spirit of EEO” that NASA regularly engaged in was reported in an independent 
investigation that NASA commissioned in 1975. The investigator found that an EEO 
counselor “was the spouse of a reputed White Citizens Council member” who actively 
resisted school integration.87 While not an isolated example, Harris’s firing was a high-
profile example of NASA’s failure in the area of equal employment practice.  
 
 
84 Fletcher Memo to All NASA Employees 16 Aug 1974, Mrs. Ruth Bates Harris bio- 
NASA file, NASA HQ,  
85 R Tenney Johnson memo to George Low, 4 April 1974, Folder: R.B. Harris 
Termination, 013701, Box: George M. Low Papers/ EEO File/ Record Numbers 013696-
013704 NASA HQ.  
86 Memo by Harriet Jenkins 23 April 1974, Folder: Code U Chron Files 1974 Box: Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) Code U and DE Chron files 1964-174 #18508 Box 1, 
NASA HQ.  
87 “Inner City and Outer Space: A Study NASA/Minority Community/Media Relations,” 
August 1975, Folder: No. 13, 1 of 2, Box 45, Container 46, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-
12/31/1985, District Court of the United States US District Court for the District of 
Columbia, National Archives and Record Administration, Washington DC (This archive 
will be referred to as NARA I).  
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Immediate Impetus for MEAN’s organization 
“Just as peace is fine as long as there are no wars, EEO is fine as long as there are no 
complaints.”88 -Ruth Bates Harris  
The MEAN case did not form in a vacuum; NASA administrators had been on the 
spectrum from ignoring to actively perpetuating systemically discriminatory practices 
since NASA’s inception. However, a combination of Ruth Bates Harris’s case and more 
general angst about NASA’s resistance to change spurred employees to act. The first 
action was a statement of concern signed by sixty-eight NASA Headquarters employees 
and delivered to Fletcher. They wrote: “Ruth Bates Harris took with her much of the 
confidence that employees had in NASA’s intent for achieving results in equal 
opportunities.”89 This group, completely unassociated with the individuals that formed 
MEAN, said that Harris’s firing was their main cause for concern. 90  
Evidence demonstrating the connection between Harris’s firing and the MEAN 
complaint has not been previously available to scholars, as MEAN documents do not 
mention Harris’s firing.91 However, Taliaferro clearly communicated her attitude forty-
 
88 Harris, 261.  
89 Point of Concern and Suggestions for Improving Equal Opportunity Program at 
NASA, Attachment 2, Jo Marie Di Maggio to “Concerned Employees” 19 Nov 1973, 
Folder: Equal Opportunity Programs, Office of; Box: Equal Employment Opportunity, 
Box 4 of 4, General 1969-2001, #18507, NASA HQ; Fenrich, 227.  
90 Taliaferro said that the spokesperson for the “concerned employees” group, Jo Marie 
DiMaggio, did not participate in the MEAN complaint, and the efforts were not 
coordinated. Gloria Taliaferro, phone conversation with the author, 1 May 2019.  
91 Scholars have previously connected these events, as the two were less than a year apart 
and closely related substantively. Fenrich explained that “Over 50 civil rights and 
minority organizations protested Harris’s termination in the media and at Congressional 
hearings, causing a group of minority employees at NASA to become MEAN.” Fenrich, 
237. Kim McQuaid’s article “Race, Gender, and Space Exploration” linked MEAN as 
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six years later in an oral interview, explaining her reasons for organizing what became 
MEAN and the writing of their initial complaint:   
RC: so the number of complaints just about doubled in ‘74, after— 
GT: Ruth got fired  
RC: would you say that was a catalyst for people being like, “ok, we’re going to 
do something?”  
GT: Yes, yes. That was the catalyst. We were tired. Sick and tired of being sick 
and tired. That’s when this was—that’s when this came. That was the catalyst for 
us to come together. And we took a lot of us to get together, right, and a lot of 
people to help write it. They aren’t named. They were very scared; they didn’t 
come forward. They didn’t want to come forward.92  
In a follow-up interview, where more details were discussed, Taliaferro added a fuller 
discussion of the impetus for MEAN’s organization and formal complaint.  
GT: Well, I was mad. Rosemary [Ferguson] was mad. And there were some other 
folks, who had been there before us, so we went to them who had been there. And 
there were voices of irritation. …So we started talking, and we found that we had 
similar situations. So say you need shorthand for a job—that’s what Mary Richard 
told me—she’s in charge of secretaries… So we started raising regular hell about 
that. So they offered a shorthand course at NASA. And everybody in the course 
was black. It was onsite; they brought a teacher in. Every d—n body in there was 
black, trying to get shorthand to get a 7. And, most of us passed the test, but that 
didn’t guarantee you were going to get a 7—just a GS-7! Anyway, we started 
talking, did a lot of; then we started meeting. We started meeting, talking, sharing 
a lot of you know, views. And we started putting stuff on paper. Like, 
brainstorming….And we had help from people who did not want to be identified, 
and people who didn’t really give a sh-t. So I put my name out there, Rosemary 
put her name out there, and Diane. So when we put it in, we got with Ruth Bates, 
and ran it past her, and you know, had a lot of comments. We really wanted to do 
NASA-wide—meaning the other centers—because the same thing was going on. 
A lot of brilliant, brilliant black folks. It was that old boy network—it was all over 
the government. And we were the first ones…that came to class action. We put 
the system to test.93 
 
stemming from media coverage of Harris’s firing. Kim McQuaid, “Race, Gender, and 
Space Exploration: A Chapter in the Social History of the Space Age,” Journal of 
American Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Aug., 2007), 420.    
92 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
93 Profanity has been edited out at the interviewee’s request. This response is answering 
the question: “So Ruth Bates Harris was fired. About six months later, we have the 
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While Ruth Bates Harris’s firing and MEAN’s organization were closely connected in 
chronological proximity, Taliaferro’s statement is the confirmation that this event incited 
these black employees to action. Additionally, Taliaferro related that Harris offered 
comments and help to MEAN—during her exile from NASA—as they wrote the 
complaint. As one of the three main organizers, Taliaferro is perhaps the most reliable 
source to communicate MEAN’s intentions and beginnings. 
Black employees complained about ill treatment previous to the case, but NASA 
administrators and complaint processing personnel hid behind an offer for a lateral switch 
to a different office.94 Instead of finding discrimination, many complaints were found to 
be an unfortunate personal issue between a supervisor and subordinate. This attitude 
related not only to the MEAN complaints but also to many other complaints of racial 
discrimination. Taliaferro became quite familiar with this attitude through her time as an 
EEO counselor. She related one exchange between herself and Lawrence Vogel, Director 
of NASA Headquarters Administration,  
I’m sitting down there and I said so-and-so has a complaint—blah blah blah. And 
he [Vogel] said, “well I didn’t find any discrimination.” And I said, “you didn’t?” 
 
MEAN complaint and the letter to Dr. Fletcher. So, can you kind of walk me through 
how the MEAN complaint—obviously there had been complaints, obviously there were 
issues—but how did the MEAN complaint, particularly, come to be?” Gloria Taliaferro, 
Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 20 October 2019 (hereafter 
cited as Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019).   
94 MEAN letter alleged that “A vast majority of the initial grievances result in no 
satisfactory resolution for the complaint, mainly because the resolution sough by most 
counselors is to remove complainants from his ‘old environment’ to a ‘new environment’ 
with still no promotion potential or advancement.” MEAN to Dr. James Fletcher, 14 
March 1974, Folder: MEAN Group Meeting, Box: George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical 
Subject Files, Equal Employment Opportunity files #2, #13883, NASA HQ, HRC, 
Washington DC. hereafter cited as “MEAN to Fletcher”).  
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Well, I said, “well where have you seen it before, so you can recognize it again?”  
And he—he had never seen discrimination. I looked him dead in his eye. He 
turned blood red. He knew he couldn’t. I said “I know what it is. I can recognize 
it. So, no. We have a complaint here, whether you see it or not.” So that was his I-
didn’t-see-it-before. Well that’s because you wouldn’t know what it was if it hit 
you in the a--.95 
 
Administrators, middle managers, and regular employees tasked with EEO assignments 
refused to define discrimination and ignored or remained uninformed of the goals of EEO 
policies, resulting in little real relief for victims of alleged discrimination.  
MEAN Complaint 
Eleven black employees formed their complaint into a fourteen-page letter, 
addressed to Administrator Fletcher, dated 14 March 1974.96 By 15 April 1974, lawyers 
James Gray from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Rod Boggs of the Lawyers’ 
 
95 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019.  
96 All spelling, grammar, and formatting in quotes is precisely how it was typed in the 
MEAN letter; in occasional places, I have added punctuation for clarity. I have chosen 
not to use the term [sic] where abnormalities occur in this letter out of respect to the letter 
writers. The letter was also sent to George Low (Deputy Director, NASA), Bernard 
Moritz (Associate Director, NASA), Raymond Sumser (Director of Personnel, NASA), 
Dudley McConnell (Assistant Administrator for EO, NASA), Harriet Jenkins (Assistant 
Administrator for EO, NASA), Donald Lichty (Director Of NASA HQ Administration), 
Lawrence Vogel (Director of NASA HQ Administration), Robert Hampton (CSC), Irving 
Kator (CSC), Senator James Aborezk (first Arab-American US Senator, SD), Senator 
William Proxmire (Appropriations Committee, WI), Congressman Donald Edwards 
(chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, CA), 
Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (first black woman elected to US Congress, NY), 
Congressman Walter Fauntroy (a well-known black civil rights activist, born and raised 
in DC), Congressman Paren Mitchell (black representative, MD), Congressman Charles 
Rangel (Congressional Black Caucus; actively opposed NASA apartheid employment 
practices at the NASA tracking station in Hartebeesthoek, South Africa), Congressman 
Louis Stokes (Congressional Black Caucus, House Appropriations Committee, OH), 
Coalition Against Unequal Opportunity in Government, American Federation of 
Government Employees, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, GUARD, and the 
NAACP LDF; MEAN to Fletcher.  
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Committee for Civil Rights Under Law had partnered with MEAN and came to a meeting 
with top NASA administrators.97 The complaint began by quoting one of Fletcher’s 
commitments to listening to employees and asserted that Fletcher’s words were empty,  
There is no question about the clarity of those words. BUT, a review of the 
methods employed by NASA management (i.e. intimidations, harassments 
terminations, etc.) against those who attempt to communicate further discourages 
others to pursue their grievances. In essence, people are too afraid to speak up for 
justice. Because of this fear, we have united to present our allegations. We are the 
“Minority Employees At NASA” (MEAN).98 
 
The letter writers detailed the information they wished to communicate about 
themselves as a group. They were employees of NASA for between four and eleven 
years, some college graduates, and all committed to continuing education. MEAN 
explained their perspective on their employment at NASA, allowing a glimpse into the 
emotional and physical toll discrimination had on these employees: 
YET we are still in meaningless dead-end jobs. If this isn’t enough, we have 
become victims of habitual methods of discrimination with multiple, alarming 
side effects (frustrations, hyper-tension, lack of motivation, etc.) While subjected 
to these tremendous physical and mental traumas, we feel that as dedicated NASA 
employees we are entitled to our equal rights now. We want to be able to advance 
in our careers, change careers, or make a more important contribution to the 
Agency by utilizing our experience, abilities, potentialities, and education and not 
be hindered from these very humanistic goals because of our race or sex.99 
 
 
97 The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law is now called Washington 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. It is unclear when the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (LDF) became involved with the case as the NAACP LDF’s archives are not 
publicly accessible. The LDF was already aware of issues at NASA because of Ruth 
Bates Harris’s case. Discussion of Investigative Procedures to be used to deal with 
Complaints of Discrimination, 15 April 1974, transcript of tape recording, Folder: MEAN 
Group Meeting, Box: George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal 
Employment Opportunity files #2, #13883, NASA HQ.  
98 MEAN to Fletcher. 
99 All formatting is precisely how it was typed in the MEAN letter. MEAN to Fletcher.   
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Clearly not “anti-NASA,” these employees desired the ability to better benefit the agency 
as well as themselves.100 From this point, the letter unfolds from general to more specific 
allegations of types of discrimination, using statistics and specific examples to support 
their claims.101 MEAN’s arguments primarily concern either the specific ways NASA 
management regularly discriminated against people of color and women or how these 
actions impacted the individuals involved. The letter succinctly introduced MEAN’s 
principle concerns:  
Minorities experience longer waiting period for quality increases, sustained 
superior performance awards, and promotions. However, we have knowledge that 
non-minorities are not subjected to such. If a minority is favored by management, 
he can be assured of receiving one promotion for pacification. If an employee 
challenges discrimination, his chances for advancement are jeopardized.102  
 
Black employees were caught in this lose-lose situation where discrimination prevented 
them from having meaningful opportunities for promotion but drawing attention to the 
barrier seemed to seal their fate.  
The first few points of the MEAN letter addressed NASA administration directly: 
 
100 Taliaferro still reflected this attitude of loving NASA despite the immense hardships, 
even after nearly forty years of employment at NASA, “I learned a lot at NASA. I gained 
a lot of friends. And I had a good time. And there were some bad times. Some struggles. 
This [MEAN] was a struggle. This was the biggest struggle.” Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
101 As the complaint went through the administrative process, NASA brought in Dr. 
Alvin Anderson from Langley EEO to help specify the exact issues of the complaint.   
“Cause they [NASA] hired somebody from Langley to come up for ‘specificity.’ They 
didn’t know what we were talking about. They had no idea, so. The group of us got 
together to help this guy. ‘What do we mean by this?’ that was just a uh, what do you 
call—bulldog.” Ibid.  
102 Taliaferro explained that this information came from sources higher up in NASA that 
required strict anonymity. “Some of them were in positions that we couldn’t identify 
them, or it would jeopardize their position, and it would jeopardize us getting 
information. You know information: that was the main thing. We had to get information 
into their little secrets.” Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019; MEAN to Fletcher. 
 44 
NASA’s total management...[being] deeply rooted in discrimination. We allege 
that discriminatory practices on the basis of race and sex are so embedded 
throughout NASA Headquarter’s management that it has become such a “routine 
process” that no one dares to buck them or question them. Unfortunately, it 
appears that the Agency condones such discriminatory practices because they 
never seem to surface to a point where something is done about them. 
 
The letter continued to demonstrate concrete ways that management carried out 
discrimination, “we allege that Personnel Management Specialists, with the exception of 
one who happens to be a minority…are being manipulated to carry out management’s 
wishes which for the most part are biased…we further allege that the PMSs and PSSs are 
biased in their judgments in reviewing employee qualifications for job selection.”103 
Next, MEAN communicated that minority employees did not have faith in the various 
NASA programs for advancement, such as the Merit Promotion Program, or the STEP 
program, which were created to help non-professional employees gain experience or 
education necessary to earn promotions into professional pay-grades.104 Another 
allegation was that NASA did not have consistent guidelines for desk audits, job 
 
103 PMSs are Personnel Management Specialists and PSSs were Personnel Staffing 
Specialists. MEAN to Fletcher.  
104 “tape recorded interviews…were degrading and frustrating…. We allege that all 
methods used for selection of STEP applicants were biased. These feelings are shared by 
non-minorities as well as minorities, and both feel that STEP applicants were pre-
selected.” MEAN to Fletcher; Transcript, 17 Mar 1981, Box 43, NARA I; Federal 
employees pay is determined by the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM); 
positions receive “grades,” and promotions can be in grade “step” promotions, or entire 
grade promotions. Jobs increase in grade with increased requirements for experience, 
education, and/or skills. Most black women in secretarial positions at NASA at this point 
were between a GS-3 and GS-7. According to OPM regulations for 1974, a GS-3 would 
start at $6,764 and a GS-7 could make up to $13,679. By 1979, Gloria Taliaferro as a GS-
7/Step 6 made $15,184 annually.  See Figure 1, p. 72. “Rates of Pay Under the General 
Schedule Effective the first pay period beginning on or after October 1, 1974,” Office of 
Personnel Management, 1974. https://archive.opm.gov/oca/ pre1994/ 1974_GS.pdf; 
MEAN v Fletcher, 23 April 1979, Box 41 NARA I.  
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classification, promotions, and the like.105 Taliaferro explained that the lack of consistent 
guidelines was one of managers’ primary means of targeting black secretaries: 
GT: Performance plans. All that sort of stuff. They worked on us with those 
performance plans. They really tried to screw us with that…. if you got a bad one, 
you could get an adverse action and stuff like that. I never got that, but other folks 
that I know, a lot of that went on. I asked them not to confide in me because of 
who I was. I didn’t want to know….You had to be very, very smart and discrete, 
the way they were written. They’re written for you to fail. You know, because…I 
think one of them, I would rewrite them or I wouldn’t sign it. They want you to 
sign it; I’d say no. We helped each other. A lot of us started to help each other…. 
But there was a technique to give you an adverse action that would go in your 
personnel file. I’ll never forget that. Looked like very—you would miss it if you 
weren’t savvy. You would miss it—well like I had a report put in, when you get 
the report, we need this report, and they gave me a date and time, and I said well I 
can’t do it until they give it to me—the data to make the report. So you can’t give 
me a date to get it out and I haven’t gotten it. I got them every time, so they 
finally stopped that. But anyways, little things like that, you had to watch. Be on 
cue. If I didn’t know, I would go to one of my coworkers, say read this. Same 
thing. Especially me. The others might not have had it so bad. I had to be on 
cue…Oh, they were doing it intentionally. Cause they passed it down, one 
manager to another.106 
 
Without the contextualization that oral interviews provide, unspecified guidelines for 
desk audits could seem more like a bureaucratic oversight than discrimination. Yet 
prejudiced people often exploited those ambiguities to engage in preselection and 
perpetuate the general “old-boys network.”107 NASA’s clerical pool was an example of 
the job segregation and limited upward mobility opportunities for black employees. 
MEAN alleged “only Blacks are placed in this typing pool and comparable whites are 
 
105 MEAN to Fletcher.  
106 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
107 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. 
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not” and that blacks remained in this temporary typing pool instead of being placed into 
permanent positions (with promotion potential) like their white counterparts.108 
 The letter’s second and fourth major items alleged “chronic patterns of intra-
office discrimination” and that “there is a definite gap in various NASA Headquarters 
grade structures.”109 Essentially, NASA had white offices and jobs and black offices and 
jobs. Because of this methodology, offices hired whites with no experience, but refused 
black applicants with relevant training. Minorities were often tasked with more work than 
white counterparts and were not afforded the same opportunities for education.110 
Additionally, job segregation meant, “minorities, regardless of qualifications, are 
concentrated into positions requiring constant manual labor.”111 Further, MEAN alleged 
that minority employees often did the work of their superiors without the recognition or 
pay and “no opportunity or hope of eventual advancement in that field.”112Additionally, 
 
108 MEAN to Fletcher; British women faced similar forms of discrimination applying for 
federal jobs in Britain, “Allowing men into feminized job categories would upset the 
balance of low pay and poor promotion prospects designed into those job classes. As a 
result, men were not only expected but also encouraged, through formal recruitment 
processes, to take the majority of higher, permanent posts in the service, and women were 
kept out…..men might filter through that job category, but only women were allowed to 
become permanent staff there.” Marie Hicks, Programmed Inequality: How Britain 
Discarded Women Technologists and Lost its Edge in Computing. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), 2017, 89. 
109 MEAN to Fletcher.  
110 This was a major issue in Rosemary Ferguson’s individual case; Transcript of 
Rosemary Ferguson’s trial, Box 43, NARA I; MEAN to Fletcher. 
111 MEAN to Fletcher. 
112 Taliaferro related one position she held where this happened, “They had a guy 
contractor, sit there and play solitaire…cause he was [an] assistant guy. And I got his job, 
and I didn’t get his grade! …And so—he was a contractor converted. And I did his 
work—I did more than his work! I wrote the policy! They had a system—an equipment 
system—without policy! And I was in charge of the processing, and we had policy. You 
know, I had to sit there and regurgitate. I had to write policy for a system. Do you 
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when white employees retired, they were often “rehired immediately as consultants and 
contractors…thereby denying other employees an opportunity for advancement.”113  
Sandwiched between specific allegations, MEAN members expressed their 
perspective on the agency’s culture: “it is obvious that equality means nothing in your 
job, to your management, nor to the agency.”114 The members of MEAN had attempted 
every avenue available to remediate their complaints, but it was NASA’s structure that 
neutralized all of these attempts. Because of the structural and systemic racism, NASA 
was unable to remediate complaints fairly; NASA had to undergo fundamental change, 
not change the outcome of a couple of complaints.  
 The third and sixth major items concern NASA’s EEO personnel and programs. 
MEAN alleged that NASA failed to make employees—particularly minority 
employees—aware of the ongoing Congressional hearings about NASA’s EEO 
 
understand me? For a system that had existed. I said I’m not going to write guidelines for 
how to operate the system, you have to write policy. You do this, you do this—and that’s 
what they get graded on. And that book out there? I wrote them all. I don’t know if 
you’ve seen all of them, but they’re still in existence…Those are my babies. I wrote 
them, sweat and tears. And so Jeff [Sutton], he didn’t give me no promotions, bonus, 
nothing. He was an a—hole.” Taliaferro, 20 July 2019; MEAN to Fletcher. 
113 Taliaferro related that this was still the case when she retired in the early 2000s, “You 
know, when I retired—when they [white secretaries] retired, they [NASA] fixed it up so 
they were comfortable. Oh, working as contractors after they retired at Goddard, working 
as contractors here, you know, different places. I asked for a contract at Goddard, and the 
only place I got that I know I could have worked was Kennedy, cause the guys I know 
down there, you know, we were alright. And Cleveland. I wasn’t approved. And they 
didn’t set it up for me. They did a lot of setting up for them. So they were comfortable in 
their retirement. I mean—hey—that’s the way it was. But I pissed off. And I let people at 
Goddard know.” Taliaferro 20 July 2019; MEAN to Fletcher. 
114 MEAN to Fletcher. 
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program.115 NASA employed EEO counselors on a part-time basis. These counselors 
were regular NASA employees in any office who would be recruited and trained to be 
EEO counselors and therefore split their time between their regular job and counseling 
when a complaint arose.116 MEAN’s opinion on the current EEO counselors was that they 
“should be stripped of their titles, packed up, and returned to the corners of their offices 
to their former responsibilities on a full-time basis.”117 They supported this view with 
serious allegations, including that counselors had failed to: “inform employees of their 
legal rights…educate employees of the grievance process and the eeo complaints 
process” and counselors had “refused, redirected, and misguided 
complainants…prolonging and not terminating the informal complaints process.”118 This 
last allegation concerning the informal complaint process could create a dead-end for a 
 
115 NASA had a stellar track record of informing all employees about budget 
appropriations committee hearings. MEAN to Fletcher. 
116 While the MEAN case was being litigated, Taliaferro became an EEO counselor.  
Taliaferro: “in other words, it [discrimination] doesn’t exist here, because we don’t have 
to address it as long as it—'We don’t do that!’ That’s what it is. You understand what I’m 
saying?  All them words they use—that’s a bunch of craw. You understand? ‘Wh, why--
we don’t do that!’ And when the affirmative action came under problems, ‘what the hell 
we going to do?’ and they didn’t hire people with the knowledge to do these things. To 
implement them. To come in and set it up. …He made me counselor while I was doing 
the MEAN complaint. I had some nice complaints.   
RC: so were people EEO counselors on top of their other jobs or responsibilities?   
GT: the counselors? Yeah that was extra. In matter of fact I had a safe in my room of all 
my complaints and I had [inaudible] to deal with. As a matter of fact I didn’t give them 
the combination to anybody to all my complaints. And I did that and I told my boss I had 
to go—they told my boss he had to allow me, he had to allow me time. I had some 
interesting cases. But you know, some people were wrong and shouldn’t have been there. 
Everybody ain’t right, you know. And I said, and I always said, well you going to come 
to me with this crap like this? You know? No, you can do better. When you do better, 
come back.”  Taliaferro 20 July 2019 
117 MEAN to Fletcher. 
118 Ibid.  
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solution: an employee could not move their complaint forward in the administrative 
process if the counselor would not end the informal complaint process. The final 
problematic method counselors used was that, “the resolution sough by most counselors 
is to remove complainants from his ‘old environment’ to a ‘new environment’ with still 
no promotion potential or advancement.”119 Rosemary Ferguson’s complaint, one of the 
three plaintiffs to later put her name on MEAN v Fletcher, demonstrated the deep 
frustration and dead-end that EEO counseling provided. William Dolby, who was tasked 
with finding a new position for Ferguson, testified in her trial that he,  
felt that there was so much conflict within the organization and she was becoming 
very bitter and I told her that I thought the best thing for her to do was to take this 
position which was basically a clerical position in the other organization to get out 
of the organization she was in and to give her an opportunity to establish a new 
background of work for another supervisor somewhere, somebody who had not 
been involved in any of the [current situation].120  
 
 Items five and seven concern specific amenities that discriminated against NASA 
employees on the basis of race, sex, or class—which in a discriminatory system, 
converged particularly unfairly on young, black women. The specific instances cited 
were the gym facilities and the NASA credit union. NASA restricted gym usage to, 
“employees in grades GS-9 and above and by women over 35 years of age. Male 
employees in wage board positions (lower grades and minorities) are also excluded.”121 
 
119 Ibid. 
120 Within NASA, an “organization” was a department, not the agency as a whole. 
Transcript of Rosemary Ferguson’s trial, Box No. 43, NARA I. 
121 MEAN to Fletcher. 
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The credit union allegedly practiced discriminatory lending, was “indifferent” to minority 
members, and hired insufficient numbers of minority employees to “responsible jobs.”122 
The letter’s final two pages proposed remedies “to correct the problems of race 
and sex discrimination and of unequal employment opportunity at NASA 
Headquarters.”123 Some of the most foundational of these remedies included:  
6. All present EEO counselors should be replaced with new counselors nominated 
and selected by minority and women employees.  
7. All new EEO counselors must be trained and educated so that they can properly 
advise employees of their rights under Part 713 of the Federal Personnel Manual 
and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.  
9. Discrimination in promotions at all levels must cease so that minorities and 
women are not constantly passed-over by favored white employees. There must 
be some minority participation in all promotion decision.  
15. A full-time EEO Director for NASA Headquarters EEO Office should be 
appointed. A well-trained and experienced minority or women should hold this 
job. The all-white Headquarters EEO office should be integrated by employing 
minority professionals.  
 
In response, NASA officials including Administrators Fletcher and Low and 
NASA counsel met with MEAN representatives and lawyers James Gray and Rod 
Boggs.124 NASA administrators agreed to kick off a formal investigation through a third-
party investigator. Negotiations regarding the investigator were ongoing at least into late 
 
122 Taliaferro related that, “We started meeting, talking, sharing a lot of you know, views. 
And we started putting stuff on paper. Like, brainstorming. We even put the credit union 
on there, because we found they were playing games. They were playing games with us. 
They voluntarily changed—everything we put in there, so we included them.” Taliaferro 
20 Oct 2019; MEAN to Fletcher. 
123 MEAN to Fletcher.   
124 It is unclear when the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) became involved with the 
case as the NAACP LDF’s archives are not publicly accessible, but, the LDF was already 
aware of issues at NASA because of Ruth Bates Harris’s case. Discussion of 
Investigative Procedures, 15 Apr1974, transcript of tape recording, Folder: MEAN Group 
Meeting, Box: George M. Low Papers #13883, NASA HQ.  
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June 1974.125 Eventually, they agreed on Jack Spiel, a recently retired investigator from 
the General Counsel office at Kennedy Space Center.126  
While little that happened in the intervening months has survived in the 
documentary record, by a 19 December 1974 meeting, top NASA officials and EEO 
personnel understood that “the Group felt the investigation was poorly handled and 
served to aggravate the situation. It has taken too long and the results have not been made 
known to MEAN. The complaint will probably be taken to court.”127 Though MEAN had 
filed suit in December 1974, NASA’s report of the informal investigation and Harriet 
Jenkins, Harris’s successor as EEO director, wrote her final decision on 21 February 
1975.128 On page ninety-six of the final decision, Jenkins determined that “After very 
thorough review and consideration of the investigatory findings….it is the final decision 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that the evidence of record does 
not show that NASA is pursuing a policy or engaging in practices which discriminate 
 
125 James Cummings memo to Raymond Sumser, Subject: MEAN Third-Party 
Complaint, 25 June 1974, Folder: MEAN Group Meeting, Box: George M. Low 
Papers #13883, NASA HQ.  
126 Ironically in MEAN’s list of grievances, they attacked NASA’s habit of hiring 
recently retired NASA employees as contractors, taking away jobs from minority 
applicants. James Cummings Memo to Mr. Bernard Mortiz 25 June 1974, Folder: MEAN 
Group Meeting, Box: George M. Low Papers #13883, NASA HQ, HRC; MEAN to Dr. 
James Fletcher, 14 March 1974, NASA HQ.  
127 Meeting Record; subject: Miscellaneous Topics Pertaining to EEO, 19 Dec 1974, 
Folder: EEO Advisory Group (formerly concerned employees), George M. Low Papers-
Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal Employment Opportunity files, Box 32, #13691. 
128 Final Decision of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the Third 
Party Complaint of Minority Employees at NASA Part II p. 27, Folder: MEAN Group 
Meeting, Box: George M. Low Papers #13883, NASA HQ. (Hereafter cited as NASA 
Final Decision.).  
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against employees on the basis of race and sex.”129 Jenkins made this decision against the 
recommendations of Headquarters’ own EEO investigator, Theodore Lucas, who had 
found the MEAN complaint valid.130 The memo attached to the report instructed MEAN 
that they were entitled to appeal to the U.S. Civil Service Commission for a review of the 
decision.  
The many pages of the final decision outlined Spiel’s findings through the course 
of his investigation into each of MEAN’s allegations. However, this report did not 
support how or why NASA found MEAN’s allegations to be false, but only that the 
investigation did not, in large part, support the accusations.131 If the investigator had 
supported any allegation, the report carefully framed it as a one-off instance. Lucas, the 
Headquarters’ EEO investigator that reviewed Spiel’s investigation, “thought it probably 
needed to be reinvestigated, that it was not a very thorough investigation…a very poor 
investigation.”132 James Cummings, head of EEO investigations, attempted to pressure 
Lucas to say “that this was a good investigation” because Spiel was Cummings’ 
“personal friend.”133  
In the case of MEAN’s concern about a temporary clerical pool that seemed to 
serve to keep minority women from gaining permanent (and upwardly mobile) positions 
within NASA, the report found that the intention was not an “all black typing pool.” 
NASA management would “monitor” this “phenomenon” and abolish the pool if it 
 
129 NASA Final Decision.  
130 Deposition of Theodore R. Lucas, 5 Feb 1980, Folder 4 of 5, Box 45, NARA I. 
131 NASA Final Decision.  
132 Deposition of Theodore R. Lucas, 5 Feb 1980. 
133 Ibid. 
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continued to employ solely black women, but qualified that “its elimination is not 
anticipated.”134 Much of the report was flat denial of MEAN’s claims: “NASA disagrees 
that it hires ‘skillful cadres of minority haters.’”135 Generic answers claimed NASA had 
fair policies and assumed, without investigation, that they were being followed, 
“minimum qualification requirements are established by the Civil Service Commission 
for like jobs across agency lines….they are applied uniformly to all applicants.”136 In 
several of the responses to MEAN’s allegations, NASA said they could not verify or 
investigate without specific examples. As early as 22 April 1974, NASA management 
placed an announcement in the Headquarters Weekly Bulletin “notifying employees of 
the third-party complaints and urging their full cooperation during the conduct of the 
resulting investigation. As agreed, we urged employees to cooperate and assured them 
that complaints, representatives, and witnesses will be free of restraint, interference, 
coercion, discrimination, or reprisal.”137 However, even with these assurances, MEAN 
members were extremely uncomfortable with making known their association with the 
group. For example, an incident occurred where George Low asked Dudley McConnell 
“who some of the employees of MEAN were and indicated that he did this at a time when 
he was unaware of the fact that these employees did not want to be identified but wanted 
to be considered only as an organization.” McConnell “inferred” that an individual 
 
134 NASA Final Decision. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Henry Clements to MEAN, 3 May 1974, Folder: MEAN Group Meeting, Box: George 
M. Low Papers #13883, NASA HQ.  
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named Gillam was associated with MEAN. Gillam was asking Low for a promotion 
(which he received) but insisted that he was not part of MEAN.138  
Class Action Lawsuit 
As a class action lawsuit, precisely what MEAN v Fletcher attempted to prove in 
court was that NASA was systemically racially discriminatory. Black and woman 
employees faced systematic discrimination, including harassment from supervisors and 
coworkers. NASA also systematically prevented them from being hired or advancing into 
professional jobs.139 Scholars such as Fenrich, McQuaid, and Snedegar have argued from 
examples that NASA was structurally and rampantly discriminatory.  
MEAN motioned for class certification on behalf of “plaintiffs and all past, 
present and future black (including the subclass black female) employees and applicants 
for employment of NASA Headquarters and of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA).”140 MEAN argued that,  
the issue common to all members of the class is the existence of policies, patterns, 
and practices of racial discrimination (and in the case of black females racial and 
sexual discrimination) which result in the denial of equal employment 
opportunities. Although the impact of this discrimination may vary among 
 
138 George Low Memo 6 May 1974, Subject: Meeting with Co-Chairpersons of the EEO 
Advisory Group, Folder: EEO Advisory Group (formerly concerned employees) #13691, 
George M. Low Papers, Box 32, NASA HQ.  
139 “Plaintiffs seek elimination of discriminatory barriers to advancement, institution of 
appropriate training programs and implementation of an effective affirmative action 
program which will eliminate the present effects of past racially and sexually 
discriminatory practices…” Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action, 18 April 1975, Box 41, NARA I. 
140 This motion included employees at all NASA installations. Motion to Certify Case as 
a Class Action, 18 Apr 1975, MEAN v Fletcher, Vol 1 12/16/74- 7/27/76, Box No. 41, 
NARA I. 
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individuals, all members of the class suffer the same deprivation of a fair and 
equal opportunity for employment and promotion because of their race.141 
MEAN’s case further argued for class action certification because NASA had “treated 
[the MEAN administrative complaint] as a class action complaint” and because MEAN 
had “statistical evidence supporting their claims of a pattern of racial discrimination.”142 
EEO records support that the other centers had major issues as well. A letter from NASA 
General Counsel to the Administrator in late 1974 stated, “You should be aware that nine 
other composite complaints (individual and third party), similar to the two JSC 
complaints that form the basis of this suit, have been filed (four at MSFC, one at 
Headquarters, and four at Langley). Additionally, two complaints at Headquarters have 
attempted to amend their individual complaints to include third-party allegations.”143 A 
confidential letter to Dr. Eberhard Rees, director of Marshall Space Flight Center read 
that the letter writer had, “never seen a more unhappy, more disillusioned group of blacks 
than those at Marshall.”144 Individuals who contracted at Goddard Space Flight Center 
related, “Goddard always stunk.”145  
NASA opposed class action certification, arguing that the court did not have 
jurisdiction, claiming that MEAN needed to continue to exhaust remedies within the 
agency, and because “the unique factual pattern of each of the representative plaintiffs” 
 
141 Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 18 Apr 1975. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Tenney Johnson to Dr. Low, 22 Nov 1974, Folder: Complaint Procession, #13690, 
George M. Low Papers Box 32, NASA HQ.  
144 Letter to Dr. Eberhard Rees, 26 May 1972, Folder: Code U Chron Files 1972, Code U 
and DE Chron Files 1964-1974 #18508, Box 1, NASA HQ.  
145 Taliaferro 20 July 2019.  
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and the relief sought made the case ineligible as a class action.146 NASA argued that the 
members of MEAN, as federal employees, had “extensive administrative machinery 
available to them within which to resolve their grievances,” and that the case should only 
go to court if NASA had exemplified an “extreme case of agency intransigence.”147 
MEAN countered that it was necessary to go beyond the agency to the courts; the action 
“requested by the plaintiffs is required to eradicate discrimination embedded in 
defendants’ employment system.”148 Debate continued through 1975, and on 10 
December 1975, District Judge Charles Richey ruled that both MEAN and each of the 
individual plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies, and that the class would 
be certified to “include all past, present and future black employees of NASA and NASA 
Headquarters.”149 NASA motioned for an amended class on the basis that “NASA 
maintains decentralized personnel programs and responsibility. In several of the 
installations said programs have not generated any complaints of 
discrimination…therefore any issue concerning blacks at NASA Headquarters could not 
be commonly applied to other NASA installations.”150 However, Richey again ruled in 
MEAN’s favor,  
 
146 Opposition to Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action, 12 Jun 1975, 1, MEAN v 
Fletcher, Vol 1 12/16/74- 7/27/76, Box No. 41, NARA I. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action, 14 July 
1975, 8, MEAN v Fletcher, Box 41, NARA I. 
149 Order, Charles Richey, 10 Dec 1975, Box. 41, NARA I. 
150 An example of how NASA demonstrated decentralization is in NASA’s answer to 
Interrogatories 83 & 84, “To what extent, if any, do EEO personnel at NASA field 
installations now report directly to NASA Headquarters? Answer: EEO personnel at 
NASA field installations do not report directly to NASA headquarters, they report 
directly to their respective Center Directors…the Assistant Administrator for Equal 
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Defendants have demonstrated that the various NASA installations exercise some 
autonomy in the management of their personnel programs. But it is also clear that 
officials at NASA headquarters have overall responsibility for personnel 
programs and policies. Plaintiffs in MEAN have alleged system-wide 
discrimination at NASA. If further development reveal that their case should 
focus on less that the totality of NASA installations, this Court can and will 
modify its class certification…151  
 
With the case certified as a class action, the Court allowed NASA and MEAN to begin 
the discovery process, the pre-trial phase of gathering evidence, on 19 April 1976. I argue 
that MEAN v Fletcher not only offers examples of these actions, but that evidence 
provided in the case provides foundational insights into the processes and practices that 





Opportunity Programs at Headquarters receives from each installation quarterly reports 
which deal primarily with Affirmative Action Program progress….the Director of the 
Discrimination Complaints Division in the Office of the Assistant Administrator receives 
monthly reports…concerning EEO counseling and formal complaints of discrimination.” 
Defendants’ Answers to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Interrogatories,15 Sep 1976, Box No. 
41, NARA I; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and Amend Class Certification or in the Alternative for a Stay of Proceedings, 23 Dec 
1975, 1-2, MEAN v Fletcher, Vol 1 12/16/74- 7/27/76, Box No. 41, NARA I. 
151 Order, Judge Charles Richey, 31 Mar 1976, Box 41, NARA I. 
152 “NASA’s problem appeared to be more systemic rather than a collection of individual 
complaints.” Fenrich, 220; McQuaid discussed self-segregation in Kim McQuaid, “The 
Space Age at the Grass Roots: NASA in Cleveland, 1958-1990” American Studies, Vol. 
47, No. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 124-127; he argued that “’institutionalized racism and 
sexism’ existed throughout NASA, it concluded.’[n]either simple pieties nor eloquent 
declarations of principle’ would change that fact.” Kim McQuaid, “'Racism, Sexism, and 
Space Ventures': Civil Rights at Nasa in the Nixon Era and Beyond" in Societal Impact of 
Spaceflight eds. Steven J Dick and Roger D Launius, (Washington DC: NASA History 
Division), 2007, 423.  
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III 
Power in Numbers: Class Action Lawsuit against NASA 
 
“This action seeks to uproot such employment discrimination at National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.”153 
 
Plaintiffs: Minority Employees at NASA (MEAN); Diane Moore, Rose Mary Ferguson, 
and Gloria Taliaferro (as individually named members of MEAN) 
Defendant: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, James Fletcher, 
Administrator).154 
 
 Minority Employees at NASA (MEAN)’s initial case accused agency-wide 
discrimination, including twelve complaints, ranging from structural issues to individual 
grievances. While the court did initially certify the case, NASA successfully hindered 
MEAN through bureaucratic stonewalling, leading to the case’s eventual demise. Once 
the case went to out of court settlement, the magistrate appointed to oversee individual 
settlements demonstrated that perhaps the court system, in addition to NASA, was 
unwilling to fairly litigate claims of racial discrimination.  
MEAN’s Case  
MEAN, Diane Moore, Rose Mary Ferguson, and Gloria Taliaferro filed a class 
action suit against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 
December 1974.155 This case sought declaratory judgment, mandamus, injunctive relief, 
and back pay to remediate MEAN’s essential claim that NASA had “violated the 
statutory and constitutional rights of the plaintiffs…to equal employment” by engaging in 
 
153 Signed draft of MEAN v Fletcher provided to the author by Taliaferro, 1.  
154 Initially, the case also named the United States Civil Service Commission (CSC), 
Robert Hampton, Ludwig Andolsek, and Jayne Spain “individually and in their official 
capacities” at the CSC, but that plaintiff was eventually dismissed. Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
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“policies, patterns and practices which unlawfully discriminate against blacks and 
females….with respect to recruitment, compensation, promotions and assignments.”156 
The plaintiffs defined the class to include all black and woman employees of NASA 
Headquarters (DC) who were denied (or would be denied) promotions or raises and had 
applied or would apply and be denied employment at NASA HQ because of racial or 
sexual discrimination.157  
The case referenced the third-party complaint, the MEAN letter, filed with 
Administrator Fletcher in March 1974. The twelve major claims of the case reflect 
MEAN’s initial concerns but were not a mere restatement of the letter. The last four 
claims concern Ferguson, Moore, and Taliaferro’s individual claims of discrimination. 
MEAN alleged that “the personnel system in NASA Headquarters is infected by policies, 
patterns and practices against blacks and women; its Equal Employment Opportunity 
Program is a sham.”158 MEAN claimed that not only did white men advance faster, get 
paid more, and receive more opportunities than black and woman employees, but also 
that the agency administrators “intimidated,” “set back,” and took “reprisals” against 
those who drew attention to discriminatory practices.159 Four claims were devoted to 
demonstrating that NASA Headquarters employed disproportionately low numbers of 
 
156 Ibid. 1.  
157 Ibid. 3-4.  
158 Ibid, 5.  
159 Ibid. 
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black men, black women, and women of any ethnicity, and these minority employees 
were largely ghettoized into low-paying, nonprofessional positions.160  
The other claims related to the discriminatory structures barring blacks from 
advancement within the agency, including arbitrary evaluation practices, preselection of 
candidates, and quieter forms of discrimination that prevented minority employees from 
competing for jobs. For example, MEAN noted that “white employees learn of openings 
by word of mouth through their friends in supervisory positions.”161 Additionally, 
minority employees faced discrimination through unfairly enforced education 
requirements and the failure of various Upward Mobility Programs (UMP) to 
meaningfully aid minority employees. MEAN alleged that minority employees were 
completely barred from some professional code blocks such as Life Sciences and 
Professional Scientific Engineering.162 At the time of hiring, blacks began at lower grade 
level positions when compared to whites. NASA placed minority employees into 
temporary or non-promotable positions at higher rates than whites, who were “almost 
always placed in permanent offices upon entering NASA employment.”163  
 
160 An article in the Howard Law Journal in 1984 confirmed, “NASA has been one of the 
poorest agencies in terms of equal employment for blacks and women. Blacks held in 
1980 only 2.5% of the executive positions (GS 16-18) and 3.1% of the professional level 
positions (GS 10-15).” Elliot M. Mincberg & Marc L. Fleischaker, "The Federal Sector 
Employment Project: Efforts by the Washington Lawyers' Committee to Combat 
Employment Discrimination in the Federal Government 1972-1983," Howard Law 
Journal 27, no. 4 (1984),1379 
161 MEAN v Fletcher in the author’s possession.  
162 Ibid. 6, 8.  
163 Not unsimilar to the discrimination women faced in British Civil Service in the 1960s, 
Marie Hicks, Programmed Inequality: How Britain Discarded Women Technologists and 
Lost its Edge in Computing. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 2017, 89. Ibid. 
 61 
Though established as an organization for the goal of anonymity, since the first 
complaint, NASA administrators attempted to discern who comprised MEAN.164 Once 
discovery in the case began, MEAN cooperated with NASA interrogatories, disclosing 
background information about the organization including when it was established, 
officers’ names & capacities—and all members’ names, addresses, race, sex, job title, 
and NASA installation of employment.165 All eleven MEAN members were employees at 
NASA Headquarters, and this revelation may have led to the eventual limitation of the 
class to black employees at solely NASA Headquarters, instead of all NASA 
installations.166 Though some members had been meeting informally since October 1973, 
MEAN was formally established 29 January 1974.167 Diane Moore, Gloria Taliaferro, 
and Rose Mary Ferguson were chair people and heads of committees for MEAN, as well 
as named plaintiffs representing the class.  
While the suit was filed as a class action, these women’s cases illustrated many of 
the system-wide discriminatory tactics that people of color faced as employees at NASA. 
Diane Moore’s claim centered around being denied appropriate and timely promotions. 
 
164 George Low Memo 6 May 1974, Subject: Meeting with Co-Chairpersons of the EEO 
Advisory Group, Folder: EEO Advisory Group (formerly concerned employees) #13691, 
George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal Employment Opportunity files, 
Box 32, NASA HQ, HRC, Washington DC (archive hereafter referred to as NASA HQ).  
165 Plaintiffs’ Answers to Defendants’ Second Set of Interrogatories, 9 Sep 1976, 6, 
MEAN v Fletcher, Vol 2 8/9/76 – 6/28/79, Box 41, RG 21, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-
12/31/1985, District Court of the United States US District Court for the District of 
Columbia, National Archives Building, Washington, DC, (archive is hereafter referred to 
as NARA I).  
166 This revelation may have begun the trajectory toward limiting the class action to 
NASA HQ, instead of all NASA installations. Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
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After working at NASA for close to four years, Moore transferred into the Equal 
Employment Opportunity office for Headquarters at a GS-6 level. She was promoted to a 
GS-7 after six months in the office—three months later than she had been promised the 
promotion.168 Additionally, “she absorbed work loads [sic] and responsibilities 
commensurate with those of higher positioned employees,” essentially functioning as  an 
EEO Specialist, a position she was qualified for but denied by her supervisors, “solely 
because of her race.”169  
Rose Mary Ferguson also brought allegations that NASA denied her promotions. 
Ferguson was hired into the clerical reserve, often referred to as the “floating typing 
pool,” in 1968. This typing pool was comprised of nonpermanent positions, and typists 
could not begin to advance until they gained a permanent position. On average, minority 
women spent considerably more time in the typing pool than white women.170 Ferguson 
waited three months for a permanent position. She received her promotion months after it 
was due, later than white counterparts who had less time in the grade than she had. In late 
1974, Ferguson had not received a promotion in over two years, even though during that 
time she earned two relevant associate degrees and had taken on the work of a higher 
position, and she met the requirements for “education, experience, and time in grade for 
 
168 Signed draft of MEAN v Fletcher in the author’s possession, 9.  
169 Ibid. 
170 From 1973-1975 A minority GS-2 typist spent, on average 80 days in clerical reserve. 
A white GS-2 spent 57 days. From 1975-1976, the time in clerical reserve averaged 73 
days for black typists and 49 days for white typists. Interrogatory 57 and Answer, 
Defendants’ Answers to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Interrogatories 15 Sep 1976, 12-13, Vol 
2, Box 41, NARA I.   
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promotion.”171 Another specific complaint presented in Ferguson’s case argued that 
NASA Upward Mobility programs discriminated against minority employees rather than 
helping them. The case alleged that UMP required her to, “remain at the present pay 
grade level for a full year before being considered for promotion, regardless of her 
experience, education and time in grade.”172 Such regulation had not applied to the 
previous white employee that held the exact position.  
Gloria Taliaferro had worked at NASA the longest of the three named plaintiffs, 
having been hired in 1966. Taliaferro’s claim alleged repeated denial of appropriate 
promotions, forcing her to switch career paths for a chance of advancement within the 
agency.173 She advanced from a GS-4 to a GS-6 over a period of three years, but at the 
time of the case, had not received a promotion in five years despite her supervisor’s 
repeated recommendations, completing work and bearing the responsibilities classified at 
least at a GS-7 level position, and having earned an associate degree from George 
Washington University.174 
 
171 MEAN v Fletcher in the author’s possession, 10. 
172 Ibid. 
173 “Plaintiff Taliaferro was forced to transfer to another office because of discriminatory 
and arbitrary treatment and denial of a well deserved [sic] promotion by a new 
supervisor.” MEAN v Fletcher in the author’s possession, 10.  
174 Federal employees pay is determined by the US Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM); positions receive “grades,” and promotions can be in grade “step” promotions, or 
entire grade promotions. Jobs increase in grade with increased requirements for 
experience, education, and/or skills. Most black women in secretarial positions at NASA 
at this point were between a GS-3 and GS-7. According to OPM regulations for 1974, a 
GS-3 would start at $6,764 and a GS-7 could make up to $13,679. By 1979, Gloria 
Taliaferro as a GS-7/Step 6 made $15,184 annually. See Figure 1, p. 72  “Rates of Pay 
Under the General Schedule Effective the first pay period beginning on or after October 
1, 1974,” Office of Personnel Management, 1974. https://archive.opm.gov/oca/ pre1994/ 
1974_GS.pdf; MEAN v Fletcher, 23 April 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I.  
 64 
From the beginning of the case, NASA attempted to limit MEAN’s ability to 
demonstrate racial discrimination on the systemic level. While gathering evidence before 
the trial, each side formed their strategies and arguments. From MEAN’s perspective, a 
case about systemic and structural discrimination necessitated some untraditional sources 
in order to gain insights into the motives behind NASA personnel decision making. For 
example, MEAN requested and then motioned to compel NASA to produce an “On-Site 
Surevey [sic] prepared by NASA’s Personnel Office during the summer of 1975, and all 
basic documents and working papers from which the survey was prepared.”175 NASA 
objected to the production of “basic documents and working papers” because,  
the accurate evaluation of personnel management is obviously vital to effective 
administration of any agency. The knowledge that the deliberative input into such 
an evaluation will become part of a public record must have the inevitable effect 
of rounding and dulling, sharp edged and cutting analyses. In an area such as 
personnel management evaluation where evaluation must often be subjective, 
legitimate criticism of individuals may be considerably “toned down” or 
eliminated of the individuated fact of such criticism could become known to the 
subject....By its terms, plaintiffs’ request would include “yellow scratch pads” and 
similar unorganized types of documents, an invasion of personally kept rather 
than institutional files, by general understanding privileged.176 
 
While NASA’s concerns are plausible, this defense highlighted the precise reason MEAN 
requested these particular documents: if the reasons for a personnel decision discussed 
privately varied significantly from the publicly stated reason for that decision, that fact 
alone leads to further suspicion that the decision was made because of an illegitimate 
reason, such as racial or sexual discrimination, or an overtly personal, not professional, 
reason.  
 
175 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 16 Aug 1976, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
176 Ibid. 
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NASA responded to several of MEAN queries for statistical information, such as 
which educational institutions job candidates were recruited and/or hired from or “how 
many positions are now occupied by minority women at less than the highest authorized 
grade level of those positions?” by responding that the agency did not record such 
information.177 Many other denials of information were based on the argument that 
information was irrelevant to the case.178 For example, NASA claimed that information 
concerning employee complaints of EEO counselors’ negative or biased attitudes toward 
discrimination complaints, was irrelevant to the case.179 NASA rejected other 
interrogatories as unclear or too vague to answer.180  
Another way NASA limited MEAN’s ability to demonstrate racial discrimination 
was a system which essentially allowed for no comparison from one employee in a 
position to their predecessor. MEAN’s counsel asked, “in how many positions now 
 
177 Defendants’ Answers to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Interrogatories, 15 Sep 1976, Vol 2, 
Box 41, NARA I. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Interrogatory 48 & Answer, Ibid. 
180 “Interrogatory 41: In how many instances has a minority person who complained of 
racial or sexual discrimination been removed by any personnel action from the branch in 
which the complaint arose?” “Answer: The interrogatory is objected to on the grounds 
that it is vague [sic] and the question is not understood in its present form It is unclear 
what is meant by the words “complained,” “removed,” and “branches.” The question 
could be construed as covering “removals” at the request of a complainant as part of an 
adjustment of the complaint. Or, it could cover “removals” which are unrelated to the fact 
that a complaint was made…the question could also be referring to any incidents of 
reprisal against a complainant as a result of a complaint being filed. If the latter is the 
intent of the question, the only way NASA would know about any such “removal” as a 
result of reprisal would be through the formal procedure under Civil Service Commission 
regulations for bringing allegations of reprisal.” Ibid.  
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occupied by a minority woman was the immediate predecessor a non-minority man 
serving at a higher grade [sic] level?” NASA responded:  
The general practice in NASA when a position becomes vacant is to “abolish” the 
existing position and reestablish a new position. The duties of the new position 
may or may not be identical to those of the vacated position. This practice results 
from the variable roles and missions of the several segments of the agency. Since 
the majority of NASA positions are established with initial grade levels lower that 
the ultimate potential of the position….it is usual for a newly appointed 
incumbent to have a lesser grade level than the immediate predecessor, if such 
predecessor had been in the position for an extended period of time. In any event, 
information is not maintained detailing the duties of former incumbents in 
positions that have been vacated and no “institutional memory” exists which 
would permit a reliable reconstitution of this data.181 
 
Policies such as this became a sticking point which negatively affected MEAN’s 
arguments in court, because NASA argued that even with evidence, MEAN could not 
definitively demonstrate that minority employees were compensated unfairly compared 
to their white and white male counterparts.  
Settlement 
 By April 1977, MEAN and NASA had begun out-of-court negotiations in order to 
seek a mutually agreeable settlement.182 A letter from Earl Silbert, US Attorney, to 
Thomas Hearity, one of MEAN’s lawyer, offers a glimpse into early negotiations, 
NASA feels that it should be possible to resolve this case short of litigation but, 
frankly, agreement to present proposals declares a knowing pattern of 
discrimination by NASA and requires NASA to agree to relief which exceed the 
most extreme ordered in any reported case. We feel that there is no basis for an 
agreement on such lines. We would like to meet again on this matter to ascertain 
 
181 Ibid. 
182 This fact was recognized by the court in July 1977. “Plaintiffs will be furnished by 
defendants with a current list…. of the names…of all present Black employees of NASA 
Headquarters for the purpose of facilitating settlement negotiations in this matter.” 
Consent Order, 18 Jul 1977, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
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whether there are any bridges, yet uncrossed, for reaching a mutually satisfactory 
resolution to this case.183 
 
NASA desired to settle out of court but communicated that an admission of guilt was a 
nonstarter. This became one of the first points of the Settlement, stating that NASA 
agreed to the Settlement, “to reaffirm its policy of employing and promoting qualified 
individuals without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or age, and as an 
effort to respond to perceptions that minority groups have not been properly represented 
in the NASA Headquarters workforce,” and was, “not to be construed as an admission of 
liability.”184 Taliaferro, one of MEAN’s chairpersons, expressed dismay at this provision 
of the Settlement,  
RC: In the Settlement they say, we’re entering into this settlement voluntarily to 
deal with accusations and perceptions that NASA has not been fair, and we admit 
no— 
GT: No wrongdoing.  
RC: What did you think about that?  
GT: I hated it. I said, that’s the caveat of most discrimination complaints. If you 
look at—they’re doing that now! “We don’t take any kind of responsibility”—
they don’t take any responsibility for what they’ve done. That’s the caveat. 185 
… 
GT: We got some recognition. Some people were rewarded. And we had NASA 
on their toes.186 
 
 
183 Letter from Earl Silbert to Thomas Hearity, dated 7 April 1977, filed 20 Jun 1978, Vol 
2, Box 41, NARA I.  
184 Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order, 20 September 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, 
NARA I. 
185 Gloria Taliaferro, Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 20 
October 2019 (hereafter cited as Taliaferro 20 October 2019).   
186 Taliaferro 20 October 2019.  
 68 
As a term of the Settlement, MEAN and NASA agreed to limit the class certification to 
black employees of NASA Headquarters.187 Apparently, this concession was 
dissatisfactory to some MEAN members, “that pissed us off—he restricted us to 
Headquarters.”188 The Settlement assured that NASA would not take reprisals against any 
individuals involved in the case and settlement. Specific provisions included instituting 
40-hour training for EEO counselors and production and distribution of an EEO 
handbook which would “clearly [describe] the administrative discrimination complaint 
system and procedures.”189 In order to address deficiencies of minority employees in 
code blocks 500-600, NASA would promote minorities “at least in proportion to their 
representation…to the extent feasible.”190 The Settlement established specific goals for 
the Upward Mobility Programs, including the GO, STEP, and Continuing Education 
Programs. Additionally, NASA administrators committed to communicate affirmative 
action goals to “appropriate” NASA Headquarters supervisors to ensure that training, 
work assignments, and authority be delegated acceptably among their subordinates.191 To 
aid in the implementation of these goals, a department’s EEO performance would 
become part of supervisors’ own work evaluations.   
 
187 These employees also had to have been employed on 11 February 1974. Black NASA 
employees no longer covered by the scope of the case and the settlement were informed 
of their right to file an individual complaint within 30 days of receiving the notice. Notice 
of Decertification of Class, 12 Jun 1978; Motion for Class Certification, 18 May 1978; 
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for Class Certification,18 May 1978, 2 Jun 
1978; Order, 12 Jun 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
188 Gloria Taliaferro, phone conversation with the author, 5 May 2019. 





As accountability, NASA was required to make statistical data and public EEO 
reports available to MEAN’s lawyers for three years after the Settlement. Within this 
three-year period, if NASA failed to implement the terms of the Settlement, MEAN and 
NASA lawyers would meet informally to resolve it. The case could be reopened in the 
event it could not be resolved informally. The NASA Administrator, NASA Director of 
Equal Opportunity Programs, NASA Headquarters Personnel Director, and the EEO 
Officer would be responsible for implementing the settlement.192 The parties were to 
negotiate attorneys’ fees, but if unable to settle, MEAN’s counsel could file a motion for 
attorney’s fees.193 On 12 May 1978, MEAN and NASA signed a Stipulation of 
Settlement, which after Court approval on 20 September 1978, formally resolved the 
case.194  
On 10 September 1979, Rod Boggs and Thomas Hearity filed a Status Report on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, one year since the Settlement.195 This report stated that too little 
time had passed to tell if NASA was compliant with the class-wide relief measures 
stipulated in the Settlement, but remained “hopeful” that future reports would indeed 
show compliance and “demonstrate that equal employment opportunity, without regard to 
race, is now an established fact within NASA.”196 This report also requested that 









Settlement for MEAN, settled with NASA for attorney’s fees in the amount of 
$78,520.03.198 Unable to settle, Rod Boggs, another main attorney for MEAN, motioned 
the court that NASA pay $30,598 in fees.199 The court awarded Boggs $20,240.200  
The Settlement appointed a Special Master, a US Magistrate, to oversee 
settlements or recommend relief in individual claims. NASA had initially argued against 
class action status for the case on the basis that “the unique factual pattern of each of the 
representative plaintiffs” made it impossible to provide relief to the class.201 NASA 
successfully broke down the class action into individual claims, where in order to gain 
any relief, each individual had to prove his or her individual claim, removing the 
protection of anonymity, and exposing an individual to the hardship of personally suing 






198 Settlement Agreement and Release, 14 Apr 1981, Box 42, NARA I.  
199 Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 7 Aug 1981, MEAN v Frosch, United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (hereafter referred to as “US Court of 
Appeals, DC”), No. 82-1071, September Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I. 
200 “The Court is in full agreement [with NASA] that the claimed hours are excessive… it 
would be a waste of attorney time and judicial resources to get bogged down in every 
little minute detail…the Court will delete 20% of the hours claimed.” The Court also 
ruled to reduce Boggs’ hourly fee from $125/hr to $100/hr based on what he had 
previously been awarded. Memorandum Opinion of United States District Judge Charles 
R. Richey, 19 Nov 1981, Box 43, NARA I.  





NASA successfully broke down MEAN’s class action into individual complaints, 
halting MEAN’s ability to demonstrate the systemic and structural nature of 
discrimination. While the individuals were no longer demonstrating a class action, but 
rather seeking relief on the individual level, their claims illustrated how NASA’s 
systemic attitudes and organizational structures deeply affected individuals’ lives. 
Challenging the system that perpetrated “economic indignities” often left an individual 
more vulnerable than remaining silent.202 These cases highlight how black employees 
were excluded from professional code block positions, did equal work for lesser pay, and 
were consistently passed over for promotions and educational opportunities. Beyond 
disparate outcomes in pay or hiring into professional jobs, black employees experienced 
intimidation and worked in environments where they were not treated in a collegial 
manner. Taken as a group, these cases demonstrate a pattern of discrimination; however, 
NASA refused to clearly define discrimination. When an individual brought a claim of 
discrimination, NASA, even if finding the situation “unfair” or “unfortunate,” usually 
denied—without explanation—that it was racially motivated. NASA refused to recognize 
instances as evidences of discrimination; when pressed, NASA officials were unable or 
 
202 “This report is dedicated to two groups of people—those who have been victims of 
economic indignities. Those who are indignant enough to do something about it.” EEO 
Report, 21 September 1973, Folder: NASA Equal Employment Opportunity Program, 
Box: George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical Subject Files, Equal Employment Opportunity 
files #2, #13883, Box #33 NASA HQ, HRC, Washington DC (archive hereafter referred 
to as NASA HQ). 
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unwilling to define what they would consider discrimination.203 Breaking the class action 
into individual suits allowed NASA to subject employees to intense, personal scrutiny. 
NASA defense’s strategy, which was often successful, was to whittle even an 
individual’s complaint down to one instance, stamping out an ability to exhibit a pattern 
of systematic discrimination.  
Figure 1: OPM/NASA Grade-Step Pay Scale, 1974204 
The MEAN Settlement Agreement named individuals whose claims of racial 
discrimination would be eligible to seek relief by hearings before a Special Master, US 
Magistrate Lawrence Margolis, under the umbrella of this Settlement. Their names were:  
Samuel L. Alexander 
Deloris A. Dixon 
Rose Mary Ferguson 
Curtis Gilmore 
 
203 “’Well I didn’t find any discrimination.’ And I said, ‘you didn’t?’ Well, I said, ‘well 
where have you seen it before, so you can recognize it again?’  And he—he had never 
seen discrimination.” Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. 
204 “Rates of Pay Under the General Schedule Effective the first pay period beginning on 
or after October 1, 1974,” Office of Personnel Management, 1974, https://archive.opm. 
gov/oca/pre1994/1974_GS.pdf, accessed 4 Mar 2020. 
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Juanita S. Jackson  
Amy A. Knight 
Hasseltine B. Lewis  
Theodore R. Lucas  
Diane A. Moore 
Gloria T. Taliaferro 
Alcine F. Pike 
Mary L. Pike  
Gloria L. Todd  
Lawrence Walters 
 
The Settlement allowed any additional members of the class to apply to the Court; 
Barbara Johnson and James Dixon both used this avenue to present their complaints.205 
The appointed Special Master would supervise individual settlements and, if necessary, 
hear claims. To expedite claims that required a trial, the Settlement laid out a schedule of 
restraints on each phase of the process. For example, each party was allowed only one 
deposition, one request for documents, and one set of interrogatories, unless given special 
permission by the magistrate.206 The Special Master would generally include a 
“recommendation as to whether the claimant has prevailed…[and] an order directing that 
appropriate relief ” in his findings of fact and conclusion of law, within 30 days of the 
final brief submissions. Claimant or defendant could object to the Special Master’s 
 
205 Johnson sent a letter to the Court, asking for her claim be included in the Settlement, 
but there are no further records of her claim in the case files. Barbara Johnson to Charles 
R Richey, U.S. District Judge, dated 20 July 1978, filed 27 Jul 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, 
NARA I. Statement of James T. Dixon, NASA black male employee, submitted to 
Honorable James F. Davey US. District Court, dated 25 Aug 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, 
Container 42, RG 21, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-12/31/1985, District Court of the 
United States US District Court for the District of Columbia, National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC, (archive is hereafter referred to as NARA I). 
206 Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order, 20 Sep 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
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recommendations only on the basis that they were, “clearly erroneous as to matters of 
fact or contrary to law.”207 Individuals began to file claims in February 1979.  
Nine individuals filed complaints.208 Each of the individual claims brought under 
the Settlement argued that NASA Headquarters personnel had discriminated against them 
on the basis of race, usually in the form of denying promotions, downgrading a job 
classification when a minority took the job after a white employee, being passed over for 
promotions in favor of less qualified white competitors, and denial of educational 
opportunities. The wide range of offices that the individuals worked in highlights the 
thoroughly structural nature of discrimination at NASA Headquarters. 
The individual complaints had much in common, sharing many of the same legal 
and even factual details. In every case, MEAN consistently debated NASA on the basic 
definition of what discrimination looked like. For example, in several of these cases, 
NASA EEO counselors suggested that a complainant make a lateral shift out of whatever 
office they worked in. Counselor often deemed discrimination complaints to be 
interpersonal problems within the particular office, rather than investigating whether 
managers or employees were engaging in discriminatory practices.  
Another issue individual claims repeatedly addressed was education, either an 
employee’s educational qualifications or being eligible to participate in NASA education 
programs. NASA officials, when pressed about racial equality at NASA, often bemoaned 
that black employees simply were not as well qualified educationally as white employees. 
 
207 Ibid. 
208 MEAN, Rose Mary Ferguson, v Beggs, No. 82-2367, decided December 20, 1983, No. 
82-2367, Box 43, NARA I. 
 75 
While black employees sometimes had a lower educational level than some white 
employees, when black employees attempted to avail themselves of NASA educational 
programs in order to better their positions, NASA supervisors often denied them the 
opportunity. Nancy MacLean argued that this behavior and attitude was normative across 
corporate America at the time, 
the insincerity of such arguments became manifest when business spokesmen 
showed no interest in helping blacks help themselves improve their 
qualifications…Conforming to a common pattern, one corporate representative 
complained that the combination of civil rights pressure and automation 
“increases the problem of hiring and even advancing persons without adequate 
background, education, experience and ability.” While powerful white opponents 
claimed that blacks lacked qualifications, almost none tried to assist them in 
becoming qualified….the truth was that most mangers did not want to be 
bothered, and were at best indifferent to injustice.209 
 
Another evidence that these cases did indeed show systemic problems at NASA 
was the fact that at various points in 1979-1980, similar issues arose in multiple 
individual claims, and they were combined for Margolis’s deliberation on a specific 
point. Throughout the processes of resolving these claims, claimants and the defendant 
argued over what the Settlement allowed for. An issue that arose in nearly every case was 
debate over how the scope of discovery was limited. The controversy centered around 
whether it was the time length of discovery or the scope of discovery that was to be 
curtailed. Plaintiff argued that it was the former, while the defendant interpreted the 
Settlement to mean that claimants could request documents pertaining to only his or 
herself. NASA argued that “the real problem exists not with the terms of the 
 
209 Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2006, 68.  
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Stipulation…but with the misguided and improper interpretation of the Stipulation by 
counsels for the plaintiff class…who are unfamiliar with and did not participate in the 
development of the Stipulation.”210 The plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the Settlement was 
entered into to ensure that these individuals claims would be resolved quickly, “for this 
reason, plaintiffs agreed that claimants would be limited to one round of discovery. It was 
not the intention of the plaintiffs to limit the scope of discovery to which individual 
claimant’s [sic] are entitled….defendant has improperly applied that characterization [of 
‘class action discovery’] to any discovery requests which calls for information not 
directly connected with specific instances of discriminatory action.”211   
On 29 February 1980, roughly one year from when the claims—claims that were 
supposed to be resolved within six months—went to court, Magistrate Margolis ordered 
on NASA’s side,  
“(i)t is the intent of this Stipulation that a claimant be afforded an opportunity to 
present a claim respecting a personnel action or failure of action with respect to 
himself or herself.” (emphasis added). Section XIII (C) (6) limits interrogatories 
and request for production of documents to what is “…relevant to the claim of the 
individual claimant.” (emphasis added). It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court 
that, contrary to the general procedures followed in Title VII cases, the text of the 
Stipulation makes it clear that the individual claims were intended by the parties 
to be presented in strictly limited proceedings  and that statistical data and other 
information pertaining to the class is beyond the scope of allowable and stipulated 
discovery.  
Statistical data and other information directly relevant to individual claims such as 
limited department, division, or section statistics may be obtainable by Claimants 
and confined to the department, division, or section in which the alleged 
discrimination occurred…. 
 
210 Joint Affidavit of Richard J. Wieland and Tobey W. Kaczensky, 17 Oct 1979, Vol 5, 
Box 42, Container 43, NARA I. 
211 Claimants’ Supplement Memorandum Relating to the Scope of Discovery, 28 Sep 
1979, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I.  
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Interrogatories and requests for documents…[shall] be limited to information 
directly relevant to the specific job(s) and the specific person involved in each 
individual claim.212 
 
MEAN lawyers and plaintiffs found this measure a devastating blow that fundamentally 
altered their ability to prove cases. They viewed it as evidence that the court system was 
not yet ready to acknowledge the civil rights of minority citizens.213 MEAN rejected 
Margolis’s interpretation as deeply unfair and an inaccurate interpretation of the 
Stipulation to which the claimants had previously agreed. Taliaferro’s lawyer Rachel 
Trinder related her views on the court’s opinion.  
The way I saw it, … [the court placed] limits on even looking for evidence. I saw 
it as part of an overall pattern to keep these African American claimants down. 
The Magistrate’s Order was so limiting that as a practical matter it killed any 
opportunity to develop meaningful evidence. If you're prevented by the court 
system from even searching for the evidence needed to support your case, then 
your civil rights regarding racial discrimination are so limited that they become 
almost nonexistent. It gave me further insight into the devastating impact of 
NASA Headquarters’ actions on these employees, and from a lawyer’s 
perspective it was incredibly disheartening to see the court system add to their 
burdens by in effect gutting their cases through discovery limitations.  It’s one 
thing for a court to rule against a plaintiff based on a panoply of evidence, but to 
see the court prevent that evidence from even being collected was 
heartbreaking.214   
 
NASA repeatedly refused to supply statistical data, arguing such data was irrelevant to 
individual claims. The claimants argued that their “entitlement to statistical data is one of 
substance which goes to the heart of their claims.”215 Further, the plaintiffs argued that 
 
212 Order, 29 Feb 1980, Lawrence S. Margolis, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I.  
213 Rachel Trinder, phone conversation with the author, 10 May 2019; Motion for 
Reconsideration, 18 Mar 1980, Box 42, NARA I. 
214 Rachel Trinder, phone conversation with the author, 10 May 2019; Trinder email 
communication with the author, 22 March 2020.  
215 Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration, 8 Apr 
1980, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I.  
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without statistical data, they were under “severe handicaps” and this violated the 
“Stipulation’s purported promise, that each claimant ‘be afforded an opportunity to 
present a claim respecting a personnel action or failure of action with respect to himself 
or herself.’”216 
Six lawyers, on behalf of the plaintiffs, motioned that Judge Richey, who had 
jurisdiction over the Settlement, reconsider Margolis’s motion.217 They framed the 
question in this way “did the parties intend to foreclose discovery of statistical data to 
which they would otherwise be entitled under Title VII and pertinent case law?”218 The 
plaintiffs argued that statistical data was “crucial” to establishing a case, and argued 
against Margolis’s opinion that the Settlement curtailed the plaintiffs’ Title VII rights, 
quoting the Stipulation, “‘The issues involved in individual claim proceedings shall be 
resolved in accordance with the law governing Title VII actions in the federal courts.’”219 
When Margolis dismissed Rose Mary Ferguson, Diane Moore, and Gloria 
Taliaferro’s claims, each appealed in the Court of Appeals on the basis that Margolis had 
improperly limited their scope of discovery, leading to their inability to properly prove 
their cases. These three cases were consolidated and heard by a panel of three judges. The 
Court stated in their decision that “the magistrate improperly inferred…that the parties 
also intended to limit the substantive scope of discovery… we emphasize that it is an 
 
216 Additionally, the plaintiffs’ argued from case precedent that, “statistical proof may 
alone be used, without presentation of specific instances of discrimination, to establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination.” Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to 
Claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration, 8 Apr 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I. 




abuse of discretion to prevent a Title VII plaintiff from obtaining information that is vital 
to proving a discrimination claim.”220 Because of this abuse of discretion and the belief 
that expanded discovery may allow Taliaferro to satisfactorily prove her case, the Court 
remanded Taliaferro’s case to the District Court for further proceedings.221 However, 
Richey affirmed the lower court’s decision for NASA in the cases of Diane Moore and 
Rose Mary Ferguson. Neither Moore nor Ferguson appealed the Court’s ruling, and their 
claims were closed in 1983. Because of the length and comparative complexity of her 
case, Gloria Taliaferro’s case will be discussed in the following chapter.222 The remaining 
individual plaintiff’s stories show the broader frustration.  
Samuel Alexander 
NASA Headquarters employed Samuel Alexander, a black man, from 1975 – 
1977.223 He worked as an Equal Opportunity Specialist, GS-11/4. Alexander alleged that, 
compared to similarly situated coworkers, both man and woman white employees, he was 
denied promotions he was eligible for, on the basis of his race and sex.224 He had filed a 
complaint with Headquarters EEO that he was denied promotions, his job was 
 
220 While he did eventually rule for the plaintiffs, in May 1980, Judge Richey denied 
Taliaferro’s appeal. Order, 12 May 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I; MEAN, Rose Mary 
Ferguson, v Beggs, No. 82-2367, decided Dec 20, 1983, No. 82-2367, Box 43, NARA I. 
221 “Because the discovery limitation may have denied appellant Gloria Taliaferro access 
to information that was central to her claim of disparate treatment, we remand her claim 
for further proceedings.” MEAN, Rose Mary Ferguson, v Beggs, No. 82-2367, decided 
Dec 20, 1983, No. 82-2367, Box 43, NARA I. 
222 Discussion of individual claimants is organized in alphabetical order.  
223 He transferred to the Department of Housing and Urban Development after leaving 
NASA. Amended Claim of Samuel L. Alexander, 18 Jun 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
224 Alexander supplied examples of coworkers’ promotions and claimed discrimination 
on the basis of race and sex. Ibid. 
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misclassified, and, he was denied “equal terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”225 In this complaint, he detailed discrimination and harassment, alleging 
that after an argument with his supervisor, Peter Chen, Deputy Assistant Administrator 
for Equal Opportunity Programs, Chen harassed and mistreated and “influenced others in 
the office to also harass [Alexander].”226 In his complaint before Magistrate Margolis, 
Alexander reported that Chen had also given Alexander’s potential new employer 
(General Services Administration’s National Archives), “inaccurate, false, or misleading 
information” about him, resulting in Alexander being denied employment. The EEO 
counselor who, in the course of his investigation, spoke with Alexander’s coworkers to 
understand the dynamics in the office, reported that other employees “complained of 
Sam’s wife being a real problem to the office. If anyone was being harassed they 
were.”227 By August 19, 1976, Alexander, together with Duward Crow, Associate Deputy 
Administrator, had agreed to withdraw his discrimination complaint if, “a competent 
authority, would evaluate his current job.”228 The audit did not satisfy Alexander.229 
Alexander claimed that NASA retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint, 
by “arbitrarily and illegally, chang[ing] the rating criteria” for an EEO Specialist, after he 
 
225 Amended Claim of Samuel L. Alexander. 
226 Carolyn W. Shovely Memo to HQ Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, Subject: 
EEO Counseling Report on Mr. Samuel L. Alexander, filed 14 Jul 1976, Vol 4, Box 42, 
NARA I. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Samuel L. Alexander Memo to Associate Deputy Administrator, Subject: Withdrawal 
of Complaint of Discrimination Complaint [sic] 19 Aug 1976, Vol 4, Box 42, NARA I.  
229 Duward Crow to Samuel L. Alexander, 10 Sep 1976, Vol 4, Box 42, NARA I.  
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had already applied.230 Lastly, Alexander stated that he was given a warning for poor 
work performance, but he believed that it, “was in fact issued because plaintiff had filed a 
complaint.”231 NASA initially responded to Alexander’s claim by denying any 
wrongdoing and requesting dismissal.232 Subsequently, NASA argued that the court 
lacked jurisdiction.233  
 Alexander’s pretrial statement argued that though he was qualified, and his 
position had non-competitive potential to GS-12, he was not promoted for nearly two 
years.234 He argued that he was not selected for another position he applied for, EEO 
Specialist, because NASA illegally “preselected a Hispanic male.”235 Alexander argued 
that he was entitled to $9,701 in backpay.236 NASA’s pretrial statement responded that 
“the plaintiff’s position was properly classified, that he was not entitled to a 
reclassification…and that the decision not to reclassify…was not based on race,” and that 
Alexander was “clearly” not the most qualified candidate for the position for which he 
applied and was not selected.237 Last, NASA denied the allegation that Peter Chen’s 
 
230 Motion to Amend Claim of Samuel L. Alexander, 30 May 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, 
NARA I. 
231 Work Review attached as Tab B alongside Answer to Amended Claim of Samuel L. 
Alexander, 28 Jun 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I; Motion to Amend Claim of Samuel L. 
Alexander, 30 May 1979.  
232 Answer to Claim of Samuel L. Alexander, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
233 NASA argued this because Alexander claimed NASA discriminated against him on 
the basis of race and sex and the class covered only racial discrimination. Answer to 
Amended Claim of Samuel L. Alexander, 28 Jun 1979.   
234 Pretrial Statement of Samuel Alexander, 12 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 42, NARA I. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, (Claim of Samuel Alexander), 15 Aug 1980, Vol 7, 
Box 42, NARA I. 
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statements were false or that these statements negatively affected Alexander’s application 
to the GSA.238 After extended negotiations, Alexander settled with NASA.239 NASA 
denied discrimination had occurred and would not pay attorneys’ fees. Alexander 
received $1,750.00.240 
James Dixon 
James Dixon, a black man, began his career at NASA Headquarters in January 
1974 as an EEO specialist. He claimed that his promotion had been unfairly delayed by 
ten months beyond the time he became eligible. Additionally, he was authorized to attend 
only one out of five classes directly pertinent to his position, leaving him vulnerable to a 
reduction of GS-level.241 Dixon observed that whites were promoted at a quicker pace 
than minority employees, and he related an example of how NASA’s old-boys network 
negatively impacted minority employees, leading to even increased job vulnerability, “In 
response to a question as to who is qualified to conduct a program evaluation, the 
Director quickly named two non-Black males who are not assigned to the Evaluation 
Division. I reminded the Director that function was clearly my responsibility. The impact 
of these discriminatory actions could result in my position being downgraded and loss of 
 
238 Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, (Claim of Samuel Alexander). 
239 Initially, Alexander’s trial had been scheduled for Nov 26, 1980, Notice of Trial 
Schedule, 25 Jun 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I. 
240 The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights coordinated pro bono lawyers, 
who received payment only when the case was won. Settlement Agreement and Release, 
(Claim of Samuel L. Alexander), 2 Mar 1981, Vol 9, Box 42, NARA I.  
241 Dixon began at a GS-12 and earned promotion to a GS-13. Claim of James Dixon, 14 
Feb 1979, Vol 2 Box 41, NARA I. 
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income.”242 NASA argued that Dixon, “was not automatically entitled to” the promotion 
Dixon had claimed he received ten months late.243 NASA denied any wrongdoing and 
requested that Dixon’s case be dismissed. The outcome of Dixon’s case is not recorded in 
the case files.  
Rose Mary Ferguson 
Rose Mary Ferguson was hired at NASA in 1968 as a clerk-typist, GS-3. In 
eleven years, she rose to a GS-11 program analyst in the Space Transportation Systems 
Operations office.244 In her initial claim before Magistrate Margolis, Ferguson claimed 
that some of her responsibilities were reassigned to a white employee, putting that 
employee on track to become an administrative technician. The removal of these 
responsibilities from Ferguson meant that she was, “prevented, at least in part on the 
basis of her race, from obtaining a promotion to a position as an administrative 
technician,” which was a promotion from GS-6/3 to GS-7/2.245 Ferguson later applied for 
“several” positions, but each went to a white employee or was cancelled.246 NASA drew 
attention to the fact that Ferguson had received a promotion through the GO program 
and, through Merit Promotion, eventually received a position with career ladder potential 
to GS-12, and had received appropriate step increases.247 NASA denied any wrongdoing 
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and requested that Ferguson’s case be dismissed. The case was not dismissed and went to 
trial in 1980. NASA argued in a pretrial statement that Ferguson did not apply for the 
position she claimed she was not selected for because of discrimination and that had she 
applied, she would have been legitimately not selected because she was selected for 
another position.248 On Ferguson’s second allegation, that NASA had cancelled four 
positions “in order to prevent” her from being selected and subsequently filled the 
positions with all nonminority candidates, NASA argued that the positions were 
cancelled, and therefore no one was selected.249  
Ferguson’s pretrial statement requested $16,500 in backpay as well as a projected 
$7,500 in attorney’s fees, and compensation for leave time used in connection with the 
case.250 Margolis dismissed all of Ferguson’s claims of discrimination.251 Ferguson 
appealed Margolis’s ruling, arguing,  
there is ample evidence in the record to compel an inference of discriminatory 
intent….No other inference can be drawn from defendant’s cancellation of four 
vacancies for which only blacks applied, in an agency where there is a dramatic 
underrepresentation of minority professionals, where defendant repeatedly has 
failed to explain the cancellation and, where jobs similar to three of the cancelled 
positions were contemporaneously filled by whites.252 
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Ferguson filed exceptions to the Special Master’s findings, arguing that Margolis had 
“erred as a matter of law on ruling that she had not set forth a prima facie case”253 In this 
document, she argued that in light of the fact that the court found NASA to be non-
compliant with increasing “levels of black representation in the professional job 
categories at NASA,” Ferguson argued that this cast doubt on the assumption of non-
discriminatory reasons behind NASA’s actions against her.254 Judge Richey subsequently 
denied Ferguson’s appeal and adopted Margolis’s ruling.255 Ferguson lost her case and 
received no relief except attorneys’ fees. 
Curtis Gilmore 
Curtis Gilmore was a black male who began his career at NASA Headquarters in 
1972. At the time he brought his claim, Gilmore was employed at Goddard Spaceflight 
Center, but his complaint concerned discrimination while employed at Headquarters as a 
clerk/typist in the Personnel Division. Gilmore applied for a GS-5 personnel management 
specialist trainee position, which had promotion potential to a GS-13. According to 
Gilmore’s claim, he was passed over in favor of a white female who had, “lesser 
experience and qualifications in the personnel field than Mr. Gilmore possessed.”256 He 
was unable to secure a position in a professional grade, and was passed over for “training 
and educational opportunities which would have enhanced his ability to compete for 
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other professional personnel-related positions in NASA.”257 While affirming the basic 
facts of the claim, NASA denied any wrongdoing.258 Gilmore’s counsel, Dennis Adelson, 
requested the entire personnel record for Gilmore and seven others to compare the 
qualifications of Gilmore’s competitors for the personnel management specialist 
position.259 NASA objected to answering the majority of Gilmore’s interrogatories, 
usually because they considered the questions vague or irrelevant to the case. When 
Gilmore asked if minority applicants were asked different questions in their interviews 
than white applicants, NASA responded that such a question was “nonsensical, 
conclusional, and misleading.”260 NASA requested that the claim be dismissed. In the 
midst of litigating this case, Gilmore ended his employment at NASA in March 1979.261 
Similarly to Gloria Todd’s claim, Gilmore’s counsel, Adelson, pressed that NASA 
counsel was being “disingenuous” in their responses to Gilmore’s requests for documents 
or interrogatories, and that NASA attorneys had not given their, “best efforts to obtain the 
requested information.”262 Gilmore’s claim specifically dealt with a broader issue within 
race relations of NASA: NASA’s refusal to define and acknowledge discrimination. 
Taliaferro explained the problem this way,  
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GT: they didn’t have any policy. Defining meaning for it [discrimination]. They 
refused to acknowledge it. So they wouldn’t have to define the meaning for it. “Is 
that the right word?”…In other words, it doesn’t exist here. Because we don’t 
have to address it as long as it—"We don’t do that!” That’s what it is. You 
understand what I’m saying? …all them words they use—that’s a bunch of craw. 
You understand? “Wh, why—we don’t do that!”263 
 
When NASA repeatedly denied claimants comparative statistical data, claiming it was 
“irrelevant” to individual claims, Gilmore’s attorney argued that, “it is true that some of 
these materials may relate to the treatment of other persons at NASA, both black and 
white. This is because the concept of racial discrimination comprehends the treatment of 
persons differently on the basis of their race. No claim can be litigated if information 
relating to persons other than the claimant is barred, for no comparisons of treatment can 
be made.”264 Adelson argued against NASA’s repeated attempts to whittle a claim down 
to one instance, explaining that racial discrimination is “a series of attitudes, policies and 
actions, which may exist over a period of time and be manifested in numerous ways and 
instances…the plaintiff here claims that he was the subject of a pattern of discrimination 
which found expression in various forms.”265 The record reflects the attorneys’ 
exasperation, and Gilmore filed to go to trial.266 NASA’s pretrial statement argued that 
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Gilmore, while minimally qualified for promotion, was not the “best qualified.”267 The 
candidate chosen already held a position at the GS-5/4 level and was a college graduate, 
while Gilmore was a high school graduate.268 Gilmore’s pretrial statement argued that he 
entitled to $11,625.26 in backpay.269 The outcome of Gilmore’s case is not recorded in 
the official court files of the case. 
Theodore Lucas 
Theodore Lucas was a black male employed at NASA from February 1975 – July 
1975 as an investigator, where he specialized in investigating EEO complaints.270 He 
argued that he faced discriminatory hiring practices that resulted in inappropriate grade 
level classification. Lucas claimed that a less well-qualified investigator was hired at the 
same time at a GS-12, while Lucas was classified as a GS-11.271 In a deposition, Lucas, 
was asked, “to list all the factors which indicated to him that [NASA]…had discriminated 
against him on account of his race.” He discussed several “incidents and factors which he 
observed or experienced.” 272 The day Lucas was hired, Cummings assigned him the 
MEAN complaint to review and “make a determination and recommendation” to 
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Cummings and Harriet Jenkins the Headquarters EEO officer, who would make a 
recommendation to the NASA administrator.273 Lucas felt that the MEAN complaint had 
put “a lot of pressure” on Cummings “to hire a black…and he was going to give him as 
little as possible.”274 Lucas described Cummings belittling his experience, treating him 
coolly—even unprofessionally—and being generally rude and condescending. Lucas felt 
he was treated quite differently than the white men employed in the office.275 Lucas then 
described a letter he received that related, “an incident in which James Cummings, the 
claimant’s former supervisor at NASA headquarters, made certain racist 
statements…which were derogatory to black employees in general, and, by implication, 
to Mr. Lucas in particular.”276 Lucas initially declined to produce or discuss the letter 
further for fear of reprisal on coworkers, but eventually stated that Diane Moore had 
mailed him the letter.277 This anonymous letter, sent by Diane Moore, to Dr. Fletcher and 
blind carbon copied to Ruth Bates Harris reads in part,  
A point for you to ponder:  
Some time ago… you indicated that future hires at NASA should be minorities 
and females. When you make a statement of this type, don’t you wish it could be 
carried out?... 
When you made this statement, James Cummings said very loudly that “Fletcher 
does not tell me who to hire in my office…why should I listen to him. Besides, I 
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don’t want any blacks working for me and I will not hire another one. I hired one, 
he left, thank God, and I won’t hire another one…”  
Guess what! He didn’t hire one either. Of the three vacancies he had in 
Headquarters, he placed three white males. This person Dr. Fletcher is your 
Director of Inspections, the person who is the prime one in charge of the 
investigations of complaints at all of NASA. Is this indicative of your heads of 
offices.278 
 
This letter demonstrated how infected NASA personnel was with discriminatory 
attitudes; it highlighted the necessity of NASA managerial and supervisory involvement 
in meeting EEO goals, because without their commitment, the EEO policies would 
indeed remain a “sham.”279  
There is no record of the outcome of Lucas’s case in the official court records of 
the case. 
Diane Moore 
Diane Moore, a black woman, began her career at NASA in 1969; she worked at 
both Goddard Spaceflight Center and NASA HQ. Her complaint concerned her time as a 
secretary-stenographer (GS-7) for the NASA HQ EEO Officer, NASA Emergency 
Coordinator, and HQ Safety Officer, in 1974.280 Moore’s claim states that Donald Lichty, 
her supervisor, promised her a promotion to a GS-9, as an EEO Specialist. Moore 
claimed that a white female held the same position, at the GS-9 level, while Moore 
remained a GS-7/5.281 She filed a discrimination complaint, through HQ EEO, at this 
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point. Moore described repeatedly being denied promotions for the next three years. For 
the academic year of 1977-1978, Moore “received a fellowship to a graduate study 
program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”),” and after completion, 
returned to NASA as at her previous classification, a GS-7. NASA clarified that the 
program Moore completed was a, “non-degree program,” and pointed out that she was 
paid her full salary in addition to tuition, fees, books and supplies, during her time 
away.282  
Moore argued that she was assigned a workload typically assigned to the EEO 
Officer and Specialists, but NASA countered that these, “duties were routine tasks of her 
position as secretary to the Headquarters EO Officer.”283 She was detailed to Goddard to 
do work that a white male, classified as a GS-12, had previously done. Moore remained 
classified as a GS-7.284 NASA argued, with support from a memorandum dated 13 July 
1978, that Moore’s detail to Goddard “was arranged to provide a developmental 
assignment, an opportunity to utilize your recent experience and training.”285 Moore’s 
counsel, John Davis, filed seventy-six interrogatories for NASA to answer, which NASA 
motioned against as “unduly oppressive and irrelevant,” arguing the Moore’s counsel 
took a “‘shot-gun’ approach, which bears no relation to her individual administrative or 
judicial complains, has been adopted in violation of the specific terms of the Stipulation 
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of Settlement.”286 NASA accused Moore of attempting to litigate a “full panoply of 
claims and issues presented in the case MEAN v Frosch, under the thin guise of a purely 
‘individual’ claim.”287 Moore’s counsel argued that “the claimant only believes she has 
been discriminated against. The information needed to prove or disprove this claim is in 
the hands of the defendant,” and said that if the evidence demonstrated that 
discrimination did not occur, the plaintiff would move to dismiss.288 NASA further 
argued that the Settlement made Moore an individual complainant allowed to bring only 
specific complaints, instead of a named plaintiff representing a class, and found it 
inappropriate for Moore’s arguments to be supported by, “class action suits and cases 
involving EEOC investigations of company-wide employment practices.”289  
Moore’s counsel accused NASA of, “evasiveness and dilatory tactics” and a 
“hostile” attitude, concluding that “there is no reasonable possibility for settlement.”290 
These statements offer a glimpse into the immense pressure of litigating a case against 
the government, “the irony of all of this is that it is the Federal government which has 
passed all of this employment discrimination legislation, and now, that same Federal 
government is not only refusing to litigate these EEO claims in good faith, but it is 
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putting up obstacles in the path of the claimant to prevent her from any effective, clear-
cut adjudication of her claim, regardless of whether or not the disposition is in her 
favor.”291 Trinder, another lawyer working on individual claims associated with MEAN, 
further expressed how fighting cases against the government, “takes a lot of guts to hang 
in there. To tell the federal government that they are wrong? It's not just a legal matter. 
It's highly personal.”292 The plaintiffs in these cases often felt not only that they were 
fighting the discrimination of their employer, but also pleading for justice in a system 
more concerned about covering itself than about people who were minorities not in 
positions of power.  
Moore’s pretrial statement sought restoration of 197 hours of leave used relating 
to the litigating the claim, compensation she would have received had she been promoted 
between 1975-1980, as well as interest on those wages, attorney’s fees, and that she be 
placed at a GS13/1 level. 293 NASA attorneys, in their pretrial statement in August 1980, 
argued that Moore was “not qualified for any of these positions and that she will not be 
able to prove a prima facie case of discrimination….defendant had a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting or promoting the plaintiff.”294 Additionally, 
when Moore applied for the EEO Specialist position (GS-12), NASA pointed out that the 
person responsible for determining qualification for the position did not know Moore’s 
race.295 NASA characterized Moore as being, “disgruntled when she was not promoted to 
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the position of head secretary….and charged her supervisor with discrimination.”296 
NASA explained that Moore’s promotion to GS-7, that she had been promised, was 
delayed only, “because of a temporary freeze in promotions…[which] applied to white as 
well as black employees.”297 NASA’s attorneys argued that in fact, Lichty and Vogel, 
Moore’s supervisors, had attempted to work with her to reclassify her position above a 
GS-7, but needed her to continue to fulfill secretarial duties, which her proposed 
promotion had not included. Allegedly, Moore rejected this proposal.298  
Moore claimed that she was already performing the duties of an EEO Specialist, 
and was mostly just seeking a recognition of the work she had already assumed.299 As 
evidences of such activity are seen throughout the case and other individuals claims, 
while Moore was attempting to become an EEO Specialist, she engaged in informal EEO 
counseling. NASA characterized this informal counseling as occurring “in stairwells and 
the cafeteria,” which her supervisors opposed.300 Moore characterized her EEO activities 
as including, “writing portions of the Headquarters Affirmative Action Plan, processing 
complaints, counseling employees who had filed EEO complaints or were in the process 
of filing EEO complaints, developing employee statistics, and analyzing counselor and 
coordinator reports as to the EEO activities and compliance of NASA Headquarters.”301 
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Ginyard testified that, “he did not assign specialist duties to plaintiff, that plaintiff did not 
write portions of the NASA Headquarters AAP; did not process complaints; was not an 
EEO counselor…and that the reports she filed were routine and part of her duties as 
secretary.”302 When she requested a desk audit, Moore’s counsel argued that neither of 
the two individuals who performed the desk audits were knowledgeable or informed on 
the duties of EEO Specialists and therefore their conclusions could not be considered 
accurate.303 NASA responded that Moore, “respectfully, [was] imagining statements.”304 
Moore was not considered for the position of EEO Specialist because the EEO 
Officer for Headquarters, Earl Ginyard (a black male), considered her to have, 
“considerable difficulty getting along with people.”305 However, this consideration was 
not based upon her qualifications; as Moore pointed out in multiple places, Ginyard 
himself recommended her to become an EEO Specialist at another agency.306 Moore 
explained that while Ginyard supported her promotion potential and considered her to be 
a “very intelligent, proud, and sensitive black woman, who was very competent and 
skilled in her job, and who was indispensable to him,” he personally did not get along 
with her and “was extremely anxious to get her out of his office.”307 NASA later rebutted 
this claim, saying that Moore was “destructi[ve] and not constructive and thwarted” 
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Ginyard’s efforts to help her and, “when she did perform her secretarial duties, she did 
those duties well; however, she was not indispensable to him [Ginyard] and numerous 
times he had to seek outside assistance.”308 NASA argued that Moore applied for several 
positions for which she did not meet the minimum qualifications; the candidates selected 
were qualified minorities (black male and Hispanic male), and the personnel involved in 
the decision, some of whom were black, did not know Moore’s race; it is unclear whether 
they were aware of the other candidates’ ethnicities. Moore argued that just because black 
individuals were involved in the decision making process concerning Moore’s positions 
does not automatically negate the possibility of racial discrimination.309 NASA argued 
Moore claimed discrimination for positions she never applied for, but Moore clarified, 
“she consistently ‘applied’ for positions of high grade…by attempting to get her 
supervisors to upgrade her to a position more commensurate with her duties and 
capabilities.”310 Additionally, Moore argued that while white women who had started out 
as secretaries were promoted into professional positions; they advanced through lateral 
shifts.311 NASA argued that this form of lateral shifting, in Moore’s case, “would have 
been illegal.”312 She argued that NASA had “resort[ed] to a supposed regulation that was 
not a real rule, but a practice that could be and was waived for others,” citing Jo Marie 
DiMaggio and Carmen Gowers, two white women, as examples where NASA had 
laterally shifted these women into professional positions, but claimed it was illegal when 
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Moore requested a similar action.313 Moore remained in secretarial positions for seven 
years, repeatedly denied promotions, and she had no explanation other than 
discrimination.314  
Moore asked the court to award her backpay for the difference in compensation 
since 1976-1980, accounting for both in-grade step increases and grade increases, 
attorney’s fees, and leave time used to litigate the claim.315 At Moore’s trial, Margolis 
ruled that, “defendant has articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for not 
promoting Plaintiff…Plaintiff has failed to show that these nondiscriminatory reasons 
were pretextual.”316 Margolis dismissed all of Moore’s claims.  
Moore appealed Margolis’s judgement to the US Court of Appeals for the DC 
Circuit.317 She argued that “at trial, both the Special Master and the Defendant have failed 
and refused to address the merits of Plaintiff’s case.”318 Moore’s counsel argued that the 
NASA lawyers and Margolis had both ignored or missed her major argument, “she was 
denied promotion to a professional position in the NASA Headquarters EEO office 
because of her race. She did not cite the specific positions she applied for, but rather, 
explained her consistent, persistent attempts to obtain promotion by reassignment or 
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accretion of duties.”319 Moore argued that Margolis had inappropriately limited 
discovery, halting her ability to substantiate her claims, and that she had, in fact, proved a 
prima facie case.320 NASA opposed Moore’s motion for reconsideration on procedural 
grounds, and Judge Richey subsequently denied Moore’s motion.321 Moore next filed an 
objection to the Special Master’s findings, argued that NASA had failed to rebut Moore’s 
evidence.322 NASA responded that these objections were “totally inadequate,” and that 
Moore would need to prove from the trial transcript where omissions occurred. Moore 
continued, though unsuccessfully, to fight her case through August 1982.323 
Gloria Todd 
Gloria Todd, a black female, began her career at NASA Headquarters in 1964 in 
the office of Public Services. In June 1975, she took over the responsibilities of a white 
coworker who retired. Todd was classified as a GS-7/7, but her coworker had been a GS-
9. NASA downgraded the position to a GS-7—without promotion potential to a GS-9—
after Todd began the job.324 NASA denied the bulk of Todd’s claims, arguing that she 
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had no claims that required relief to be granted, and squabbling about job titles.325 Todd’s 
counsel, Judith Jurin Semo, sought comparative data from NASA regarding the duties 
performed by Ann Shade, Todd’s immediate predecessor.326 Additionally, Todd sought to 
identify who was responsible for the decision to keep her at a GS-7, asking questions 
such as, “Identify the person(s) who decided….that Claimant would replace Mrs. Anne 
Shade as General Information Assistant…[and] that the position of General Information 
Assistant would be reclassified as a GS-6/7 level position from a GS-9 level position.”327 
NASA argued that Todd did not, in fact, “‘replace’ Mrs. Shade…Claimant was 
reassigned to a new position created for her.”328 NASA responded to the majority of 
Todd’s interrogatories and requests for documents by arguing that the questions were 
“unreasonably broad and not relevant to this individual claim,” not within the Court’s 
jurisdiction because they occurred before 1974, or because they considered the question 
too vague.329 For a period of about a month in the late summer of 1979, Todd’s counsel, 
Semo and NASA counsel, Edith Marshall (Special Assistant, US Attorney) and Sara 
Najjar, attempted to resolve some objections informally, but ultimately failed to do so.  
MEAN and NASA put forth conflicting accounts of these meetings. Semo 
reported that Najjar stated that the documents requested were “either unavailable, 
 
compensated at the GS-7, step 7 level without potential for future promotion to the GS-9 
level.” Pre-Trial Statement of Gloria L. Todd, 11 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 42, NARA I. 
325 Answer to Claim of Gloria L. Todd, 7 Mar 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
326 Interrogatories of Claimant Gloria L. Todd, 20 Jun 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
327 Interrogatory 26, Ibid. 
328 Defendant’s Response to Interrogatories of Claimant Gloria L. Todd, 20 Jul 1979, Vol 
2, Box 41, NARA I. 
329 Ibid. 
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inaccessible or impossible to locate, or that relevant documents had been destroyed,” but 
had not even requested any records from the Federal Records center, nor “reviewed 
NASA’s files or had others review them to determine if…information was available.”330 
Semo explained that she, “could not accept representations that documents are not 
available when no records have been ordered from the appropriate Federal Records 
Center and no reasonable effort to locate such documents has been made…..this selective 
trickling out of documents seems to confirm that no reasonable effort has been made to 
ascertain the existence of or to produce documents subject to Mrs. Todd’s production 
request.”331 A letter from Sara Najjar to Edith Marshall, both attorneys on NASA’s 
behalf, countered Semo’s letter, which Najjar found “oppressive and unwarranted.”332 
Najjar accused Semo of “crying wolf,” “only hear[ing] what she wants to hear,” and 
attempting to undermine the Settlement, 
Ms. Semo was not a participant in the negotiations leading to the settlement… 
consequently, we do not view her conclusion as authoritative on such matters. Her 
conclusion appears to be nothing more than a camouflage of the real reason—i.e., 
refusal by counsels for the claimants in these proceedings to adhere to the 
settlement agreement. I regret that we are forced into these constant arguments by 
opposing counsel, but [sic] believe that our position is a correct one…we are 
grateful, however, to your persistent objection to Ms. Semo’s unreasonable 
demands.333 
 
Najjar denied Semo’s characterization of her, claiming that she, “has been more than 
responsive to Ms. Semo’s demands, and any suggestion by Ms. Semo to the contrary is 
 
330 Judith Jurin Semo to Edith Marshall, 13 Aug 1979, Exhibit A, Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion of Claimant Gloria L. Todd, 31 Aug 1979, Vol 3, 
Box 42, NARA I.  
331 Ibid. 
332 Sara Najjar to Edith Marshall, 14 Aug 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I. 
333 Ibid. 
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unconscionable.”334 Najjar implied that Semo had lied about her efforts and later accused 
Semo of “outright falsehood” explaining that, “Ms. Semo has been told time and again, 
that I had retrieved [documents] from the Federal Records Center….my recollection is 
that I pleaded with Ms. Semo to specify any record to which she has reference so that we 
may know what it is she is asking for and be able to identify where under the heavens 
such file may be.”335 By 21 September 1979, Todd filed an order to compel on the basis 
that, “it had become apparent that…NASA did not intend to comply.”336 NASA 
responded that Todd’s counsel had mischaracterized Marshall and Najjar’s responses and 
that they had never committed to providing more information or documents.337 
Todd’s pretrial statement argued that she had been discriminated when she 
assumed a white employee’s position and duties but was rated and compensated at the 
GS-7 level without promotion potential while the white coworker had been rated and 
compensated as a GS-9.338 The pretrial statement included a discussion of the duties and 
responsibilities that Todd had assumed which were “substantially all” of the 
responsibilities of former employee Ann Shade.339 Todd argued from case precedent, 
 
334 Ibid. 
335 In a motion to the Court, Todd’s counsel later described this letter as “Ms. Najjar’s 
intemperate letter” and said it was never sent to the claimant/claimant’s counsel. Reply of 
Claimant Gloria L. Todd to Defendant’s Response to Claimant’s Statement Regarding 
August 21, 1979 Filing of Discovery Motion, 2 Oct 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I; Najjar 
to Marshall, 14 Aug 1979. 
336 Statement of Claimant Gloria L. Todd Regarding Filing on August 31, 1979 of Motion 
for Order Compelling Answers and Other Related Orders, 21 Sep 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, 
NARA I. 
337 Defendant’s Response to the Statement of Gloria Todd Regarding Filing on August 
31, 1979, 24 Sep 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I. 
338 Pre-Trial Statement of Gloria L. Todd, 11 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 42, NARA I. 
339 Ibid. 
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McMullen v Warner, that the abolition of a position does not, itself, negate a claim of 
discrimination, “the District Court for the District of Columbia held that McMullen’s 
showing entitled him to compensation…the court stated that since the general practice is 
that government jobs are only rarely abolished…given the evidence presented, the 
Navy’s refusal to promote McMullen was the product of racial discrimination.”340 
NASA’s pretrial statement argued that the position was “a new position…established 
based upon the agency’s needs in 1976….Further the evidence will show that during 
1976 that [NASA] was winding down its space program resulting in the abolishment of a 
number of jobs.”341 In the ‘70s, NASA faced several complaints of discrimination that 
resulted from “reductions in force”—when many jobs were abolished because of 
downsizing after Apollo and massive budget cuts. In Todd’s case, NASA argued that 
Todd was placed in her position in order to prevent her from losing pay or her job 
altogether.342 Discrimination complaints as a result of reductions in force were hotly 
contested, sometimes referred to as “designer” reductions in force.343  
 
340 The case was McMullen v Warner, 416 F Supp. 1162 (D.D.C. 1976). Pre-Trial 
Statement of Gloria L. Todd, 11 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 42, NARA I. 
341 Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, (Gloria Todd), 11 Sep 1980 Vol 7, Box 42, NARA I. 
342 Ibid. 
343 “Marshall's achievements in fostering equal opportunity from 1963 to 1965 resulted 
from pressure from Washington...Federal regulations for reductions-in-force dictated that 
the last people hired should be dismissed first, leaving recently hired minorities 
vulnerable. For the relatively few black scientists and engineers seeking jobs, the 
uncertainties of NASA's future and the lure of higher salaries elsewhere made 
employment in the private sector more attractive. NASA argued that given the constraints 
under which it operated, it was not doing badly.” Andrew Dunar and Stephen 
Waring, Power to Explore: A History of the Marshall Space Flight Center, 1960-
1990, (Washington, DC: NASA Headquarters History Office), 1999, 125; Taliaferro 20 
July 2019.  
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Todd requested that the court order NASA to upgrade her to a GS-9/4, pay $4,500 
to remediate the differential in compensation she suffered, and to pay $600 in attorney’s 
fees.344 Todd and NASA counsel settled out of court, for the amount of $2,000 plus $500 
for “reasonable cost,” and NASA avoided admitting discrimination against Todd.345 
Lawrence Walters 
Lawrence Walters, a black male employed as a clerk at NASA from 1973-1978, 
claimed that he was denied a promotion which, white “employees situated similarly to 
him routinely received…upon becoming eligible therefor.”346 Walters argued that this 
denial was reprisal for his support of a black supervisor, who was also denied a 
promotion in favor of a white individual. A letter of disapproval was placed in Walters’ 
personnel file, “concerning his use of leave time.”347 NASA responded that Walters’ step 
increase, “was delayed because of plaintiff’s poor performance and abuse of leave.”348 
NASA supplied three memos from Chief of Administrative Services, Don Lichty, to 
Walters, informing him of this delay on the basis that Walters’ “work was not of an 
acceptable level of competence,” and warning Walters that he must “report to work 
promptly and regularly [to avoid] disciplinary action….while there has been significant 
improvement in your attendance…you must make a conscientious effort to improve your 
 
344 Pre-Trial Statement of Gloria L. Todd, 11 Sep 1980. 
345 Initially Todd’s trial had been set for 24-25 November 1980, but the parties settled by 
25 November 1980; Notice of Trial Schedule, 25 Jun 1980, Vol 6, Box. 42, NARA I; 
Stipulations of Settlement and Dismissal, 25 Nov 1980,Vol 8, Box 42, NARA I. 
346 Claim of Lawrence Walters, 28 Feb 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Answer to Claim of Lawrence Walters, 9 Mar 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
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leave situation.”349 In addition to backpay, Walters requested that NASA remove the 
negative letter from his file. NASA denied any wrongdoing and requested that Walters’ 
case be dismissed. By July 1979, both parties agreed to dismiss the claim.350 
In November 1979, an additional six individual claimants had settled their cases 
with NASA: Deloris A. Dixon received $250, Amy A. Knight received $600, Hasseltine 
B. Lewis, $200, Alcine F. Pike, $500, Mary L. Sligh $400, and Barbara Johnson $200.351 
Personal Cost  
 For many of these individual plaintiffs, litigation dragged out for over five years. 
Breaking down the class action to individual cases forced individuals to bring cases 
against the government on their own. Fighting not only their employer, in many cases 
their current employer, but also the US Government took a psychological toll on the 
plaintiffs. One of the lawyers involved explained: 
When it involves something personal like this, you're very exposed. You have to 
be prepared for the government to come around and attack you for what you're 
doing.  They [the plaintiffs] also may have felt that it was helpless. Taking on the 
federal government is not a small thing. And you take them on personally. Most 
people don't win. Gloria was the only one [of the MEAN plaintiffs that won her 
case in court].352 
 
 
349 Memo to Lawrence Walters, 3 Jan 1978; 3 Nov 1977; 13 Oct, 1977, Vol 2, Box 41, 
NARA I. 
350 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal of Claim of Lawrence Walters, 30 Jul 1979, Vol 3, 
Box 42, NARA I.  
351 Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal of Individual Claims, 21 Nov 1979, Vol 5, 
Box 42, NARA I. 
352 Rachel Trinder, phone conversation with the author, 10 May 2019. 
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In the initial MEAN letter, the writers drew attention to the emotional and 
physical toll of discrimination, but for some, the problems were almost just beginning.353 
Even one of the lawyers, Rachel Trinder, remarked on how the case affected plaintiffs.  
Despite her courageous and determined demeanor, it was obvious that Gloria 
[Taliaferro] was really suffering from the years of having to push endlessly 
against the tide.  It was very distressing to see how that effort was adversely 
affecting all the plaintiffs. By the time I became involved their efforts to seek 
redress had already been ongoing for several years, and the emotional toll was 
significant.  I absolutely don't doubt that there was the fear of ongoing retaliation.  
I had long been a fan of NASA’s technological achievements, and it was very sad 
to realize that in the midst of that incredible success – NASA had reached the 
moon only a decade previously – these employees were not able to enjoy the 
glory and instead felt relegated to, in their words, meaningless dead-end jobs 
regardless of their educational background or qualifications.  Gloria had been 
rated qualified or highly qualified for multiple jobs within NASA, and yet over 
fifty times she was denied the opportunity for promotion.  She was a very 
courageous woman, and I so admired her.  She realized that there was a price to 
pay merely for asking for what she was already due, but she also was unwavering 
in her commitment to press ahead.  She had a firm sense of right and wrong and 
she felt that as a matter of principle it was imperative that she press on.  She 
managed the extraordinary stress while continuing to work at the agency and raise 
a family.  It was particularly impressive to see, because she knew that as an 
African American female at that time, the type of challenge she was presenting – 
and to the federal government no less - was not something she was “supposed” to 
do. It was especially burdensome for her because by pursuing her case she was 
having to articulate very negative assertions about the leadership of one of the 
most admired federal agencies. I saw her as being like the mythological Amazon 
women.  She was a fierce warrior at her core, and I think that she drew on that 
strength enormously at the time. I can't imagine how horrible it was for her to 
have to manage the situation, and to keep up her efforts over so many years.”354 
 
Taliaferro herself discussed the cost, mentally, physically, and for her career. “We would 
go to court periodically…and then they [supervisors or coworkers] started picking at us, 
 
353 MEAN to Dr. James Fletcher, 14 March 1974, Folder: MEAN Group Meeting, Box: 
George M. Low Papers, #13883, NASA HQ.  
354 Rachel Trinder, phone conversation with the author, 10 May 2019; Trinder email 
communication with the author, 22 March 2020.  
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trying to get us to leave, making our life hard. Making work hard, difficult. But we stuck 
it out. It was very stressful. Very stressful on us and our families. And—I was a single 
mom of three. Rosemary had one. Diane had three girls.”355  
GT: they had our phones tapped. Where they could hear. We could hear [clicking 
sounds] when we [picked up the phone]. It was a frightening time. And you know, 
we had families. Yeah, so, a lot of people didn’t want to come forward. Scared.  
RC: Was there intimidation?  
GT: Oh yes, lot of intimidation, a lot of, a lot of intimidation. Whispering and 
talking. Oh yeah…You know, stuff like that. I remember listening to, this…from 
blacks and whites. From both sides. There’s this black girl—see I had been an 
EEO counselor there where I was at, but anyway—I said “where you going, Jen?” 
and she said oh, and I said “Well, come get a bite to eat,” “oh, I can’t do with you 
cause you got a lot of trouble” I said “Trouble?” Cause I’m a troublemaker now. I 
got tagged. And I said “OK.” Couple years later, they crapped on her. She was 
looking for me to help her. They wouldn’t get a promotion—to a four or five or 
something. So, you know, I got that. You know, some people stopped talking to 
me altogether… 
RC: if you’re comfortable, I wanted to ask you…This went on for so long how 
d[id] you deal with the [emotional] pressure of that and the weight?  
GT: I have to go back to my religion. And my parents, and my family, you know. 
My support. And friends. Cause it’s very emotional. You become 
paranoid. Who’s, who’s doing—you had to watch everything because 
somebody’s going to do something against you. You had to watch, you had to be 
very—and as soon as you let your guard down somebody do something try to 
make you look bad. Trip you up, give you a bad work assignment. Or something 
like this. It’s very—by the grace of God I’m here to talk about it. And a lot of 
people were bitter. They left…It’ll change you, make you another person. And I 
think it changed me for the better. I really do because I helped a lot of people. 
And I know had I not done that I would have retired at SCS. But my career. But 
that [the case] got in the way. Cause I knew my work. And I was good at it. I was 
good at everything I did. And I had excellent work performance. I had some 
mentors that kept me in there—even though they knew this, they still liked my 
work—that I worked for.356  
GT: “This [case] followed me all my life. All my life. And I’m not happy.”357 
 
 
355 Taliaferro 20 October 2019. 
356 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
357 Gloria Taliaferro, phone conversation with the author, 25 September 2019. 
 107 
While some plaintiffs left their jobs at NASA when the stress became too great, 
some had difficulty gaining employment elsewhere because they had been branded a 
“troublemaker.” Samuel Alexander and Gloria Taliaferro related experiencing 
discrimination when applying for jobs elsewhere in the federal government, Alexander at 
the GSA and Taliaferro at the Civil Aeronautics Board.358 Neither were hired.   
NASA succeeded in breaking the class action down into individual cases and won 
or settled without admitting guilt, costing the agency very little, and the pattern of 
discrimination continued. MEAN maintained that few relatively few came forward with 
individual claims because of intimidation and lack of belief in the system. Claimants who 
did come forward received little relief, and sometimes faced increased hostility from their 
managers. Litigating the case had very little benefit for the intense scrutiny and cost to 











358 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
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CHAPTER V 
Gloria T. Taliaferro  
“When questioned at trial, plaintiff’s supervisors demonstrated almost total ignorance 
and a serious misunderstanding of the agency’s EEO responsibilities. Dr. Emme 
indicated that he knew nothing about affirmative action and testified that the Historical 
Office during his tenure was ‘totally color blind with regard to race’…Dr. Wright’s 
understanding was that such responsibilities did not even apply to the Federal 
Government…such lack of understanding by NASA officials concerning the agency’s 
obligations can be characterized only as remarkable and reflect a deep insensitivity to 
the serious issues of racial discrimination which are presented by this case.” - Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 1980359 
 
“The issue of equal employment opportunity (EEO) was not yet the source of difficulty it 
would later become, when the imperative (for NASA) of recruiting and retaining highly 
trained personnel collided with the demands of blacks and women for a greater share of 
Federal jobs.” -Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, 1982360 
 
Gloria Taliaferro was an individual claimant, like the thirteen others, designated 
in the Settlement to file a claim with US Magistrate Lawrence Margolis in February 
1979. Though she had been a named plaintiff on the original MEAN case, this did not 
change her situation.  However, unlike most of the other individuals, she fought against 
the limitations imposed by Margolis, resulting in a legal battle lasting an additional six 
years. Though her case eventually ended in an out-of-court settlement, Taliaferro fought 
all the way to the Court of Appeals to gain access to statistical information about 
similarly situated white employees, in order to prove her claim, and to demonstrate the 
racial discrimination rampant throughout NASA. Although the outcome of Taliaferro’s 
 
359 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 
1980, Vol 8, Box 42, RG 21, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-12/31/1985, District Court of 
the United States US District Court for the District of Columbia, National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC, (archive is hereafter referred to as NARA I). 
360 Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. (Washington, DC: NASA 
Headquarters History Office), 1982.  
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case did not change the outcome of the class action or change NASA structurally, her 
case made data and information that demonstrated NASA structural and systemic 
discrimination publicly available.  
Gloria Taliaferro’s initial claim established that she was a black female employed 
at NASA Headquarters since 1966, currently working as a secretary-stenography GS-
7/6.361 Taliaferro’s claim stated that she was repeatedly denied promotions while working 
the NASA History office on the basis of racial discrimination. Taliaferro argued that 
because she was denied promotions, she also missed opportunities to participate in 
NASA upward mobility training programs and to compete for professional grade jobs. 
Because of NASA’s refusal to recognize her workload and performance with appropriate 
promotions, she was not fairly compensated.362 NASA responded to her claim by 
quibbling with Taliaferro’s use of the word “finally” to describe her promotion, denying 
allegations of wrongdoing, and asking for its dismissal.363 
Gloria Taliaferro was a woman of black and Cuban ancestry, raised in Miami, 
Florida. Her employment at NASA Headquarters began in May 1966. In 1968, she joined 
the NASA History Office as an Archives Assistant.364 She took this position as somewhat 
of a challenge and, in the early years of her work in the office, did exceptionally well.  
 
361 GS-7 Step 6; See Figure 1, p. 72 for explanation of grade scales; Claim of Gloria 
Taliaferro, 14 Feb 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
362 Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 14 Feb 1979, 2-3, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
363 Answer to Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 7 Mar 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
364 In 1969 and 1972, she had received promotions eventually to a position with potential 
to the GS-6 level, “Secretary to the NASA Historian.” Dr. Emme confirmed that she 
began as an “Archives—this is some sort of hyphenated title, and a year later we 
promoted her to a GS-6, and she became, in effect, the secretary for me as NASA 
Historian.” Pretrial Statement of Gloria T. Taliaferro, 11 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 42, 
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GT: Dr. Emme—he was so sweet—they said no one could work for Emme. “You 
sure you want to work there?” Cause I was in administrative services—I didn’t 
like that—but anyway, I said, “I can work for him anyway.” I said, “You never 
know.”365  
GT: [They said] he can’t keep a secretary. I said, “well I’m not going to be a 
secretary, I’m going to be an archivist assistant.” And that was my job title on my 
PD. And I was help with the archives.366 
 
Taliaferro went on to describe her relationship with then NASA Historian, Eugene 
Emme, “GT: I guess Emme spoiled me,” “and we got along like peas in a pod. Oh, he’d 
bring me flowers—especially when he made me mad. Oh, he’d bring me chocolate, 
‘Alright, ok, I was wrong.’ He’d bring me flowers, chocolate. He was a very wonderful 
supervisor.”367 Taliaferro repeatedly received excellent work reviews and was even 
lauded in History Office newsletters as indispensable,  
 
NARA I; Transcript of Proceedings, Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 6 Nov 1980, Box 44, 
NARA I; Gloria Taliaferro, Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 
20 July 2019 (hereafter cited as Taliaferro 20 July 2019); Defendant’s Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Claim of Gloria Taliaferro), 12 Dec 1980, Vol 8, Box 
42, NARA I.  
365 Before working at NASA, Taliaferro worked at the Federal Housing Administration 
(HUD), She was unhappy there because of discrimination and lack of promotion for 
black employees working in computer programming and secretarial positions. “So when 
my girlfriend worked at NASA, Sandy, she said why don’t you come to NASA? I said 
NASA? But I said ok. So they hired me. NASA—to be a Flexowriter operator, you know 
to make tapes for the computers. But there wasn’t any big [projects] so what they had me 
do? They had me write those d—m monkey letters….People would call and write about 
us sending monkeys, right? And people would complain. So what I was going in, was 
writing the same letter, but putting in different addresses…These monkey g—d— letters. 
That’s what I called them. And that was the start of my career at NASA. Can you believe 
that sh-t… And I was fast and I knew my sh-t, and I knew how to type—I knew how to 
work the editorial typewriters. And that’s what Dr. Emme like me for, because I knew 
editorial typewriters.… Anyways, so I did that, working on manuals. It was fine.” 
Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019; Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
366 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. 
367 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019; Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
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The labors of everyone were superbly supported, it must be mentioned, by 
Archivist Lee Saegesser, Secretary Gloria Toliaferro [sic] and Typist Rosemary 
Ferguson, without whom the workload would have been intolerable.368  
Gloria T. Toliaferro [sic] served as office secretary, and Rosemary Ferguson as 
clerk-typist. Without their stalwart service in all areas of the bureaucratic and 
historical clerical labors, little would have been completed.369    
 
Emme described her as, “very effective and we were very pleased with her fitting 
into our office…[she was] most competent, and we were warm personal friends.”370 She 
was “recommended for promotion as a secretary from the GS-6/4 to the GS-7/3 level by 
her then supervisor, the NASA Historian,” Emme.371  However, the position she held was 
not eligible, according to CSC guidelines, for promotion at the GS-7 level.372 Though 
Emme did not personally have the authority to promote her, he worked to get the position 
upgraded even before Taliaferro took the position, and he continued to pursue options to 
have the position reclassified so that her position would be eligible for a higher 
promotion potential. Emme argued that her role had expanded to include GS-7 level 
responsibilities and he recognized “‘this marked increase in level of responsibility.’”373 
NASA argued that Emme’s repeated attempts to get the position reclassified for a white 
employee, before Taliaferro took over the position, and continued efforts for Taliaferro, 
 
368 History Newsletter No. 12, 1 July 1970, Historical Division NASA, Washington, 
D.C., “History Newsletters and Annual Reports,” NASA, https://history.nasa.gov/ 
nltr12.pdf accessed 22 January 2020 
369 History Newsletter No. 9, 1 January 1969, Historical Division NASA, Washington 
D.C, “History Newsletters and Annual Reports,” NASA https://history.nasa.gov/nltr9.pdf 
accessed 22 January 2020.  
370 Transcript of Proceedings, 167, 169, Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 6 November 1980, 
Box 44, NARA I.  
371 Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 8 April 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I. 
372 Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, (Claim of Gloria Taliaferro), 11 Sep 1980, Vol 7, Box 
42, NARA I. 
373 Findings…Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 1980. 
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demonstrated that the promotion denial was not on the basis of race. 374 While ultimately 
these efforts were unsuccessful, when asked “Did she ever say to you that she felt that 
your actions were not satisfactory on her behalf?” Emme answered, “No, never. I think 
we were disappointed that we hadn’t succeeded in mover her along with the situation as it 
was, but she wasn’t alone in this. I think she knew that.”375 Taliaferro believed that 
Emme fully supported her and that, “It was out of his hands. I really think so. If he could, 
he would have. So, I really believe that in my true heart, and because it went up to his 
boss, with signature and Personnel papers, just sign off. He put me in for it. All the bells 
and whistles it went up there.”376 Emme described his commitment despite the 
bureaucratic process this way, “I felt that Miss Taliaferro did such a good job of learning 
the routine, improving her quality of typing and being dedicated in her work, going to 
night school and other things that I said, well I can’t promote you, but I am sure going to 
try and being in the Government many years, you just keep asking when you get turned 
down.”377  
While Emme believed he had done everything possible to help Taliaferro—and 
Taliaferro agreed, Taliaferro’s attorney, Rachel Trinder, queried into whether Emme 
understood his responsibility to promote Affirmative Action goals in his office. Emme 
responded “as far as I am concerned, our office was totally color blind with regard to 
race, and that that was just a fact of life. And it pervaded the whole operation of the 
 
374 Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12 Dec 1980.  
375 Transcript of Proceedings, 173, Taliaferro, 6 Nov 1980, Box 44, NARA I.  
376 Taliaferro, 20 October 2019. 
377 Transcript of Proceedings, 170, 6 Nov 1980. 
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office, and racial matters had not bearing whatsoever in any form in the office. Is that 
Affirmative Action? I don’t know.”378 When asked who told him that Taliaferro’s 
position was ineligible for a promotion, Emme could not recall other than “probably 
someone in Personnel.”379 He had never received written communication on the subject, 
and he did not “make any further attempt to find out whether it was a valid reason.”380 In 
court, NASA argued, based on Emme and Wright testimony, that the GS-level of the 
position of NASA Historian did not warrant a secretary at the GS-7 level.381 Taliaferro 
argued that there was no evidence “that the GS-grade or level of a secretary is not and 
was not at the time tied to the GS-grade or level of the supervisor,” a point which NASA 
did not refute.382 Margolis’s conclusions of law found that “even if Drs. Emme and 
Wright were not totally correct about the relationship between the grade level of their 
secretary and their own grade level, they both held good faith beliefs that the 
classification system prevented Plaintiff from receiving her promotion regardless of her 
race.”383 
In addition to the CSC classification issue, NASA argued that an addition 
bureaucratic roadblock to Taliaferro’s promotion was “a promotion and hiring freeze 
which placed severe fiscal restrictions on the allocation of promotions.”384 During this 
 
378 Transcript of Proceedings, 192, 6 Nov 1980.  
379 Ibid. 185.  
380 Ibid. 
381 Findings…Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 1980. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Findings of Fact of Face and Conclusions of Law, (Taliaferro), Lawrence Margolis, 12 
Mar 1981, Vol 9, Box 42, NARA I.  
384 Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, 11 Sep 1980. 
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period, NASA had a point system by which a certain number of points were allocated to 
different offices in order to distribute a limited number of promotions appropriately.385 
Therefore, other employees in the office were able to be promoted despite this freeze.386 
One individual promoted was a white college graduate who was graded at a GS-4. 
According to Emme, this woman, Susan Whiteley, was first in line for a promotion, then 
Taliaferro, but the office could only promote one person.387 NASA repeatedly argued that 
the History Office had a “moral obligation” to promote her because she was undergraded 
and had been promised a GS-5 position.388  
In the trial before Margolis, Lawrence Vogel testified concerning the issue of 
promotions during a limited freeze on hiring and promotions; he administrated the point 
system by which departments could promote during this time. While Emme had stated 
that he had done all he could to promote Taliaferro and it was out of his hands, Vogel 
 
385 Transcript of Proceedings, 256, 6 Nov 1980.  
386 “From what I understand, my papers went in with several other people, and everyone 
got promoted except me.” Taliaferro 20 October 2019; “Ms. Taliaferro was selected as 
one of six persons whose promotions were recommended by the Office of the Associate 
Administrator for ‘immediate approval.’ All six individuals, except for Ms. Taliaferro, 
were promoted within a matter of months. One of these individuals was a non-minority 
located in the same office as Ms. Taliaferro.” “By May 1972, [five employees] had 
received the promotions recommended in February 1972 by the Associate Administrator. 
Claimant did not receive the promotion recommended in 1972 by her supervisor and the 
Associate Administrator.” Pretrial Statement of Gloria Taliaferro, 11 Sep 1980; 
Stipulation to Facts, 11 Sep 1980, attached to Pretrial Statement of Gloria Taliaferro, 11 
Sep 1980; Defendant’s Pretrial Statement, 11 Sep 1980; Transcript of Proceedings, 255, 6 
Nov 1980. 
387 Transcript of Proceedings, 172, 6 Nov 1980.  
388 Findings of Fact of Face and Conclusions of Law, (Taliaferro), Margolis, 12 Mar 
1981; Objections of Plaintiff Gloria T. Taliaferro to the Special Master’s Recommended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 21 Apr 1982, US Court of Appeal for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, No. 82-1915, Box 43, NARA I.  
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shifted responsibility back, testifying that “office heads had their own authority then to 
operate with the control of these points.”389 NASA and Taliaferro disputed evidence that 
the point system was a major factor in Taliaferro’s non-promotion: first, NASA argued 
that the History Office simply had no more points, and therefore could not promote 
Taliaferro. On Taliaferro’s side, Trinder pointed out that multiple NASA officials had 
testified that they had taken “exceptional action” and “were able to scrape up a point to 
get Susan Whiteley” a promotion.390 Next, NASA argued that this freeze and the point 
system was “not relevant to the claim of Gloria Taliaferro in that Gloria Taliaferro had 
reached the maximum promotion potential within her job category, she therefore would 
not have been eligible for promotion without reclassification. Thus the freeze and 
ensuring point system would have had no effect on the promotion or non-promotion of 
claimant.”391 Taliaferro’s counsel, on the basis of expert testimony, argued that lack of 
promotion potential did not make promotion impossible, but rather, that “the accretion of 
duties standard enables an agency to promote an individual within a particular position 
due to the accretion of additional duties and responsibilities,” which was precisely the 
method Emme had used to make a recommendation of Taliaferro’s behalf.392 According 
to Taliaferro, NASA did not argue that the lack of promotion potential completely 
blocked her possibility of promotion until after she filed a complaint.393  
 
389 Transcript of Proceedings, 256, 6 Nov 1980. 





NASA’s conflicting arguments led Taliaferro and her lawyer to argue that NASA 
had “completely failed to articulate a legitimate explanation for its failure to promote 
plaintiff. Indeed, its several attempts show that its reasons for doing so are unsatisfactory, 
inconsistent, and pretextual. At the time that plaintiff was denied promotions she was 
given a variety of reasons all of which have been shown to be invalid.”394 Trinder even 
quoted Judge Richey’s opinion on another case, arguing that “the Court could give little 
credibility to a person whose story has continually changed through the course of these 
proceedings.”395 Even though NASA attorneys themselves, at one point, argued against 
this as an explanation for Taliaferro’s non-promotion, Margolis’s opinion cited “the 
NASA-wide hiring and promotion freeze which was imposed during the period in 
question” as the second half of the satisfaction of NASA’s burden of proof.396 
In September 1973, Dr. Emme was relieved of his administrative duties to work 
on a history of NASA, and Dr. Monte Wright became head of the NASA History Office 
and Taliaferro’s supervisor. Taliaferro as well as other employees of the History Office 
mark this as a seismic shift in the culture—and perhaps even goals—of the History 
Office. Under both, the history office published annual chronologies of the NASA 
experience, built an archive, and contracted independent scholars to write topical 
histories. However, Emme focused on annual chronologies, whereas Monte Wright 





397 Alex Roland, phone conversation with the author 2 Feb 2020. 
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competency above all else. After a twenty-year Air Force career Wright was accustomed 
to military culture, and he occasionally struggled to work with civil servants.398 Taliaferro 
approached Wright for help with her promotion, “soon after I [Wright] arrived she started 
talking to me on this question and kept it up fairly regularly….about once a month until 
she left….she would come into my office when no one else was there and usually stand 
looking out my window and say something like ‘I want to talk about my promotion.’”399 
These conversations were tense,  
I would have said something and I thought there that was all there was to say—
and she didn’t think that was all there was to say, I suppose. And so nothing was 
said for awhile [sic]. They were awkward…I did my best to explain to her what I 
understood of the situation and it became apparent very soon that she was not 
understanding what I was saying because from time to time I had different 
repetitive conversations with her. She asked the same questions and I felt I was 
giving the same answers, and obviously we were not understanding one 
another.400 
 
Taliaferro’s recollection of her last seven months in the History Office offered a 
stark contrast to her time working with Emme, “Wright? I can’t stand him. He came in, 
Emme had left…But he wasn’t a good man for me. We didn’t get along. I don’t know 
whatever happened. We didn’t get along I don’t think. He was a straight military guy, I 
think. And I wasn’t a military wife. But I don’t have good memories of that 
relationship.”401 When Wright inquired of others in the office about the history of 
 
398 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019.  
399 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 28 Sep 1979, Box 43, NARA I. 
400 Ibid., 59; Transcript of Proceedings, 202, 6 Nov 1980.  
401 This comment about being a military “wife” is an example of the persistence of the 
“office wife” that pervaded pink collar work at this time. Kari Frederickson, Cold War 
Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press), 2013, 100; Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. 
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Taliaferro’s attempts at promotion, an additional discrepancy arose. While Emme had 
ranked Taliaferro highest on priority for a promotion, he had also listed her as “the person 
who would be first let go,” or least essential, in the event of a reduction in force.402 
Taliaferro characterized this conflict as the result of the History Office editor—Frank 
Anderson—having “submitted a secret, handwritten list reversing the order of priority for 
promotions, placing the white employee above Ms. Taliaferro in order of priority.”403 
Another document designated another individual as first to be let go.404 Wright claimed 
that NASA associate administrator Homer Newell’s executive assistant, whose name he 
did not recall, told him that Taliaferro’s position had no promotion potential, and 
therefore, he believed promotion to be impossible, and further pursuit would be 
“fruitless.”405 Taliaferro received misinformation that only her supervisor could order a 
desk audit, vital to her continued efforts to reclassify her position. Taliaferro therefore 
asked Wright to order a desk audit to continue efforts to reclassify her position, but he 
refused.406 
Wright eventually did recommend Taliaferro for an in-grade promotion,  
 
402 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 32, 28 Sep 1979.  
403 NASA argued that this was no secret, handwritten note, but rather that “when Dr. 
Wright succeeded Dr. Emme as NASA historian he made his own evaluation and 
recommended that Carrie Karegeannes receive a promotion.” Defendant’s Reply Brief in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Claim of 
Gloria T. Taliaferro), 19 Dec 1980, Vol 8, Box 42, NARA I; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 1980. 
404 Transcript of Proceedings, 225, 6 Nov 1980.  
405 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 28 Sep 1979; Findings of Fact of Face and 
Conclusions of Law, (Taliaferro), Margolis, 12 Mar 1981.  
406 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Proposed by Gloria T. Taliaferro, 12 Dec 
1980. 
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[Wright]: The principal reason that I would have recommended her for promotion 
was the opinion of my predecessors. I feel it is unfair to anyone at the time of a 
change of supervisor to ignore whatever has happened in the past…I felt an 
obligation to rely on earlier recommendations. And there was a history of an 
attempt to promote Taliaferro, and I felt obligated to keep that in mind. That is the 
only reason I sought a promotion for Taliaferro…on my personal 
knowledge…she was already overgraded [sic], and her performance was no more 
than average. Nothing really exceptional…someone reading my narrative 
comment on this would not come to that conclusion.407 
[Wright]: In my experience with the Civil Service, if anyone at any time ever tells 
an absolutely factual account of a subordinate, that subordinate does not get 
promoted…the expression was often used, don’t crusade with the careers of your 
subordinates, which means, yes, the system is faulty; yes, the system requires 
over-optimistic appraisals to give your subordinates a fair chance, but if you tried 
to correct the system on an individual case, then your subordinate suffers…I try 
not to lie in evaluations. I try to stress the positive aspects as much as possible, 
and I try to pay less attention to faults, which all of us have. 
[Trinder]: Did you lie in this document [a recommendation], Dr. Wright?  
[Wright]: I did not.  
Magistrate Margolis: Did you do a little puffing?  
Dr. Wright: One leans on occasion.408 
 
Trinder pressed Wright further on why, if he believed Taliaferro did not deserve a 
promotion, he recommended her; he responded, “well, she had earned it by efforts. She 
had tried,” and that while he generally would only recommend employees he deemed 
worthy, he understood that there were sometimes “organization[al] reasons” for 
promotions.409 He continued that he did not attempt “everything possible” to secure 
Taliaferro’s promotion, but “everything that I felt was right and proper and fair.”410 He 
talked to his second in the office, Anderson, who “seemed quite knowledgeable of 
Personnel matters,” but never personally inquired with Personnel as to whether or why 
 
407 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 46-47, 28 Sep 1979. 
408 Transcript of Proceedings, 210, 6 Nov 1980. 
409 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 48, 28 Sep 1979. 
410 Transcript of Proceedings, 205, 6 Nov 1980. 
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Taliaferro’s position was not promotable.411 A History Office employee and friend of 
Wright, with whom Wright had discussed his difficulty with Taliaferro commented, 
Monte was simple, old-fashioned—smart and good scholar—but [from a] hard-
scrabble background…he could hardly understand the world that she came from. 
He had nothing in his background that gave him any experience with how to talk 
to Gloria. It's not that he lacked empathy, it's just that after months and months of 
this ordeal, he thought that he had no alternative… He might have been unfair, but 
I was not a party to the dispute.  If unfair, I strongly doubt that it was because of 
racial prejudice.  I never saw any hint of racial bias in his speech or behavior.412  
 
Wright recounted that he and Taliaferro had conflict over Taliaferro’s “personal visitors, 
too many personal telephone calls and coming to work late.” 413 Taliaferro suspected that 
when white supervisors complained that black employees had too many personal visitors, 
it was often because they spoke with other black employees, “You couldn’t be talking 
together. Couldn’t, you know, two or three black people talking, and they made sure we 
were separated apart so we wouldn’t get together and talk.”414 The fact that Wright was 
known to tolerate these behaviors from other [white] employees in the office probably 
confirmed Taliaferro’s impression that Wright treated her in a discriminatory manner. 415 
Wright claimed that “her vocabulary and her command of grammar were not—
certainly not really good. And we had some differences of opinion as to how my letters 
 
411 Transcript of Proceedings, 206-207, 6 Nov 1980. 
412 Roland 2 Feb 2020.  
413 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 28 Sep 1979.  
414 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
415 Roland confirmed that Wright was prone to turn a blind eye to this type of behavior, 
as long as employees completed their work in an efficient fashion. However, he did not 
believe Wright would have discriminated against Taliaferro in this manner, commenting, 
“I do not ever recall seeing Gloria talking with any black colleagues in or near our office.  
I do not recall any other black colleagues being on the same floor with us in the Reporters 
Building.  Monte never objected, to my knowledge, to NASA employees talking with 
each other.” Roland 2 Feb 2020; Roland email to the author, 22 Mar 2020.  
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were to be spelled and punctuated—associating retyping.”416 At this time, Wright was 
unaware that Taliaferro was “an advocate of civil rights within the Agency.”417 Taliaferro 
related that complaints about poor grammar and spelling were not uncommon for black 
employees at NASA,  
At that time period, nobody could read, nobody could write….That’s another 
thing they started doing in a performance reviews. “You can’t write. You can’t 
read.” …he was going to tell me, “You have to go to school. I think you need 
English.” I said, “English class? I took my English at George Washington 
University. What do I need to take another one for?” … 
RC: Did they have an example of why they wanted you to [take an English 
course]? 
GT: Of course not! He couldn’t prove sh—. Excuse me. Nothing! I think—again, 
I would write something. He would always—he was a micromanager—so he 
would write over everything…I would say this is grammatically wrong. It may be 
what you want put in there, fine, but it’s wrong. So I sent it up, and it came back 
from the…What do you mean talking about [more classes]. I refused to go. But 
that’s what he’s going to come and tell me that. And so these are the kinds of 
things they’re doing to different blacks….There was a trying time.418 
 
The discrimination that occurred while Taliaferro worked in the History Office, 
she argued, led to long lasting effects, particularly denial of “equal opportunity to 
compete for professional positions within NASA Headquarters, with regard both to her 
potential participation…to compete in the merit selection process.”419 Taliaferro’s claim 
confirms that she applied for—and was denied—over fifty positions within NASA. 
 
416 Deposition of Monte. D. Wright, 55, 28 Sep 1979. 
417 Transcript of Proceedings, 221, 6 Nov 1980. 
418 Taliaferro was discussing another supervisor, not Wright, but this illustrates that, from 
her perspective, this complaint was a NASA-wide tool of discrimination, not a legitimate 
complaint against her, nor merely controversy with one supervisor. Taliaferro 20 July 
2019. 
419 Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 8 April 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I. 
 122 
Taliaferro reflected that though she was qualified, she was rejected for promotions, and 
ultimately switched career paths within NASA,  
I went in as an archival assistant. Because of discriminatory practices, I had to 
change to secretary to get a g—d— promotion. It took me out of my career. I said 
it’s that [simple] to get a promotion. One.420  
So the secretary—I don’t know who it was—I started helping her out, and then 
that lady—I’ll never forget her, in Personnel—I always wanted a promotion, 
cause I started looking and said, an archivist. And she said, “well, you have to go 
to secretary to get a promotion.” That’s what they gave us. You see how they con 
us? That was a con job. And that con job they did on every black employee that I 
can recollect that I spoke to. That was a con. “Well you got to be a secretary.” 
And then another con, when you became a secretary, “you got to have shorthand.” 
Nobody was taking no shorthand. “You got to have shorthand,” no whites around 
there—secretaries, [GS] 8s, [GS]9s—they didn’t have shorthand. We had black 
secretaries with a degree. You know, master’s degrees.421  
 
Court documents corroborated this account, and an expert witness confirmed that 
“stenographic skills are not required before a secretary in the federal service can be 
promoted to the GS-7 level (Tr. P. 26) Plaintiff had no reasons to question this advice and 
in fact began and completed stenographic courses…in the hopes that this would result in 
her promotion to the GS-7 level.”422 
By June 1979, Taliaferro motioned to amend her claim, adding that since filing a 
complaint, she had been denied every job at NASA that she applied for, totaling over 
fifty applications.423 Taliaferro’s amendment also made a striking allegation of 
retribution, 
 
420 Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
421 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019 
422 Objections of Plaintiff Gloria T. Taliaferro to the Special Master’s Recommended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 21 Apr 1982, US Court of Appeal for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, No. 82-1915, Box 43, NARA I. 
423 Motion of Claimant Gloria Taliaferro for Leave to Amend Claim, 22 Jun 1979, Vol 2, 
Box 41, NARA I. 
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it appears that in some instances these denial were indeed directly related to the 
long delay in promotion claimant to the GS-7 level…on the other hand there is 
reason to believe that some of these denial were related to her earlier complaint in 
a different way: that they were the product of continuing discrimination by the 
agency, which discrimination was the subject of the original complaint. Still 
further, in some cases rejection stemmed from claimant’s widely known 
involvement as a named plaintiff in MEAN v. NASA. This continuing pattern of 
racial discrimination, although occurring subsequent to the specific instances of 
discrimination alleged in MEAN v. NASA, is clearly related to, and indeed may 
stem from, those very same instances.424 
 
This statement offered a tempered view at how unsatisfied Taliaferro was with the 
Settlement of the class action, and makes a compelling, sweeping argument that NASA 
not only needed to change the outcome of a few cases, but needed to undergo more 
foundational, hearts-and-minds change, at the core of supervisors’ attitudes, leading to 
the removal of structural and systemic patterns of treating people of color with animosity 
and retaliating for fighting discrimination.425 NASA opposed Taliaferro’s amendment on 
the basis that “such amendment of an individual claim, amounting to a manifold 
multiplication of the topics and factual issues to be litigated….[was] impermissible under 
the terms of the [Settlement]…and that it would effectively circumvent the spirit and 
intent of that settlement.”426 
 
424 Another document states the argument this way: “these subsequent denials reflect a 
continuing pattern of discrimination against Ms. Taliaferro, stemming not only from the 
specific instances of race discrimination originally alleged, but form a continuing practice 
of discrimination by the agency with regard both to the claimant’s race and to her widely-
known participation as a named plaintiff in MEAN v. NASA”; Amendment to Claim of 
Gloria Taliaferro 22 Jun 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I; Motion of Claimant Gloria 
Taliaferro for Leave to Amend Claim, 22 Jun 1979, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA l.  
425 Both Trinder and Taliaferro remarked on the cost of fighting discrimination; Rachel 
Trinder, phone conversation with the author, 10 May 2019; Taliaferro 20 July 2019. 
426 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition got the Motion of 
Claimant Gloria Taliaferro for Leave to Amend Her Claim, 2 Jul 1979, Vol, Box 42, 
NARA I; Margolis initially ordered in favor of Taliaferro, allowing her an extension until 
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Taliaferro’s counsel inquired for NASA to provide significant statistical data 
concerning promotions comparing minority and nonminority employees, the process by 
which promotions were applied for and granted, and who was involved in decision 
making concerning promotions. This request was partially motivated by Taliaferro’s 
belief that there had been a breakdown in her promotion paperwork being delivered to the 
correct individual,   
from what I understand, my papers went in with several other people, and 
everyone got promoted except me. Someone pulled me out. I think it was Colonel 
Vogel…personally, because I was already authorized to get the promotion, all he 
[Homer Newell] had to do was sign off, it wasn’t a matter of being qualified. 
Personnel [Office], if they did, it was usually for an excuse. I never named—I 
can’t recall any names in Personnel, off hand. But it had gone up there, and 
everyone got promoted, except me. And they couldn’t figure out why wasn’t I? 
All this court stuff, “why was she taken out?” You know why. And they trying to 
say. This other lady Elba Green? She was in there, but she was very light, she 
could pass for white. And she worked for Homer Newell. Of course, she was 
going to get promoted. You know, that’s a given! That’s a given.427 
 
Additionally, Taliaferro’s counsel asked, “whether any complaints, formal or informal, 
charging Dr. Monte D. Wright, Dr. Homer E. Newell, Mr. J. Allen Crocker, Dr. Eugene 
M. Emme, and Dr. Frank W. Anderson or Ms. Dorothy Horowitz with discrimination on 
the basis of race have ever been filed by any present or former employees of NASA or 
applicants for jobs at NASA,” and if so, to provide pertinent information about any such 
 
30 September 1979, but NASA continued to motion against extension. Margolis denied 
Taliaferro’s extension on 26 July 1979; Taliaferro motioned for reconsideration 14 
September 1979. Defendant’s Response to the Reply of Claimant Gloria Taliaferro to 
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Her 
Claim, 23 Jul 1979; Order, 20 Jul 1979; Order, 26 Jul 1979, Vol 3, Box 42, NARA I; 
Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order Denying the Motion of Claimant Gloria T. Taliaferro for 
Leave to Amend Her Claim, 14 Sep 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, NARA I. 
427 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019.  
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complaints.428 Additionally, Taliaferro’s counsel sought information on whether NASA 
had previously received complaints, “of discrimination or harassment of any kind on the 
basis of… [an employee’s] involvement in litigation, or legal or administrative 
proceedings of any kind.”429 NASA rejected answering the interrogatories, claiming the 
answers were irrelevant to Taliaferro’s case.430  
Taliaferro’s counsel made the unusual motion to depose Sara Najjar, a NASA 
Headquarters attorney. NASA objected on the basis that Najjar’s only involvement with 
the case was as in her capacity as NASA counsel, and any information she knew 
pertaining to the case was protected under attorney-client privilege, and that “the 
information sought by the claimant is not exclusively in the possession of Ms. 
Najjar…[and] could be obtained by the clamant through interrogatories.”431 NASA’s 
counsel accused Taliaferro’s attorneys of trying to take a “short-cut” and that, “plainly, 
what the claimant seeks to accomplish by the deposition of Ms. Najjar is to obtain second 
hand, through defendant’s counsel, the accumulated information that might otherwise be 
 
428 Dr. Monte Wright was her supervisor until Mar 3, 1974, when she began working for 
Richard E. Halpern, and then Dr. Albert Opp from Jan 9, 1976 at least until the time of 
the Settlement. Interrogatory No. 21 Defendant’s Answers to Claimant Taliaferro’s 
Interrogatories, 30 Jul 1979, Vol 3, Box 42, NARA I; She received a promotion 
recommendation and “more than satisfactory” performance review from Halpern in June 
1975. Program Manager HEAO [Richard Halpern] Memo to Director, Physics & 
Astronomy Programs, Subject: Recommendation for Promotion of Ms. Gloria Taliaferro, 
dated 23 Jun 1975, Vol 3, Box 42, NARA I; Interrogatories of Claimant Gloria Taliaferro 
to Defendant, 29 Jun 1979, Vol 2 Box 41, NARA I. 
429 Interrogatories of Claimant Gloria Taliaferro to Defendant. 
430 Interrogatory No. 33, Defendant’s Answers to Claimant Taliaferro’s Interrogatories, 
30 Jul 1979, Vol 3 Box 42, NARA I. 
431 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion for a 
Protective Order to Prohibit Claimant Taliaferro from Taking the Deposition of Ms. Sara 
Najjar, 1 Aug 1979, Vol 3, Box 42, NARA I. 
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sought through the deposition of several people more directly involved in the 
circumstances surround Ms. Taliaferro’s claim,” because the Settlement allowed only one 
deposition.432 Trinder, argued that Najjar’s “mere employment in the Office of the 
General Counsel” was not sufficient to demonstrate attorney-client privilege and that the 
NASA could object, with proof of attorney-client privilege, to any question asked during 
the deposition.433 Additionally, Trinder pointed out that while “any communications 
between the attorney and client must be confidential…if there were any third parties in 
the room, other than agents of the attorney, communications are not privilege[d]….where 
a client is a corporation or a federal agency, all employees of the…agency are not 
‘clients’ of the attorney.”434 She continued by highlighting that, “attorney-client 
privilege…cannot be used to further criminal or fraudulent schemes or activities.”435 
Taliaferro believed Najjar was incompetent and had no legal strategy, “They had a lawyer 
up there—Sara Najjar—she was always going to judges crying. And we’d say, ‘There’s 
Sara crying again.’ You know, she did her point on the court. Because Boggs and them 
would eat her up and spit her out.”436 
In the continued fight over production of documents, Trinder argued that NASA’s 
defense was attempting to narrow Taliaferro’s claim to the point that it would become, 
“meaningless,” and continued the argument that the documents requested should be 
 
432 Defendant’s Memorandum 1 Aug 1979. . 
433 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for a Protective 
Order 13 Aug 1979, Vol 3, Box 42, NARA I. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Taliaferro 20 Oct 2019. 
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produced because “courts have recognized that a liberal construction of the discovery 
rules in Title VII cases is not only highly desirable, but that absent such a construction a 
plaintiff may be denied the very opportunity to establish a prima facie case.”437 Because 
Margolis ruled to limit discovery and not allow an amendment to the claim, by March 
1980, Taliaferro appealed Magistrate Margolis’s order to the District Court, Judge 
Richey. 438 The decision to limit the scope of discovery was foundational to Taliaferro’s 
ability to prove her claim of discrimination, and ultimately, was overturned by the Court 
of Appeals.439 Phrases such as “whether leave to amend should be granted is a matter of 
justice, not merely convenience to the defendant,” which some may argue was 
gamesmanship, seem to reflect Trinder’s vigor that this case was a matter of right and 
wrong, one she cared very much to see decided on the side of what she viewed as 
morality.440  
 
437 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of Claimant Gloria T 
Taliaferro to Compel for the Production of Documents, signed 28 September 1979 Vol 5, 
Box 42, NARA I. 
438 Notice of Appeal to United States District Judge Richey of Claimant Gloria T. 
Taliaferro from the February 29, 1980 Order of Magistrate Margolis, 13 Mar 1980, Vol, 
Box 42, NARA I. 
439MEAN v Beggs, 723 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1983), Box 43, NARA I. 
440 “I think Gloria's energy and passion was the key defining factor in what she managed 
to achieve. She knew that what was happening was wrong at a very fundamental level, 
and she was justifiably angry about it. But she kept that anger in check and remained 
totally focused, passionate rather than angry, and that passion certainly invigorated me. I 
could feel the terrible unfairness and sense her pain as well as her passion, and yet she 
was never bitter about how she was being treated by Headquarters.  She also felt that it 
was her duty to try to make a difference to others similarly affected, and that really 
inspired me to try to help. I consider it an enormous privilege to have been able to play a 
part in assisting her.  The case was ultimately about basic justice.” Trinder, 10 May 2019, 
Trinder email communication with the author, 22 March 2020. Reply of Claimant Gloria 
T. Taliaferro to Defendant’s memorandum in Opposition, 3 Oct 1979, Vol 5, Box 42, 
NARA I.  
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RT: By the time my law firm became involved, the case had already been going 
on as a class action for some time. We were assigned a case that would be tried by 
a magistrate, but there had already been limitations imposed on the gathering of 
evidence. It was a significant challenge because proving any case requires 
evidence, and if a plaintiff is prevented even from seeking that evidence through 
discovery, that can be an insurmountable obstacle.  To me it was further proof of 
the fundamental unfairness of the system seen throughout the civil rights 
movement, because there were glaring limitations placed on minorities in so many 
aspects of life - voting rights restrictions, for example.  The way I saw it, she 
faced enormous resentment that an African American female would have the 
nerve to challenge the system, and we had a magistrate who didn’t appear 
interested in seeing or understanding the impact of imposing severe discovery 
limitations,  There was a terrible sense among the claimants that the deck was 
stacked against them – which it was.441 
 
Taliaferro sought backpay that remediated the difference in pay resulting from not 
receiving promotions from March 1972 through 1980 (at the time the claim was 
submitted to the court), totaling $10,914.442 She also requested that she be compensated 
for leave time used to fight this case, totaling 400 hours, and that she would receive a 
position “within the NASA Headquarters STEP upward mobility program at the GS-7/7 
or higher level.”443  
On 12 March 1981, Margolis ruled against Taliaferro. He believed that Taliaferro 
had made a prima facie case, but NASA had demonstrated satisfactorily legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory reasons for Taliaferro’s non-promotion. He ruled that Taliaferro had 
not demonstrated that NASA’s reasons were pretextual.444 Taliaferro filed objections to 
 
441 Trinder, 10 May 2019.  
442 Pretrial Statement of Gloria Taliaferro, 11 Sep 1980. 
443 Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, 9 Apr 1980, Vol 6, Box 42, NARA I; Ibid. 
444 Findings of Fact of Face and Conclusions of Law, (Taliaferro), Margolis, 12 Mar 
1981.  
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Margolis’ findings by April 1982.445 On her behalf, Trinder’s essential argument hinged 
upon this claim, “defendant’s continually shifting, invalid justifications are even more 
suspect when viewed in conjunction with the evidence concerning racial imbalance in the 
lower echelons of the agency and Plaintiff’s well-known civil rights activities. By 
continually retreating from one invalid reason to another, Defendant has destroyed its 
own credibility.”446  Two major issues, Trinder argued, were apparent in Margolis’s 
findings. He found that NASA had “articulated clear and specific legitimate reasons for 
its failure on two occasions to promote her [Taliaferro] from GS-6 to the GS-7 level,” but 
first, did not even address Taliaferro’s claim that she was misclassified as a GS-6.447 
Margolis recognized that, “the Historical Office had a ‘moral obligation’ to promote the 
white employee because she was undergraded,” but Trinder argued that this explanation 
was “woefully inadequate,” and that Margolis ignored, “the fact that similar efforts were 
not made to promotion Plaintiff although she too was undergraded” and concluded that 
“the Special Master’s findings fail even to address the undisputed evidence that special 
treatment was accorded the white employee, and they are erroneous for that 
 
445 Taliaferro asked for an extension on filing an appeal until Rose Mary Ferguson’s case 
was decided, because many issues were “the same or inextricably tied,” implying and 
moving forward the argument that these individual cases really belonged together, not 
broken down into individual cases.445 Richey approved the extension. Motion of Plaintiff 
Gloria T. Taliaferro for Enlargement of Time, 8 Apr 1981, Vol 9, Box 42, NARA I; 
Order, Charles Richey, 13 Apr 1981, Vol 9, Box 42, NARA I; Objections of Plaintiff 
Gloria T. Taliaferro to the Special Master’s Recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 21 Apr 1982, MEAN, Taliaferro v Frosch, US Court of Appeals, 
DC, Box 43, NARA I.  
446 Objections of Plaintiff Gloria T. Taliaferro 21 Apr 1982. 
447 Ibid. 
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reason.”448Additionally, Trinder argued that Margolis was incorrect because both of 
NASA’s justifications were invalid. These two basic problems, Trinder argued, caused 
the whole case to crumble, and held that “although it is conceivable that the Special 
Master might have found that any one of the excuses given to Plaintiff, if made 
independently, might have been made in good faith, the record as a whole and the fact 
that Defendant found it necessary continually to change is position requires a finding that 
these defenses were pretextual.”449  
Trinder’s argument continued; while NASA stated that the white individuals 
promoted had promotion potential, NASA repeatedly refused to provide evidence to 
substantiate that claim.450 She therefore argued that, “defendant’s failure and refusal to 
produce these documents can lead only to the inference that their production would have 
been unfavorable to its case.”451 She pointed out that NASA lawyers themselves “made 
the astonishing admission that the lack of promotion potential was irrelevant in the 
promotion of whites…that whites: ‘were recommended on their own merit, and these 
recommendations were justified irrespective of whether there is promotion potential in 
the job or not.’ (Tr. P. 153)”452 On 8 June 1982 Judge Richey ordered that Margolis’s 




450 Trinder made this argument all throughout the case, it was not a new argument in this 
opposition. Ibid. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Emphasis in the original. Ibid. 
453 Order, 8 Jun 1982, Charles R. Richey, MEAN, No. 82-1915, Box 43, NARA I. 
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Gloria Taliaferro, Diane Moore, and Rosemary Ferguson collectively challenged 
Margolis’s dismissal—and Richey’s affirmation of the dismissal—on the basis that his 
order violated the rights owed Title VII claimants by unlawfully, “limit[ing] the 
substantive scope of discovery permitted in the individual discrimination cases.”454 The 
Court of Appeals DC Circuit heard the case in November 1983, and justices Edward 
Tamm, Abner Mikva, and David Bazelon decided the case, finding that,  
the district court's order limiting the substantive scope of discovery was incorrect 
as a matter of law. Because the discovery limitation may have denied appellant 
Gloria Taliaferro access to information that was central to her claim of disparate 
treatment, we remand her claim for further proceedings. Our reversal of the 
court's discovery order, however, does not affect the claims of appellants Diane 
Moore and Rose Mary Ferguson. Neither Ms. Moore nor Ms. Ferguson 
demonstrated how reversal of the discovery order might lead to the discovery of 
information which could alter the magistrate's conclusions.455 
 
The Court argued that Margolis’s “primary flaw” was that he had prioritized the 
Settlement’s limitation with regards to relevance to an individual claimant over the, 
“section of the Settlement which provided that the individual discrimination claims ‘be 
resolved in accordance with the law governing Title VII actions in the federal courts.’”456 
The information crucial to Taliaferro’s case, which had gone ignored in the lower courts, 
concerned statistical information comparing Taliaferro to similarly situated white 
employees outside her office. The Court found that. “If NASA promoted white 
employees without promotion potential or during the hiring freeze, this information 
would be highly relevant to Ms. Taliaferro's claim of intentional discrimination. But the 
 
454 James Beggs began his tenure as NASA Administrator in 1981 and became named 




discovery order precluded her from obtaining that information. This erroneous 
interpretation of the Settlement precluded Ms. Taliaferro from obtaining comparative 
information that goes to the heart of her claim against NASA.”457 The Court confirmed 
that, contrary to Margolis’s ruling on statistical data requested in discovery by all three 
claimants, “it is well established that statistical data and comparative information 
concerning an employer's treatment of minorities is relevant evidence in an individual 
discrimination claim against that employer.”458 The Court concluded their opinion with 
this order, “we emphasize that it is an abuse of discretion to prevent a Title VII plaintiff 
from obtaining information that is vital to proving a discrimination claim. 
We affirm the district court's orders concerning Diane Moore and Rose Mary Ferguson. 
We vacate the district court's orders limiting the scope of discovery and dismissing Gloria 
Taliaferro's claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.”459  
Throughout 1984, NASA repeatedly attempted to get Taliaferro’s claim 
dismissed; Trinder characterized these efforts as requests, “apparently designed to render 
meaningless Ms. Taliaferro’s victory in the Court of Appeals” that NASA was 
“attempting to ‘appeal’ the Circuit Court’s order to the District Court, a course of action 
clearly not available,” and that NASA intended the Court to act, “as if the entire appeal 
proceedings were merely a figment of Ms. Taliaferro’s imagination.”460 The Court denied 





460 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 12 Apr 1984, Box 43, NARA I; 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 1 Aug 1984, Box 43, NARA I. 
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Taliaferro’s interrogatories and requests for documents; in November, Taliaferro 
requested leave to take depositions. NASA opposed this measure, and Richey denied her, 
“although after the remand, this Court has permitted plaintiff to conduct some new 
discovery, it has not consented to depositions such as those now requested.”461 The denial 
was based on substantial legal and practical reasoning: the Settlement limited the 
claimants to one deposition—which the Court of Appeals had allowed as appropriate—
and because none of the three individuals were even still employed at NASA. 
On February 13, 1985, NASA and Gloria Taliaferro settled her claim; the first 
point states that NASA “expressly denies that plaintiff’s rights were violated in any way 
or that plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief sought.”462 NASA paid Taliaferro $15,000 
for any backpay, attorney’s fees, and any other costs associated with the action.463 This 
amount was nearly a year’s salary for Taliaferro and significantly more than any other of 
the MEAN complainants were awarded. However, this settlement did little to remediate 
even Taliaferro’s personal problems at the agency. While Taliaferro was still in litigation 
for her claims of discrimination in the History Office, she filed a new complaint in June 
1979. By 1982, she had appealed it up to the EEOC, which affirmed NASA’s finding of 
nondiscrimination. She did not appeal the EEOC’s decision, but the complaint highlights 
the fact that the MEAN case did little to improve conditions for black employees at 
NASA.464 While her individual claim did not affect the outcome of MEAN’s Settlement, 
 
461 Order, Judge Charles Richey, 7 Nov 1984, Folder (267-73), 1 of 2, Box 46, NARA I. 
462 Claim of Gloria Taliaferro, Settlement Agreement and General Release, 13 Feb 1985, 
Folder (267-73), 2 of 2 Box 46, NARA I. 
463 Settlement Agreement and General Release, 13 Feb 1985.  
464 Gloria Taliaferro v. NASA, 1982 EEOPUB LEXIS 53; 83 FEO (LRP) 3002.  
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the statistical information Taliaferro eventually obtained may have helped to fuel efforts 























RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: Unsettled 
 “[We] may have placed too much reliance on NASA’s good faith in carryout the 
Stipulation” -MEAN, 4 December 1981  
 
The MEAN case’s Settlement was not effective in moving NASA forward in its 
structural and systemic treatment of black employees. By breaking down the case from a 
class action into individual claims, the burden to illustrate a pattern of discrimination 
shifted from the entire class to individuals. Despite the limited individual successes, 
Taliaferro reflected that the Settlement was disappointing but not worthless. While not 
worthless because the Settlement benefited some, it was disappointing because the 
outcome has not led to the needed shift in NASA structure and culture toward racial 
equality and justice.465 
RC: What impact did the Settlement have? Were people satisfied with it from the 
MEAN side?  
GT: Well, we were satisfied that it got the recognition. Some people got 
rewarded; a lot of them were too scared to come forward. And they didn’t do it. 
Too scared—that was their livelihood—they had a family. They were very, very 
frightened. And it’s a shame, but that’s the way it was. But they were glad we did 
it.  
We got some recognition. Some people were rewarded. And we had NASA on 
their toes. We had them on their g—d—n toes about what they were doing and 
who they were doing it to, because eyes were on them to do the right thing.  
And I was black balled, and that’s how it goes with people like me, but I 
understand. And instead of rewarding me for putting them to straighten up for this 
disgrace to our agency which is supposed to be so high tech. It was a disgrace. 
You would think we would put more emphasis on our people. Like we did the  
d—n astronauts.  
But they [other black employees] were happy, but they were just too scared to 
come forward. Like one girl, she said “Gloria, I just can’t do it.” She didn’t even 
 
465 Rachel Trinder commented that she felt “because of the precedent that was established 
when Gloria’s case was successful on appeal in the DC Circuit, she made a tremendous 
difference for the future.” Trinder email communication with the author, 22 March 2020.  
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want to go to lunch with me. She said, “I can’t go to lunch.” I said “Ok. I’ll take 
that. But when you get ready, you know, hey I’m here.” If you stay at NASA long 
enough—you’re going to get sh—ted on. That was the policy. Especially black 
men. If you stay there long enough, you’re going to get sh—ted on in some 
fashion.…All of them…down the line they get sh—ted on. That’s what they do. 
It’s worse now, I’m sure…. 
GT: there were some bad times. Some struggles. This [MEAN] was a struggle. 
This was the biggest struggle…back then, it was a lot of civil rights activities. 
Congress [was] looking at them. They did, you know, start hiring minorities—
black and women—and promoting. And then it fell off. you know, what? I think 
they just stopped. They don't give a d—n.466 
 
Progress at NASA was not linear. Black employees at NASA remained intimidated and 
mistrusting of NASA administration, a fact demonstrated by the low number of 
employees who brought individual complaints as provided for under the Settlement. The 
Settlement did little to instill faith in NASA administrators. While some MEAN members 
did receive some monetary awards, many victims of discrimination were too afraid of 
retribution to come forward. The case gained little recognition within NASA; many white 
employees, even those aware of some of the same discrimination complaints made in the 
case, were unaware that a class action case was litigated. 
The case did have a measure of success in making NASA accountable. The Court 
validated some of MEAN’s concerns of discrimination and ordered NASA to change 
some glaring discriminatory structures, maintaining jurisdiction over the settlement from 
1978 through 1985. Additionally, because of the MEAN complaint and the Ruth Bates 
Harris controversy, Congress became aware of the problems, and multiple committees 
probed into NASA’s EEO activity in 1974 and 1976. Congress observed slight progress 
 
466 Gloria Taliaferro, Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 20 
October 2019.  
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on NASA’s part, but did not follow-up on NASA’s refusals to adopt their 
recommendations. Because NASA administrators and supervisors had not allowed the 
facts of the case to reform their attitudes and actions, once the Settlement expired, many 
black employees watched as their situation deteriorated to as bad or worse than before.467  
NASA and MEAN settled out of Court in September 1978; the Settlement 
initially was set to expire after three years, on September 20, 1981.468 The Settlement 
allowed MEAN to file a motion with the Court to extend the Settlement in the event that, 
“any aspect of the Stipulation has not been substantially complied with.”469 In early 
September 1981, MEAN expressed “significant concerns with respect to NASA’s 
performance of certain of its obligations under the Stipulation.”470 Throughout the 
summer, MEAN analyzed the information that NASA was obligated to furnish to them, 
including statistical and performance reports. MEAN “attempt[ed] to resolve these 
perceived deficiencies in NASA’s performance through informal negotiations with 
 
467 Taliaferro repeatedly mentioned that she felt NASA got worse after the Settlement; 
she voiced that individuals she knows who still work at the agency feel similarly. 
Taliaferro, 20 October 2019.  
468 The Court of Appeals case no. is 81-1349 (but still often associated with the civil no. 
74-1832). Motion and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities for 
Conditional Extension of the Term of the Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order, 1 
Sep 1981, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (hereafter referred 
to as “US Court of Appeals, DC”), No. 82-1071, September Term, 1981, RG 21, Box 43, 
Container No. 44, Civil Case Files 01/01/1965-12/31/1985, District Court of the United 
States US District Court for the District of Columbia, National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC, (this archive is hereafter referred to as NARA I).  
469 Motion and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Conditional 
Extension of the Term of the Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order, 1 Sep 1981, 
US Court of Appeals, DC, No. 82-1071, Sep Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I.  
470 Ibid. 
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NASA personnel.”471 These meetings were still on-going in September; NASA was 
cooperating, including supplying MEAN with further information requested. In order to 
protect MEAN during these informal negotiations, MEAN filed for an extension of the 
Settlement. This meant that MEAN would wait to file a motion with the Court to require 
NASA’s compliance with the Settlement in hope of remediating concerns out of court. 
Judge Richey affirmed this action.472 By November, MEAN asked the Court to require 
NASA’s compliance.473 MEAN raised major issues concerning the Settlement’s 
provisions on minority hires into job code block 600 and that supervisors be evaluated on 
their adherence to EEO policy. Code block 600 referred to “NASA’s occupational code 
for professional administrative positions, for which a college degree or the equivalent, 
and specialized training and experience are required.”474 
NASA argued against the extension, first, with a procedural argument that MEAN 
had violated the Settlement by bringing their concerns for the first time in late August 
1981, not “promptly conferring…any alleged deficiency.” 475 NASA argued that MEAN 
had not actually tried to resolve them in informally, but that the meeting MEAN referred 
 
471 Ibid. 
472 Order, Charles Richey, 14 Sep 1981, US Court of Appeals, DC, No. 82-1071, Sep 
Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I.  
473 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Compliance with Stipulation 
of Settlement and Consent Order, 19 Nov 1981, US Court of Appeals, DC, No. 82-1071, 
Sep Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I.  
474 Emphasis in original. Defendant’s Memorandum, 11 Jun 1982, US Court of Appeals, 
DC, Sep Term, filed 16 Sep 1982, Box No. 43, NARA I 
475 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, 19 Nov 1981, US Court of Appeals, 
DC, No. 82-1071, Sep Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I. 
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to was not a good faith attempt at informal resolution but, “for the most part attempted to 
conduct discovery and to relitigate matters disposed of 3-5 years ago.”476 
NASA accused MEAN of trying to enforce terms which NASA “specifically 
rejected…which were never agreed-upon in this settlement agreement. This includes the 
effort by plaintiffs to expand the life of the settlement to a 5-year term (which was also 
specifically rejected during negotiations)…Plaintiffs seem intent on continuing to litigate 
and relitigate this case, even after settlement.”477 NASA argued that they “had complied 
with the terms of the settlement agreement concerning Code Block 600 hires…STEP, and 
Evaluation of EEO Performance.”478 On this point, NASA further argued that MEAN 
misinterpreted “the maintenance of the hiring rates achieved for minorities, as measured 
by their proportion of total hires, in code block 600” to be a quota.479 Rather than a quota, 
NASA argued, this was an “ambitious” goal that would be pursued “to the extent 
feasible” and accused MEAN of pushing for “preferential hiring” and “reverse 
discrimination.”480 NASA demonstrated that minority hires into professional jobs (code 
block 600) increased from 10.1% in 1974 to 15.4% in 1981.481 NASA furthered argued 





479 Emphasis added. Ibid. 
480 NASA supervisors received accusations of reverse discrimination: “would you explain 
why, on the flyer for the Fashion Show…the models were both black. Talk about 
discrimination! …Us white folks have had it!” Larry Vogel memo to Earl Ginyard, 16 
June 1976, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, 19 Nov 1981.  
481 Exhibit 1, Ibid. 
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professional positions, “was not and is not…to help minorities gain entry to Code Block 
600,” that NASA had no responsibility to make changes to this program.482 
The Settlement required NASA to make EEO performance part of evaluation for 
all managers and supervisors.483 NASA argued that MEAN was attempting to “substitute 
their judgment for that of the NASA Administrator as to what the EEO obligation would 
be…. or to what extent or degree the Administrator would employ such outcome in 
considering the professional advancement of managerial/supervisory personnel.”484 
In MEAN’s estimation, NASA’s trajectory was going in the wrong direction, 
even before the Settlement expired. The Settlement’s effect was not substantially 
advantageous to minority employees at NASA, and NASA was not putting forth the 
necessary effort to remediate even the agreed upon inadequacies. “Plaintiffs believed—
they thought reasonably—that defendant’s performance under the Stipulation would 
improve with time, and that a three-year running battle would not be necessary or 
productive in encouraging NASA to fulfill its obligations. It now appears in retrospect 
that plaintiffs unfortunately may have placed too much reliance on NASA’s good faith in 
carryout the Stipulation.”485 In response to NASA’s accusation that the motion was 
untimely, MEAN replied that they had been “overly optimistic” and while “it is 
 
482 Ibid. 
483 This was a requirement by Executive Order 11478; a GAO report on NASA found 
only Johnson Space Center had implemented this. Report to the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, “National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program Could be Improved,” 16 April 1975, Box 45, NARA I. 
484 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, 19 Nov 1981.  
485 Reply to Defendant’s Opposition, 4 Dec 1981 US Court of Appeals, DC, No. 82-1071, 
Sep Term, 1981, Box 43, NARA I. 
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unfortunate that the Motion had to be filed at all…its timing certainly cannot excuse 
defendant’s conduct.”486 MEAN’s reply pointed out that NASA sought,  
to divert attention from its inadequate performance by claiming that its efforts 
have been measured against the wrong standard….this hardly obscures the truly 
dismal nature of the results…clearly NASA has not come close to the 25.5 
percent minority hiring rate goal to which it committed itself, and its compliance 
with the Stipulation has actually deteriorated over the past three years...minority 
representation as a percentage of totally code block 600 employment actually has 
decreased each year during which the Stipulation has been in effect.487 
 
The Settlement required NASA to provide MEAN information on EEO efforts. NASA 
complained of MEAN’s insistence on NASA’s accountability on EEO performance—not 
just goals. MEAN argued that it was “inherent” in the agreement that NASA was 
accountable to MEAN and the Court, and that NASA should not expect them “to accept 
on faith that EEO performance has become a meaningful factor in the evaluation of 
Headquarters and supervisory personnel despite the substantial evidence to the 
contrary.”488 
NASA appealed the motion for extension, but Richey ruled that portions of the 
Settlement would be extended through 20 September 1983.489 Richey’s opinion stated, 
“NASA has failed to comply in some respects with the Stipulation…with respect to the 
Code Block 600 minority hiring goals…the defendants have not performed satisfactorily, 
particularly in Fiscal year (“FY”) 1981, in which only 7.2% of those hired were 
 
486 Reply to Defendant’s Opposition, 4 Dec 1981.  
487 Emphasis in original. Ibid. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Order, Charles Richey, 31 May 1982, US Court of Appeals, DC, Sep Term, filed 16 
Sep 1982, Box No. 43, NARA I.  
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minorities. The goal agreed to in the stipulation is 25.5%.”490 Because NASA failed in 
this section of the Settlement, the Court would continue to supervise that provision, 
partially extending the Settlement. The Court found that NASA— “by its own internal 
review”—failed in eleven out of sixteen categories regarding “the requirement that the 
professional advancement of Headquarters managerial and supervisory personnel be 
dependent in part upon fulfillment of their EEO obligations.”491 Richey extended this 
provision also. However, the Court found that because no specific goal was agreed upon 
regarding the STEP program, therefore STEP would no longer be part of the Settlement 
negotiations.492 The Court’s requirements for NASA remained the same for extension as 
the original Settlement, including developing goals, keeping race data on competitive 
hires and promotions in code block 600, and supplying MEAN with information 
regarding EEO performance in code block 600 hires and promotions, and submitting 
evidence to the Court for two years that, “demonstrates that EEO performance in fact 
plays a significant role in the advancement process.”493 
 
490 Memorandum Opinion of United States District Judge Charles R. Richey, 1 Jun 1982, 
US Court of Appeals, DC, Sep Term, filed 16 Sep 1982, Box No. 43, NARA I.  
491 “NASA’s 1981 Interim Status Report: ‘Each Office Head was evaluated…five 
organizations were rated satisfactory or better…the remaining eleven organizations 
whose progress was judged to be less than satisfactory were assigned EO as a Key 
Specific Objective.’”  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 24 Jun 1982, US Court of Appeals, DC, 
September Term, filed 16 Sep 1982, Box No. 43, NARA I; Reply to Defendant’s 
Opposition, 4 Dec 1981.  
491 Memorandum Opinion, Richey, 1 Jun 1982.  
492 Ibid. 
493 Order, Charles Richey, 1 Jun 1982, US Court of Appeals, DC, September Term, filed 
16 Sep 1982, Box No. 43, NARA I. 
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NASA fought extension, arguing that “the Court’s interpretation…transformed 
the goal into a mandatory quota of 25.5%...this was not what the Stipulation provided or 
what the parties agreed to. The goal was a goal to aspire toward—a maximum ceiling, not 
a minimum floor…the goal was agreed upon simply to prevent the decline of the existing 
minority representation.”494 NASA claimed that the internal report highlighting their 
deficiencies in prioritizing EEO performance in personnel’s work reviews, “was an 
incomplete, unreviewed, interim report, which inaccurately described the evaluation 
outcome.”495 Last, NASA argued that they had fulfilled their obligation to the Settlement 
“the central issue is: did defendant require that EEO performance be included in all 
evaluations of Headquarters managerial and supervisory personnel? The answer is a 
resounding Yes, as it is undisputed that this is being done.”496 MEAN found this rebuttal 
to be a confirmation of their fears, “this effort highlights what Plaintiffs have suspected 
for some time, i.e. that NASA has not taken, and indeed never intended to take, certain 
elements of the Stipulation seriously.”497 First, MEAN disputed NASA’s invention that 
the code block 600 goal was merely to prevent decline of minorities, arguing that this 
idea was, “a construction…defies common sense, misrepresents the purpose of the 
Stipulation, and misconstrues the terms to which NASA agreed. The purpose of the 
 
494 Emphasis in original. Defendant’s Memorandum, 11 Jun 1982 
495 One may wonder why such an inaccurate report would have been submitted to the 
Court at all. Emphasis in original. Ibid. 
496 Emphasis in original. Ibid. 
497 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 24 Jun 1982.  
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Stipulation…was clearly to increase minority representation…if NASA were 
correct…there would have been no benefit whatsoever to Plaintiffs in agreeing to it.”498 
On the issue of NASA’s compliance with EEO performance in personnel 
evaluations, MEAN argued that,  
NASA has chosen unilaterally to ignore the most important part…that the 
professional advancement be dependent in part upon the adequacy of a person’s 
EEO performance…NASA has been unwilling to release information that would 
aid in monitoring compliance….the evidence that does exist completely 
undermines NASA’s contention that professional advancement has been 
dependent in part upon EEO performance.499  
 
MEAN argued that NASA’s track record on this issue “meshes perfectly with NASA’s 
unwillingness to comply” with the Settlement, highlighting NASA’s broader structural 
and systemic problems with regard to race and unwillingness to change.500 MEAN drew 
the conclusion that without this provision, all other issues could not be resolved. NASA 
managers and supervisors were the key component of bringing change and equal 
opportunity for black employees at NASA, and without accountability and “incentive to 
remedy their deficiencies,” MEAN harbored little hope for effective change.501 Richey 
upheld his decision to extend certain provisions of the Settlement.502 NASA 
unsuccessfully appealed the decision a second time.503  
 




502 Order, Charles Richey, 6 Jul 1982, US Court of Appeals, DC, Sep Term, filed 16 Sep 
1982, Box No. 43, NARA I. 
503 Notice of Appeal by Robert Frosch, 28 Jul 1982, US Court of Appeals, DC, Sep Term, 
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Throughout the fall of 1983, MEAN filed motions with the Court to extend the 
deadline by which they could require NASA to comply with the Settlement; while NASA 
rebutted these extensions, Richey granted them.504 By January 1984, MEAN filed for an 
extension of the Settlement and for leave to conduct limited discovery.505 After extended 
time to respond, NASA opposed this extension in March.  
Little happened substantially until August 1984, when MEAN renewed attempts 
to further extend the Settlement.506 MEAN argued that the Court had authority to extend 
the Stipulation until, “satisfied defendant has complied with the terms of the 
Stipulation.”507 MEAN argued that they sought a second extension, “only after having 
become convince that defendant’s highly unorthodox personnel actions fail to comply 
with the goals embodied in the Stipulation.”508 This “unorthodox” action referred to 
 
504 By August 1983, MEAN and NASA agreed to a settlement concerning attorneys’ fees 
for requiring compliance with the Settlement through 3 July 1982, in the amount of 
$17,476.10. This did not prevent MEAN from requesting attorneys’ fees from their 
efforts after that point in time; Settlement Agreement and Release 25 Aug 1983, MEAN v 
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1983; 23 Dec 1983; MEAN v Frosch Docket No. 74-1832, Civil Docket Continuation 
Sheet, acquired from the US District Court for the District of Columbia Historical 
Records Specialist, in the author’s possession.  
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Settlement and Consent Order, 3 Aug 1984, 1 Aug 1984, Box 43, NARA I. 
508 Ibid. 
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NASA’s methods—“manipulation” of the personnel system—to meet the code block 600 
goals.509 MEAN argued that NASA made only “cosmetic changes” in attempting to meet 
the code block 600 hiring goal. NASA “converted technical positions held by minorities 
in Code Block 500 into professional positions in Code Block 600…the position 
descriptions produced by defendant fail to dispel this suspicion…there is serious question 
whether the employees whose positions were converted received any real improvements 
in their employment status in the agency.”510 Of the eighteen converted positions, twelve 
of them were held by minority employees; MEAN argued that this number was 
unprecedented, and that the job descriptions “reveal[ed] few or only superficial changes 
in job duties.”511 NASA included temporary employees, including interns, in the numbers 
of code block 600 hires. MEAN argued that all of these indicated that NASA was not 
implementing “real and lasting gains in minority representation.”512 In 1982, MEAN’s 
assessment was “the agency achieved virtually no improvement in its level of minority 
representation in Code Block 600.” The increase in percentage of minority employees 
resulted only because some white employees were no longer employed in code block 
600.513 MEAN argued, if calculated apart from NASA’s bureaucratic maneuvering, the 









NASA explained that they intended to at least offer interns—many of whom, 
NASA claimed, were minorities—competitive, permanent positions.515 NASA considered 
this fact to be legitimate grounds for inclusion in the code block 600 numbers. 
Additionally, NASA argued that while some of the conversions were lateral 
reassignments, many of the employees converted to code block 600 received promotions 
and had a career ladder.516 
By November 1985, the Settlement was dismissed from Court oversight. The 
Court ruled that each party had satisfied their obligations.517 NASA paid $21,830 in 
attorneys’ fees and $1,456.79 in costs of case, but this Settlement, like the initial 
Settlement, maintained no admission of liability.518 
The MEAN Settlement expired in 1985, but just as the case had not begun in a 
vacuum, it did not end in one either. Black employees at multiple NASA centers brought 
class action suits around the same time the MEAN case was being litigated, including 
“Barrett v CSC, et al., Civil Action No. 74-1694, filed November 20 1974, pending 
before this court in which a class of black employees at Johnson Space Center, Houston, 
Texas, is presently certified…[and] two class actions against the Marshall Space Flight 
Center, Huntsville, Alabama. Bynum v Fletcher, C. A. 75-G-0352-NE, filed March 26, 
1975; Cofield v. Fletcher, C. A. 76-G-0665-NE, filed May 10, 1976, both cases in the 
 
515 There is no evidence of these offers, nor evidence that many intern positions were 
converted into long-term positions. 
516 Defendant’s Response to “Plaintiffs’ reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Extension of the Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order and for Leave 
to Conduct Limited Discovery,” 16 May 1984, Box 43, NARA I. 
517 Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal, 5 November 1985, Box 43, NARA I. 
518 Ibid. 
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U.S. District Court, Northern District of Alabama.”519 In addition, four complaints with 
third-party components were filed at Langley Research Center around this time.520 
Another black Headquarters employee, Gale Watson, whose name does not 
appear in any MEAN case files, filed a class action complaint on behalf of BEAN—
Black Employees at NASA—in August 1982. The complaint concerned many of the 
same problems the MEAN complaint had addressed: NASA’s “pattern and/or policy of 
giving preference to Whites when making all employment decisions in the areas of 
promotion, upward mobility, recruiting, hiring, training, job assignments, disciplinary 
policies, reorganizational policies, and terms and conditions of employment.”521 The 
EEOC ruled that while it was not technically identical to the MEAN complaint, and 
individuals whose employment at NASA Headquarters began after 1978 could 
technically bring their own suit, because Watson had been employed at Headquarters in 
1978, she was bound by the MEAN Settlement.522 She did not appeal the EEOC’s ruling. 
Watson brought a second complaint in 1987 which the EEOC remanded to NASA for a 
second investigation, including how the MEAN Settlement related to Watson’s second 
claim.523 The fact remained: black employees at NASA did not feel they were treated 
fairly, even after the MEAN Settlement had been implemented to the Court’s satisfaction. 
 
519 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 20 Jun 1978, Vol 2, Box 41, NARA I. 
520 R. Tenney Johnson, General Counsel, memo to James Fletcher, Administrator, 22 Nov 
1974, Folder: Complaint Processing, Box: George M. Low Papers-Alphabetical Subject 
Files, Equal Employment Opportunity files #2, #13883, NASA HQ, HRC.  
521 Gale A. Watson v. NASA, 1985 EEOPUB LEXIS 72; 85 FEOR (LPR) 1054. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Gale A. Watson v. NASA, 1988 EEOPUB LEXIS 3695; 88 FEOR (LPR) 21995.  
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Employees felt compelled to bring administrative action because of the adverse effects 
they experienced and observed.  
Despite administrator Dan Goldin’s efforts in the early 1990s to uproot the “male, 
pale, and stale” nature of NASA’s ranks and to promote diversity in hiring, in 1993, 120 
black scientists and engineers filed a class action.524 The case “contend[ed] that the 
Goddard Space Flight Center discriminated against African American non-managerial, 
non-supervisory scientists and engineers who were eligible for but did not receive 
promotions to the GS- 14 and GS-15 levels.”525 The parties settled in 2002; NASA did 
not admit wrongdoing.526 The Settlement, overseen by the EEOC, provided $3.75 million 
in economic relief. The Settlement appointed independent experts to help Goddard 
improve how they assessed employee performance and awarded promotions, and 
members of the class (and others) would be awarded promotions after merit-based 
reviews. Another outside consultant would evaluate and suggest changes to Goddard’s 
EEO complaint resolution processes. The Settlement also stipulated that Goddard would 
provide additional training to managers and supervisors on issues like employee 
development, EEO, and diversity.527 While this case did not concern Headquarters, it 
 
524 Albert A. Harrison and Edna R. Fiedler, “Behavioral Health” in Psychology of Space 
Exploration: Contemporary Research in Historical Perspective, ed. By Douglas A. 
Vakoch, Washington DC: NASA History Program Office, 2011, 40; Sawyer, Kathy. 
“The Man in the Moon.” The Washington Post, 20 July 1994, accessed 6 February 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1994/07/20/the-man-on-the-
moon/0fc3cc3d-ea96-401d-9947-302ad1edad5a/ 
525 “NASA Goddard and Class Agree to Settle Race Discrimination Suit,” Inside 
Wallops, Volume XX-02, Number 13 May 6, 2002, National Aeronautics and Space 




demonstrates the truth of MEAN’s allegation of “system-wide discrimination at 
NASA.”528 
In 2014, a motion was filed with the EEOC to certify a class action representing 
over 2,000 black and Asian American NASA employees in GS grades 13-15. The claims 
are similar to those raised in the MEAN case “alleging discrimination in performance 
appraisal ratings that result in lower compensation and lesser promotion opportunities for 
members of those two racial groups.”529 The administrative judge assigned to the case did 
not rule on the case for five years; in 2019 it was reassigned to a different judge, but by 
March 2020, the class was still awaiting certification.530 The EEOC and court systems 
have not shown to be an effective or efficient tool for change in NASA’s treatment of 
minority employees.     
Reflections: NASA Institutional Memory & Race Relations 
In 2018, Congress renamed the street in front of NASA Headquarters “Hidden 
Figures Way,” alluding to the film (2016) and award-winning book authored by Margot 
Lee Shetterly, which tells the story of three black women, Katherine Johnson, Dorothy 
Vaughan, and Mary Jackson who were employees at NASA Langley. NASA hoped that 
this renaming would honor these women, “as well as all women who honorably serve 
their country, advancing equality, and contributing to the United States space 
 
528 Judge Charles Richey affirmed Headquarters “overall responsibility” for all NASA 
personnel policy. Order, Charles Richey, 2 Mar 1976, Barrett v USCS & MEAN v 
Fletcher, Vol 1, 12/16/74 - 7/27/76, Box 41 NARA I.  
529 “NASA Race Discrimination,” Mehri & Skalet PLLC,  
https://findjustice.com/cases/nasa-race-discrimination/ (accessed 7 Feb 2020).  
530 Michael Lieder, phone conversation with the author, 13 Feb 2020; Mehri & Skalet, 
https://findjustice.com/attorneys/michael-lieder/ (accessed 12 Feb 2020).   
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program.”531 This event was NASA’s public-focused attempt to deal with its 
discriminatory past which Shetterly’s work had highlighted. The book and film 
highlighted issues of discrimination on the basis of race and sex intertwined. However, 
NASA chose to generalize the event to all women, and continue to leave them hidden by 
not using actual names.  
Three white men, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine, D.C. Council Chairman 
Phil Mendelson, and Senator Ted Cruz were the main speakers, along with author Margot 
Lee Shetterly. But perhaps even the individuals involved were not attentive to NASA’s 
own history. Administrator Jim Bridenstine announced that Hidden Figures was “a very 
prominent book that became a magnificent movie that started a movement that brought 
all of us here today.”532  
Margot Lee Shetterly spoke at the dedication, and her comments touched on a fear 
of some older black NASA employees, that their names and struggles will be glossed 
over and forgotten, “let it [the street name] also remind us of the Hidden Figures way, 
which is to open our eyes to contribution of the people around us so that their names, too, 
are the ones that we remember at the end of the story.”533 To some blacks associated with 
NASA, the “new movement” Brindenstine referred to looked identical to all NASA’s 
previous efforts. NASA has, in some way, celebrated Black History Month and black 
 
531 “Sign of Progress: Street Renaming Puts NASA Headquarters on Hidden Figures 
Way” 12 June 2019, ed by Karen Northon, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/sign-of-
progress-street-renaming-puts-nasa-headquarters-on-hidden-figures-way (accessed 6 Feb 
2020). 
532 Emphasis added. Ibid. 
533 Ibid. 
 152 
firsts at NASA since the late 1960s. Gloria Taliaferro offered her perspective on NASA’s 
black history efforts, exemplified by this street renaming,  
I think it’s full of crap. That [Hidden Figures] is a d— movie. We had—we have a 
lot of “hidden figures” at NASA…that’s a bunch of crap. I don’t know whose 
idea that [renaming] was “give a dog a bone—give them something.” That’s full 
of sh—. I’m not happy about it. And from what I heard—who was there at the 
Agency? I wouldn’t go there for sh—…That’s a bunch of political BS.534  
 
Shetterly proposed a lesson to all listening at the dedication, “Hidden Figures is about 
taking off our blinders and recognizing the contributions of the unseen 
individuals…whose persistence and whose courage have delivered us to where we are 
today.”535 For NASA, removing blinders must include not only celebrating the excellent 
contributions of black employees, but also recognizing times when individuals were 
barred from contributing to their fullest ability and recognizing the deep injustice of 
discrimination.  Throughout the course of the MEAN case, NASA consistently refused to 
frankly define and recognize discrimination. Without this fundamental shift, the agency 
will continue to perpetuate injustice.  
 Many individuals benefited by privilege refuse to believe discrimination occurs in 
employment believing that they have earned their positions through personal merit alone. 
Perhaps it is human to avoid recognizing and confronting the structures that offer oneself 
privilege and security.  However, the example of white men at NASA complaining about 
reverse discrimination highlights that to some perceive steps toward equality as 
 
534 Gloria Taliaferro, Interview by Ruth Calvino. Oral interview. Oxon Hill, MD, 20 July 
2019.  
535 NASA, “A Sign of Progress: Honoring NASA’s Hidden Figures.” YouTube video, 
1:16, 12 Jun 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6NGgs8S4qs  
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personally threatening. To desire justice often means putting others above one’s own self-
interest.  
Racial injustice is often perpetuated by ignorance, whether willful or negligent. 
As the MEAN case demonstrated, employee-supervisor relationships strained under the 
pressure of cultural or personality differences. But supervisors rarely admitted that these 
differences were present, instead claiming a colorblind attitude which only further buried 
the problems. When black employees started conversations around race, white 
supervisors, perhaps uncomfortable, unequipped, or too busy, quickly shut down these 
essential conversations, refusing to believe there was anything to talk about.  
 Individuals in positions of power did not see a problem; perhaps nothing in their 
personal experiences gave them context to experientially understand the problems 
minority employees faced. When black employees brought up harassment and 
discrimination they experienced, people in power refused to call these injustices by their 
correct names, leading to frustration and deeper mistrust. Many of these supervisors 
defended themselves, saying they listened, had empathy, or felt badly for the individual. 
But yet they could not or would not see these injustices for what they were. It is 
uncomfortable and messy work to reckon with how one’s own actions and deeply held 
beliefs may negatively impact another individual.  
The MEAN case is a powerful example of what happens when people in positions 
of power seem determined to keep their blinders on. The persistent and the courageous 
suffer because of that attitude, demonstrated by the unending stream of cases since the 
MEAN settlement. In the midst of the agency’s public celebrations of black history, 
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administrators and many white employees seem to remain unaware of the actual 
experiences of NASA’s black employees and have made little progress in listening to and 
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